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Abstract 
Nitrate discharges from diffuse agricultural sources have long term effects on 
groundwater and surface water quality. Market-based instruments have been proposed 
as a means of balancing the demand for nitrate intensive farming and the capacity of 
the natural water bodies to dilute nitrates. Trading is complicated by the dispersed, 
delayed, and protracted effects of diffuse sources. Market mechanisms proposed to date 
have failed to incorporate these physical characteristics of nitrate pollution correctly. 
We propose a new market mechanism for allocating and pricing nitrate discharge 
permits, based on the design of modern electricity markets which use LP models to find 
optimal prices and dispatch schedules. The system operates as a centralized auction. 
The sources submit bids to the auction indicating the benefits gained from each unit of 
nitrate discharge. The auction operator runs an LP which maximises the benefits from 
trade, subject to a set of environmental and operational constraints. The LP solution 
produces the optimal prices and allocations relative to the economic values indicated in 
the bids.  
Our contributions include alternative LP models to suit different hydro-geological and 
socio-economic conditions. We present a generalized LP model which can include 
constraints that describe nitrate residence and transport in groundwater and surface 
water, the ability of water bodies to accept nitrates, and the operational limitations of 
the commercial sources. We show how to adapt available methods to incorporate the 
complex physical systems into an optimisation model. We present a double-sided 
market model which allows the polluters to buy permits, and environmental agents to 
lease out the ability of the natural water resources to accept nitrates. The model allows 
the providers of environmental services to participate in the market as sellers.             
 iii 
 
We build up and prove the concepts by explaining the prices and allocations produced 
by the LP models. Based on the theory of nodal pricing applied in electricity markets, 
we discuss the price structures and relationships and show how the prices would reflect 
the spatial and temporal effects of diffuse nitrate discharges. We interpret the 
information generated from the outcomes of trading and discuss how the available tools 
and information can be used by the market participants to optimize their bids. We 
expand the proposed market model to include point sources, and identify the factors 
that determine the extent to which the point and nonpoint sources can trade with each 
other. In addition, we develop measures of the extent to which the diffuse sources 
themselves can trade with each other. We demonstrate the models and the resulting 
prices and allocations, using a catchment nitrate transport model. 
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Chapter 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Tragedy of Global Fresh Water Resources  
Water pollution is a tragedy of the commons that both rich and poor nations are 
striving to mitigate. Many of the world‘s largest fresh water rivers and aquifers are 
already contaminated (Jeantheau, 2005). According to United Nation‘s statistics, 
twenty percent of the global population lack access to safe drinking water (UNEP, 
2008).  Each year, 5 to 10 million people die from water related diseases (Jeantheau, 
2005). The roots of this hazard lie in the conventional perception of fresh water as a 
common freely available resource; everyone‘s resource is treated as no one‘s resource 
(Hardin, 1968); and everyone pollutes water for short-sighted economic benefits.  
The largest water polluters are commercial entities such as large scale crop and 
livestock farms and manufacturing plants. The so-called polluters provide products 
and services, national wealth, employment, and luxurious living, even at the cost of 
ecosystem health. The world needs factories, farms, cities, and economic 
development. Neither the economic benefits nor the quality of the environment should 
be totally forgone for the sake of the other; instead we have to find a compromise.  
Fortunately, the self-purification ability of water and the bio-chemical processes of the 
natural water cycle allow us to load some amount of pollutants into water systems. 
The question confronted by mankind today is how to distribute this limited pollution 
intake capacity of water among many competing interests.  
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1.2 Tradable Permits for Water Pollution 
Tradable permit programs have recently appeared as a potential solution to the 
problem of allocating pollution rights efficiently. The success of air pollution permit 
trading programs in the West has motivated the idea. Two important factors have 
contributed to the success of air pollution trading: (1) creation of a tradable 
standardized commodity which is capable of achieving environmental goals and (2) 
ability to achieve the environmental goals at least cost by designing the trading 
program to be as efficient and attractive as possible (Schary & Fisher-Vanden, 2004).  
However, some sources of water pollution, especially agriculture, have delayed and 
dispersed effects, making it difficult to identify a standardized commodity which is 
capable of achieving environmental goals over time and space. From the polluter‘s 
view, the right to discharge is the valued commodity, while from the public view, the 
sustainable pollutant intake capacity of water is the valued commodity. The trading 
programs should be designed to minimise the cost of trading commodities viewed 
differently.  Therefore, the market design has significant effects on the performance of 
water pollution trading programs; institutional settings and participant behaviour 
(demand and supply) are also important (Kochtcheeva, 2009).  
Though significant effort has been made to design market-based mechanisms for 
allocating water pollution permits, ―much remains to be done in the area of diffuse 
sources‖ (O'Shea, 2002).  Research to date is mostly dedicated to allocating emission 
rights to municipal and industrial entities who discharge effluents directly into the 
rivers (point sources). One reason is that the United States, the country which has 
pioneered emission permit trading and has the most on-the-ground, active water 
pollution permit trading programs, does not regulate agricultural discharges, and thus 
the trading programs are usually focused on point sources ignoring the diffuse 
agricultural sources.  
The effects of diffuse (nonpoint) sources spread widely over time and space, so the 
management of diffuse sources requires an integration of physical and economic 
models. Recent attempts to develop market-based instruments are based on 
simplifications of the physical systems (US EPA 2007; NIWA 2009), rather than 
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integration. The ability of such systems to achieve environmental goals over time and 
space cannot be guaranteed.  
1.3 Scope of the Work and Contributions    
This thesis is about the design of a trading program (a market mechanism) for 
allocating water pollution permits. We focus specifically on designing a market for 
trading nitrate discharge permits in agricultural watersheds, with particular concern on 
diffuse agricultural sources but considering all types of pollutant sources. We choose 
nitrate in particular because it is a critical agricultural water pollutant which affects 
both groundwater and surface water, and the way nitrate pollution works is complex 
compared to the other pollutants. However, we develop the models and the concepts 
so that they are adoptable and applicable to other water pollutants as well as other 
environmental problems.  
The first stage of the work is identifying the characteristics of the problem:  the issues 
related to trading nitrate discharge permits which arise from the hydro-geology of the 
watershed, characteristics of different types of polluters, and environmental goals.  
The second stage is designing a trading program to be able to addresses all those 
issues. In the market design process, we study how to define the permits, what serves 
as the basis for trading; how to deal with the spatial and temporal complexity in nitrate 
transport via groundwater; how to set the time frames for trading; how the trading 
system should interface with different users; how the required information is obtained, 
processed, and shared; and, how the market is operated. 
The proposed trading framework is based on the architecture of modern electricity 
markets which use LP models to find the optimal prices and allocations, but we have 
incorporated features of successful emission and water pollution trading programs.  
Since the market design is based on optimisation models, the next stage of the work is 
about developing LP models for the market. We study the physical and economic 
constraints which drive the prices and allocations, include them in the LP models, and 
discuss their effects on prices and allocations.  
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A considerable portion of this thesis is dedicated to interpreting and explaining the 
prices and allocations produced by the LP models. Based on the theory of nodal 
pricing applied in electricity markets, we discuss the price structures and relationships. 
We show how the prices would reflect the spatial and temporal effects of diffuse 
nitrate discharges. We interpret the important information generated from the 
outcomes of trading, for example, the economic values of investment in treatment and 
remediation projects to remove nitrates from water bodies.   
We present various design options and extensions and their consequences on prices 
and allocations. We discuss favourable institutional, behavioural, and natural settings 
for the proposed trading system, and how to adopt the market design and the models 
to facilitate trade under various conditions.   
The key contributions of this thesis are summarized below.  
1. Identification of hydro-geological factors that should be considered in trading 
nitrate discharge permits, mainly time lags, attenuation, and protracted delivery 
profiles associated with nitrate transport in groundwater. Also, the additional 
difficulties that arise from the presence of multiple receptors and point and 
nonpoint sources together are recognized. 
2. Adaptation of the ―response matrix technique‖ to be used in a tradable permit 
program as a proxy for an integrated physical model to describe the 
groundwater solute transport system.  
3. Guidelines for selecting the spatial and temporal measures of water quality, as 
the basis for a trading program. We discuss how to select the planning horizon, 
the time intervals at which the water quality constraints should be imposed, 
and other time-related parameters, based on the available hydro-geological 
information, to meet the requirements of a market mechanism. We also discuss 
the issues arising from the choice of type, location, and number of receptors; 
and how to choose a compromise.   
4. A basic LP which models the essentials of a market in nitrite discharge permits 
among nonpoint sources. The basic model includes the effects of nitrate 
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transport in groundwater using the response matrix technique. Permit 
allocations are constrained by the ability of the receptors to accept and dilute 
nitrates, and the bids submitted by the participants.  
5. A generalized LP model which can include all types of generally applicable 
physical and economic constraints. The generalized model allows constraints 
that describe nitrate residence and transport in surface water, together with the 
response matrix which describes nitrate transport in groundwater. The model 
can include other physical limitations in the water system as well as demand-
side (private) restrictions. 
6. A double-sided market model which allows the polluters to buy permits, and 
the environmental (or public) agents to sell (or lease out) the ability of the 
natural water resources to accept and dilute nitrates. The model allows third 
parties, such as providers of environmental services who have the ability to 
remove nitrates from water bodies, to participate in the market as sellers.             
7. Information for the market participants to optimize their behaviour in the 
market. The participant-side optimisation is beyond the scope of this thesis; we 
discuss how the market participants can use available information to optimise 
their bids and offers.    
8. Expansion of the market models to include point sources and identification of 
the factors that determine the extent to which the two types of pollution 
sources can interact in the market.  
9. Measures of the ability of the nonpoint sources to trade with each other.    
10. Ideas for expanding the market models to include the effects of surface runoff, 
profit function discontinuities (integer constraints), and compliance-related 
penalties and rewards; setting initial permit allocations; and applying the 
models and concepts to other environmental problems.   
Additionally, we provide numerical demonstrations of the models and their outcomes 
using a small case study.   
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 is about water pollution from nitrates. We discuss the ways by which 
nitrates migrate to groundwater and surface water, and the consequences of having 
nitrate in water. We summarise the available tools and techniques to measure and 
control water pollution from nitrates. 
Chapter 3 presents the non-market based approaches to the optimal control of water 
pollution. We discuss the literature on integrated simulation and optimisation based 
approaches to the optimal control of nitrate pollution from nonpoint sources. Both 
convex and non-convex optimisation models are discussed. 
Chapter 4 covers the main body of literature relevant for this work, about state-of-the-
art water pollution permit trading systems.  
Chapter 5 is about the physical characteristics of the problem addressed in this thesis. 
Having understood the way nitrate pollution works, we discuss the basic requirements 
of a market-based approach for allocating nitrate discharge permits. We analyse the 
applicability of the available systems discussed in Chapter 4 and highlight the 
difficulties of using them for nitrates and nonpoint sources. In addition, we analyse the 
market designs for other resources such as electricity which have similar complexity, 
and highlight the applicability for pollution permit trading, especially for nitrates and 
nonpoint sources.  
Chapter 6 proposes a new market mechanism for allocating nitrate discharge permits 
among nonpoint sources. The market is designed to use an LP to find the optimal 
prices and allocations ex-ante.             
Chapter 7 presents the basic and generalised LP models discussed under the thesis 
contributions 5 and 6 above. Different types of applicable constraints are also 
discussed. This chapter includes interpretations and explanations of the prices and 
allocations generated by the LP models, price structures and relationships, gains from 
trade, and issues related to settlement. 
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Chapter 8 presents the double sided market discussed under thesis contribution 7 
above. We present another LP model for this market which facilitates the pollution 
sources and environmental agents to trade different commodities in a combined 
market.   
Chapter 9 is for the market participants, mainly the agricultural sources and the 
environmental authorities who participate in the market as environmental agents. We 
do not present any participant-side optimisation model, but we discuss the information 
that would be useful for the participants to optimise their decisions. 
Chapter 10 presents numerical demonstrations of the results (prices and allocations) 
generated from the models discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. This chapter covers the 
ways of dealing with initial (pre-trade) permit holdings also. 
Chapter 11 is about extending the market to include point sources, opportunities for 
trade between point and nonpoint sources, and the ability of the nonpoint sources 
themselves to trade with each other. This chapter highlights the physical and 
economic conditions under which the point and nonpoint sources can interact in the 
market. In addition we discuss some measures of the extent to which major players in 
the market (nonpoint sources) can trade with each other.   
Chapter 12 wraps up the thesis, discussing possible extensions and applications of the 
models and concepts, our conclusions, and directions for further research.            
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Chapter 2 
2 WATER POLLUTION AND NITRATES 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses on water pollution from nitrates. This chapter discusses the 
background of the problem addressed in this thesis. First, we discuss general concerns 
about water pollution, and then provide an introduction to nutrients pollution. We 
discuss nitrate pollution, being particularly concerned with nitrate transport in 
groundwater, a process which worsens nitrate pollution. We provide a brief overview 
of the general solute transport equation which is used to model nitrate transport in 
groundwater. Then we outline the essential concerns for the control of nitrate 
pollution. The chapter closes with a description of alternative pollution control 
policies applicable for nitrates.   
2.2 General Background: Water Pollution 
2.2.1 Water Pollution and Water Pollutants 
Water pollution is any undesirable change in the physical, chemical, or biological 
characteristics of water that can harmfully affect the health, survival, or activities of 
human or other living organisms (PCE, 2010). The most common water pollutants are 
nutrients, organic matter, heavy metals, microbial contaminants, toxic organic 
compounds (oil, pesticides, some plastics, industrial chemicals), salts, acids, sediment, 
suspended particles, and high temperature (Revenga & Mock, 2001). 
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Pollutants affect water quality in different ways. Usually water pollutants are not 
uniformly mixed in water whereas some air pollutants such as CO2 and GHG are 
considered to be uniformly mixed in the medium (Keudel, 2006). If a pollutant is 
uniformly mixed, the effects of discharge at any time at any location are the same, but 
with non-uniformly mixed pollutants, both the time and location of discharge matter. 
Some pollutants such as heavy metals and plastic wastes are accumulated in water 
bodies. In contrast, pollutants such as nutrients and salt are assimilative rather than 
accumulative, but the assimilative capacities of the water bodies are limited, beyond 
the limit they may be accumulated. This work is about a non-uniformly mixed 
assimilative water pollutant, nitrate.  
2.2.2 Groundwater and Surface Water Pollution 
Natural water that exists as groundwater or surface water is often contaminated by 
human activities. Streams and lakes are polluted mainly by municipal and industrial 
discharges, storm water runoff, and contaminated groundwater inflows. Groundwater 
pollution occurs from disposal or dissemination of pollutants on the land surface or 
into the soil, because these pollutants (for example, agricultural chemicals) 
contaminate the percolating waters that recharge the groundwater aquifers. In extreme 
circumstances, for example, in flood conditions, contaminated surface water may flow 
into groundwater aquifers.  
Surface water pollution is readily visible as a change of colour, smell, or appearance; 
growth of weeds; and extinction of aquatic species. Groundwater pollution, by 
contrast, remains invisible for a long time because groundwater flows slowly and does 
not flow towards a single outlet (Harter, 2003). As a consequence, groundwater 
pollution has delayed and dispersed effects. Natural cleanup of groundwater takes 
many years unless expensive treatments are carried out. As drinking water mostly 
comes from groundwater, significant effort has been made to prevent long terms 
hazards caused by groundwater pollution. In recent years, the US Department of 
Agriculture has spent $3.5 billion per year on conservation programs to reduce 
agricultural discharges, the number one source of groundwater pollution (Faeth, 
2000). Surface water pollution, worsened by groundwater pollution, still remains a 
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global hazard. Every year, about 2 million people, mostly children under five years, 
die from diseases caused by surface water pollution (UNEP, 2008).  
2.2.3 Point Sources and Nonpoint Sources 
Water pollution occurs from two types of sources, point sources and nonpoint sources. 
Sources that discharge effluents directly into water bodies through pipes, drains, or 
canals are called ―point sources‖. Processing and manufacturing plants, sewage 
treatment works, and urban waste water systems usually discharge effluents directly 
into waterways, and therefore they are point sources. Point sources have a single point 
of origin and are introduced into a receiving surface water body from a specific outlet. 
In contrast, ―nonpoint sources‖ are diffuse, they originate in a wider area, and hence 
they do not have a single point of origin.  Seepage and runoff of agricultural fertilizer, 
pesticides, and animal wastes from agricultural land are the major nonpoint source 
contributors of water pollution. Other nonpoint sources are urban and suburban storm 
water, mining, construction, and forestry.  
Damage from point and nonpoint sources occurs differently. Point sources instantly 
pollute surface water while nonpoint sources pollute both groundwater and surface 
water slowly over a long period. 
2.2.4 Traditional and Modern Sources of Pollution 
About a century ago, the major causes of water pollution were untreated human 
wastes and factory effluents (Ongley, 1996; Revenga & Mock, 2001). Today, 
developed  countries have managed to reduce the adverse effects of these point 
sources through treatment and disposal technologies and pollution laws, whereas 
many developing countries are still struggling with the conventional water pollution 
sources such as sewage and industrial effluents (Revenga & Mock, 2001).  Still, the 
developed countries are suffering from rising nonpoint source pollution caused by 
agriculture, storm water runoff, mining, construction, and other development 
activities. For many developed countries in North America and Europe, intensive 
agriculture is the single greatest threat to their precious water resources (OCED, 2008; 
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Ongley, 1996; Revenga & Mock, 2001; Ribaudo, Horan, & Smith., 1999; USGS, 
1999). 
2.2.5 Agricultural Pollution 
Global agriculture, which includes crops, livestock, aquaculture, and forestry, is the 
main source of the world‘s food supply (UNESCO, 2003), but an emerging threat to 
fresh water resources. Agricultural fertilizers, pesticides, manure, and livestock 
effluents are significant causes of water pollution. Agricultural pollutants include 
nutrients (mainly nitrogen and phosphorus), sediment, pesticides, salts, and pathogens 
(Ribaudo, et al., 1999). The cause of high nutrient concentrations in most rivers and 
aquifers is the ―increased use of manure and manufactured fertilizer in global 
agriculture‖ (Revenga & Mock, 2001). The US EPA has declared agriculture to be the 
―leading source of impairment in the nation's rivers and lakes‖ (Ongley, 1996). Rising 
nutrients pollution in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hungary, Portugal, Spain and 
many other countries is related to the expansion of agricultural production (OCED, 
2008).  In New Zealand, some rivers flowing across pastoral land fail to meet 
environmental guidelines, while shallow groundwater aquifers in dairying catchments 
are under threat (OCED, 2008).  
2.3 Nutrient Pollution 
2.3.1 Nutrients in Water  
Nutrients are chemical elements and combinations of elements that all living beings 
need to grow and survive (Mueller & Helsel, 1996). Water systems need nutrients, but 
excess nutrients in water bodies cause serious problems. The most commonly found 
nutrients in water are nitrogen and phosphorus. In water bodies, they are found in 
various forms such as nitrate, nitrite, ammonia, organic nitrogen (in the form of plant 
material or other organic compounds), and phosphates (orthophosphate and others). 
Nitrate is the most widespread form of nitrogen, and phosphate is the most widespread 
form of phosphorus found in natural water bodies (Mueller & Helsel, 1996). 
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2.3.2 Surface Water Pollution from Nutrients  
The major sources of nutrients in surface water are sewage treatment facilities, soil 
erosion and runoff from agricultural land, and contaminated groundwater inflows.  
Surface water may contain all types of nutrients, including nitrate, phosphate, and 
ammonia.  
Nutrients in surface water stimulate plant growth (algae and other weeds). The process 
of nutrient enrichment in water bodies causing plant growth is called ―eutrophication.‖ 
Intensive growth of algae and other weeds in surface waters prevents sunlight 
infiltrating deep waters, reduces the dissolved oxygen level in water, and disturbs the 
natural habitat. Once these algae die, the decomposition process consumes available 
oxygen and creates a shortage of oxygen in the ecosystem, threatening the lives of fish 
and other aquatic species (Wiederholt & Johnson, 2005). The shortage of oxygen in 
water is called ―hypoxia.‖ Excess nutrients in surface waters have other adverse 
effects such as clogged pipelines and reduced recreational opportunities (Ribaudo, et 
al., 1999).  
2.3.3 Groundwater Pollution from Nutrients 
Nitrate is the most widespread nutrient in groundwater. Agriculture and septic systems 
are the major causes. Section 2.4 provides more discussion on how and why nitrate 
migrates to groundwater, and the consequences of groundwater pollution from 
nitrates. 
2.3.4 Ocean Pollution from Nutrients 
The consequences of nutrient discharge into water do not end in the receiving water 
bodies, but continue towards the oceans. Nutrients carried down to the oceans via 
rivers cause ocean dead zones. The Gulf of Mexico dead zone is steadily extending 
due to nutrient pollution in US rivers (Alexander et al., 2008). The Mississippi River 
alone carries about 0.95 million metric tonnes of nitrate pollution into the Gulf 
annually (USGS, 2000).   
13 
 
 
 
2.4 Nitrate Pollution 
2.4.1 Significance and Global Intensity 
High nitrate concentration in water is a major (perhaps the most severe) water 
pollution problem. Most of the rivers in Europe have ―nitrate levels four times the 
norms found in nature‖ (Lenntech Water Treatment & Air Purification Holding B.V., 
2006). Although nitrate pollution tends to be severe in Europe and North America, the 
threat is global, and high nitrate concentrations are recorded in China and South 
Africa also (Revenga & Mock, 2001; Staff of World Resources Program, 1998). In 
New Zealand‘s Waikato region, groundwater nitrate levels commonly exceed the 
national drinking water standards owing to intensive market gardening and livestock 
farming (Wright, 2007). Surplus nitrates in water harm the aquatic ecosystems as 
explained above, and high nitrate concentration in drinking water can cause illness. In 
particular, excess nitrates in drinking water can cause ―blue baby" syndrome in infants 
(Wiederholt & Johnson, 2005). Chronic exposure to high nitrate levels cause diuresis, 
increased starchy deposits, and haemorrhage of the spleen (US EPA, 2006). 
2.4.2 How Does Nitrate Migrate to Groundwater and Surface Water? 
Nitrate migration to fresh water is mainly a consequence of nitrogen overload on the 
land surface. Nitrogen (N) is an essential nutrient for all living organisms and is 
abundant in the atmosphere as nitrogen gas (N2), but the plants cannot take up 
atmospheric nitrogen gas. Plants can take up nitrogen in two solid forms: ammonium 
(NH4
+) and nitrate (No3
-). Plants consume nitrate and ammonium from the soil and 
animals obtain nitrogen by consuming living or dead organic matter that contains 
nitrogen.  
Intensive application of nitrogen fertilizer and manure on agricultural land improves 
crop harvest. Nitrogen fertilizer products include ammonia (NH3), ammonium nitrate 
(NH4NO3), ammonium sulphate ([NH4]2SO2), and urea. Organic nitrogen is found in 
manure, sewage waste, compost, decaying leaves and trees, and dead animal parts. In 
the soil, nitrogen contained in organic matter is converted into ammonia, and then to 
ammonium, by some soil organisms. Ammonium is converted into nitrate through a 
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process called ―nitrification.‖ Nitrate in the soil may be taken up by plants, subjected 
to de-nitrification1, carried down to surface water bodies by surface or sub-surface 
runoff, or leach into the groundwater aquifer. This process is explained by the 
―nitrogen cycle‖ shown in Figure 2.1 below.  
 
Figure 2.1: Nitrogen Cycle. 
In agricultural catchments, due to intensive fertilizer usage and deposition of organic 
wastes, soil nitrate content usually exceeds plant demand and the de-nitrification 
                                               
1
De-nitrification is a process which converts nitrate into nitrogen gas (Conan, Bouraoui, Turpin, Marsily, & 
Bidoglio, 2003; Deutsch, Gruber, Key, & Sarmiento, 2001; Korom, 1992).  Nitrate and the intermediate 
products of the de-nitrification process (nitrite and nitric oxide) serve as electron accepters for the 
oxidization of organic and inorganic compounds. Usually de-nitrification is high in anaerobic (low oxygen 
concentration) conditions (Deutsch, et al., 2001). Availability of organic matter and other chemical 
compounds which provide electrons from oxidation (for example, pyrite FeS2) stimulate de-nitrification. 
De-nitrification may take place in soils, groundwater, surface water, wetlands, and oceans depending on the 
availability of favourable conditions. 
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capacity of the soil. The surplus nitrate is lost to the environment via runoff or 
leaching, mainly due to the high solubility of nitrate.  However, soil nitrate has a 
greater potential to leach down to groundwater aquifers than to be carried down by 
surface runoff (Czapar, Laflen, McIsaac, & McKenna, 2005). In groundwater, nitrate 
moves at approximately the same rate as water, and often ends up in surface water 
through groundwater flux. Nitrate is quite persistent in water, and likely to remain in 
water until consumed by some plants or taken away by some external process (US 
EPA, 2006). 
Apart from groundwater discharge, surface water bodies such as streams and lakes 
receive nitrates from municipal and industrial point sources. Sewage treatment plants 
are the major point sources of nitrates.  
2.4.3 Soil Nitrogen Balance and Estimating Nitrate Loading 
The amount of nitrate leaching (loading) from soil to groundwater is usually estimated 
from the soil nitrogen balance equation. The soil nitrogen balance measures the 
difference between the total nitrogen input (mainly from fertilisers and livestock 
manure), and the sum of plant uptake (mainly crops and forage) and nitrogen loss due 
to de-nitrification (OCED, 2001). A surplus means potential environmental pollution, 
because the surplus is most likely to leach into the groundwater system as nitrate.  
Precise estimates of nitrate leaching to groundwater and loss due to surface or 
subsurface runoff can be obtained from a detailed simulation of the nitrogen cycle 
(Neitsch, Arnold, Kiniry, & Williams, 2005; Pohlert, Huisman, Breuer, & Frede, 
2007).  The amount of nitrate leaching from soil to groundwater depends on regional 
climate, geography, soil properties, type of crop, type of livestock, and farm 
management practices. Many computer programs are available to simulate the 
nitrogen cycle and calculate the nitrate leaching, given the above parameters as inputs. 
SWAT (Neitsch, et al., 2005) and GLEAMS (Knisel, 1993) are some commonly used 
soil models which have the capability to estimate the nitrate leaching. OVERSEER is 
a computer based nutrient budget program used in New Zealand to estimate the 
nitrogen loss to the environment from agricultural land uses. The amount of nitrogen 
lost from land use is usually considered as the amount that leaches into the underlying 
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aquifer, assuming that the amount of nitrogen carried away by surface and subsurface 
runoff is negligible. 
2.4.4 Nitrate Fate in Groundwater and Surface Water 
Nitrates discharged into surface water may be taken up by aquatic plants and species, 
subjected to de-nitrification, or carried down towards the oceans. Oxygen depletion 
and availability of organic matter may stimulate surface water de-nitrification.  
The fate of leached nitrates in groundwater is determined by complex hydro-
geological processes described by groundwater science. Nitrate may flow with 
groundwater (advection), disperse away from groundwater flow directions 
(dispersion), or transform into other chemical forms (chemical reaction).  
Because groundwater flow is relatively slow compared to surface water, nitrate may 
travel with groundwater for many decades until being discharged into a surface water 
body. As groundwater does not usually travel towards a single outlet, nitrate leached 
from the same location may end in different outlets over different time scales. 
Therefore, nitrate pollution is strongly related to nitrate transport in groundwater. 
2.5  Nitrate Transport in Groundwater  
2.5.1 Scientific Background 
The foundation for the science of solute transport in groundwater was Darcy‘s (1856) 
experimental results on groundwater flow in a porous medium (Zheng & Bennett, 
2002). The efforts of Darcy and many of his followers resulted in the development of 
mathematical formulations which describe solute transport in groundwater. These 
general formulations are used to model nitrate transport in groundwater and to 
estimate the nitrate concentration across space and time caused by spatially distributed 
and temporally variable sources.     
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2.5.2 Groundwater Solute Transport Equation 
The partial differential equation which describes the fate and transport of a 
contaminant in a three-dimensional transient groundwater flow system is given below 
(Zheng & Bennett, 2002).  
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C = dissolved concentration of the contaminant species, gm-3. 
x,y,z = distance along the respective Cartesian coordinate axis, m. 
t = time, s. 
qx, qy, qz,= Darcy velocities, in the directions x, y, and z, ms
-1. 
θ = porosity, dimensionless. 
qs = volumetric flow rate per unit volume of the aquifer from sources (positive) and 
sinks (negative), s-1. 
Cs = concentration of the contaminant species in water that is added or removed, gm
-3.  
Dxx, Dxy, Dxz, Dyx, Dyy, Dyz, Dzx, Dzy, Dzz = Components of the dispersion tensor, m
2s-1. 
Rn = chemical sink/source term for n
th reaction, ∑nRn represents the rate of change in 
solute mass due to n = 1, 2, …, N chemical reactions. 
In the above formulation, the dissolved concentration C is a time varying scalar field 
(a function of x, y, z, and t) which represents the concentration at some location (x,y,z) 
in a groundwater system at some time instant (t). The right-hand-side of the equation 
describes the net loss of pollutant mass from the control volume (x,y,z) due to mass 
outflows and inflows. The terms in the right-hand-side represent the mass flows 
caused by four different hydrological and external processes: advection, dispersion, 
chemical reactions and external sources and sinks. A detailed discussion on the 
components of the equation is given in Appendix A.     
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Moreover, this transport equation assumes that the change in concentration that occurs 
in some location in the aquifer, at some instance in time, is a function of the following 
factors. 
1. Properties of the subsurface strata (affect θ, Dij, qi, and Rn). 
2. Groundwater flow in the aquifer (affects Dij and qi). The flow terms (qi) are 
obtained from a groundwater flow simulation as discussed in Appendix A.  
3. Properties of the contaminant species (affect Dij and Rn). 
4. Sources and sinks of the contaminant species (affect qs, Cs, and qi) 
The above general solute transport equation is used to study nitrate transport in 
groundwater. Advective transport is dominant in most aquifers (Hadfield, 2008). 
Hence if the external sources are fixed, the groundwater flow regime which 
determines qi is the main factor that affects the changes in concentration. A detailed 
discussion on the components of the equation is given in Appendix A.   
2.5.3 Mathematical Models of Contaminant Transport in Groundwater 
A mathematical model of a solute transport system consists of (1) the governing 
equations discussed above, (2) initial conditions specifying the initial level of 
contamination in the model domain, i.e., the concentration when t = 0, and (3) 
boundary conditions specifying the ways the model domain communicates with areas 
outside the model domain. Boundary conditions include fixed head or concentration 
boundaries and no-flow boundaries. By solving the mathematical model, we can 
obtain the concentration distribution over space and time. 
2.5.4 Computer Codes for Contaminant Transport Simulation  
The term transport simulation usually refers to the use of computer programs to 
develop and solve the mathematical models of contaminant transport.  Many computer 
codes have been developed to obtain approximate solutions to the partial differential 
equation of contaminant transport in groundwater, or sometimes the coupled equations 
of groundwater flow and contaminant transport. MT3D (Zheng, 1990) is a three-
dimensional solute transport code which solves the transport equation using the flow 
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terms obtained from the solution of the groundwater flow model. MT3D can be linked 
to a groundwater flow model, from which it can obtain the flow solution. MODFLOW 
(Harbaugh, Banta, Hill, & McDonald, 2000) is the most commonly used computer 
code to solve groundwater flow problems. MF2K-GWT (USGS, 2006) is an enhanced 
version of MODFLOW-2000 which simulates both solute transport and groundwater 
flow. 
2.5.5 Nitrate Transport Modelling 
Nitrate transport in groundwater is usually modelled with MT3D and MODFLOW 
(Almasri & Kaluarachchi, 2005; Conan, et al., 2003; Molenat & Gascuel-Odoux, 
2002; D. S. Morgan & Everett, 2005). MT3D can model advective, dispersive, and 
reactive transport of nitrate in groundwater. Usually, nitrate does not form insoluble 
minerals, does not precipitate, and is not naturally adsorbed; hence, the only process 
by which nitrate is removed from groundwater is chemical transformation (Conan, et 
al., 2003). With MT3D, these reactions can be modelled as first-order irreversible rate 
reactions (Appendix A).  
Rather than using standard packages such as MT3D, some studies of nitrate transport 
use customised (or regionalized) mathematical models which simplify the general 
transport equation (for example, by assuming one-dimensional and purely advective 
transport) to simulate nitrate transport in groundwater (Barkle & Wang, 2005; 
Hoffmann et al., 2006). However, the validity of a simplified model is limited to the 
specific problem domain and the assumed hydro-geological conditions.   
The advantage of customised models is that they can be integrated with the simulation 
models of other processes in the nitrogen cycle, rather than separately simulating 
nitrate transport in groundwater. For example, the integrated models proposed by 
Flipo, Even, Poulin, Théry, and Ledoux (2007) and Wriedt and Rode (2007) simulate 
both soil nitrogen dynamics and nitrate transport in groundwater. These models are 
used to predict the effects of alternative agricultural management scenarios on water 
quality.  
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The preceding section was about modelling nitrate transport in groundwater, because 
groundwater is the major path of nitrate dissemination over space and time. However, 
tools and techniques are available for detailed modelling of nitrate transport in surface 
water. One such tool is QUAL2K (Pelletier & Chapra, 2004) which can model the 
transport of multiple reactive pollutants in streams. QUAL2K can model the 
variations in nitrate level along the streams.    
2.6 Essentials of Nitrate Pollution Control 
Given the complexity of the way nitrate pollution works, nitrate pollution control is a 
multidisciplinary task, requiring a collaborative effort of hydrologists, economists, 
environmental authorities, and all other stakeholders. Some essential considerations in 
nitrate control are discussed below.   
2.6.1 Integrated Catchment Based Approaches  
Groundwater and surface water pollution from point and nonpoint sources are inter-
connected. If only the direct discharges into the streams and lakes are monitored and 
controlled, nitrates loaded into the aquifers which take a long time to appear in the 
streams and lakes, can go beyond control.  If only nitrate loading into the aquifers 
from nonpoint sources were monitored and controlled, point source discharges into 
the streams and lakes may go beyond control. Therefore, integrated watershed based 
approaches or catchment scale approaches are highly recommended for the control of 
nitrate pollution (O'Shea, 2002).  
2.6.2 Manageable and Unmanageable Sources 
For efficient pollution control, it is important to identify all the manageable and 
unmanageable pollution sources in the problem domain. Manageable sources are those 
which can be controlled by human intervention.  
Agriculture, the number one source of nitrate in groundwater, is a manageable source. 
Fertilizer, dairy manure, livestock effluents, contaminated irrigation water, dairy 
lagoons, and most other hazardous agricultural practices are manageable. Non-
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agricultural manageable sources of groundwater nitrate include onsite wastewater 
disposal, leaky sewers, and solid waste disposal in landfills.  
Even though the sources of nitrate leaching into groundwater are manageable, once 
nitrate is in groundwater, it becomes highly unmanageable. The hydro-geological 
processes which determine when and where nitrate goes with groundwater are mostly 
beyond human control. Therefore, nitrate in the upper-catchment groundwater is an 
unmanageable source of nitrate in the lower-catchment groundwater and 
groundwater seepage is an unmanageable source of nitrate in surface water.  
All industrial and municipal point sources that discharge nitrate into surface water 
bodies are considered as manageable sources. Storm water runoff into streams and 
lakes (surface and near sub-surface runoff) is also controllable to some extent via land 
management and drainage systems. Rainwater, head waters, aquatic plants and species 
(birds, water fowls, etc.) are minor unmanageable sources of nitrate in surface water.  
Virtually all sources are controllable to some extent, but those sources which are 
difficult and too expensive to control are considered as unmanageable sources.  For 
example, there are methods and techniques to manage groundwater nitrates (building 
wetlands or laying underground barriers or absorbers to reduce nitrate flow from the 
region).  
2.6.3 Environmental Standards 
The environmental objective of nitrate control is to achieve sustainable nitrate levels 
in groundwater and surface water. National and international environmental 
authorities have set water quality standards (or maximum acceptable nitrate levels in 
water) to meet human and ecosystem health needs.  
According to New Zealand‘s national water quality guidelines, the maximum 
acceptable nitrate concentration in drinking water is 50 mg/l (MFE, 2009). The water 
quality guidelines specify maximum acceptable concentrations of nitrate (NO3), 
nitrate-nitrogen (NO3-N), or total nitrogen (T-N), because in water, nitrogen may be 
present in other forms such as ammonia (NH3). A nitrate concentration of 50 mg/l is 
the same as a NO3-N concentration of 11.3 mg/l (multiplying by a conversion factor 
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of 0.226). An internationally accepted T-N standard for drinking water is 10 mg/l. As 
discussed earlier, nitrate is the most widespread form of nitrogen found in water and it 
is usually assumed that NO3-N concentration = T-N concentration.  
For streams and lakes, the maximum acceptable values are more stringent to protect 
the ecosystem balance. For New Zealand streams, the maximum acceptable nitrate 
concentration in upland streams is 0.71 mg/l while the same in lowland streams is 
1.95 mg/l (MFE, 2009).  
2.6.4 Environmental Monitoring 
Given the environmental standards, nitrate concentration in groundwater and surface 
water should be continuously monitored to ensure that the standards are met. It is 
practically impossible to monitor and control nitrate level at all the points in an 
aquifer or a surface water body. Therefore, catchment planners usually select a few 
monitoring points to indicate the overall water quality in the catchment. These 
monitoring points are called ―receptors.‖ By definition, a receptor is a water body or a 
point on a water body where water quality is monitored.  
2.6.5 Models of Source Receptor Relationships 
To impose controls on the sources so that the water quality standards at the receptors 
are met, the regulators should know the relationship between the discharges at the 
source locations and the concentrations at the receptors. Numerical models of source-
receptor linkages play an important role in controlling nitrate pollution.  
2.6.6 Cost Efficiency 
The largest nitrate dischargers are commercial entities like large scale farms. 
Inevitably, nitrate discharge controls would hurt their economic performance. For 
example, restrictions on stocking rates, fertilizer use, and other nutrient management 
practices may wipe millions of dollars from the agricultural properties (Stringleman, 
2007). Therefore, management alternatives for controlling nitrate pollution should be 
evaluated based not only on the environmental performance, but the cost of those 
alternatives. Control efforts should be implemented in such a way that they minimise 
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the economic damage to commercial entities, so that they can remain competitive in 
the global market place.  
2.7 Policy Alternatives for Controlling Environmental Pollution 
Environmental protection is a national responsibility and governments use different 
policies to control environmental pollution. There are three major types of pollution 
control policies: direct controls, pollution taxes, and tradable permits (Ragan, 2001).  
2.7.1 Direct Controls 
Direct controls, also known as command-and-control policies, specify exactly what 
the consumers or polluting firms can do. They enforce quantitative limits on 
discharges, use of natural resources, or application of polluting chemicals. Usually, 
these limits are uniform standards across all consumers or firms, regardless of the 
differences in pollution reduction costs that individual firms may have. However, 
control costs may vary across firms owing to the variations in technologies adopted, 
equipment used, plant design, processes, and location. Consequently, requiring all 
firms to reduce pollution to the same level may be expensive because some firms 
incur relatively high costs in pollution reduction.  
2.7.2 Taxing 
Pollution taxes or charges require the polluters to pay a tax for every unit of pollution 
they produce. The history of tax policy for pollution control dates back to the 1920‘s, 
when Arthur C. Pigou first suggested that firms should pay for the harmful effects of 
their operations (Pigou, 1932). Pigou identified pollution as an economic externality. 
Externalities arise when the economic activities of some parties cause incidental 
injuries or benefits to other parties not directly involved in those activities (Baumol & 
Oates, 1975). The commercial operations of some firms cause pollution which harms 
many other people. Therefore, pollution is a negative externality. Pigou suggested 
taxes to discourage negative externalities and subsidies to encourage positive 
externalities.  
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A rational firm will reduce its pollution to a level where its marginal abatement cost 
equals the tax rate. However, selecting the right tax rate is the biggest challenge 
associated with this system. Ideally the tax rate should be set ―equal to the marginal 
benefits of cleanup at the efficient level of cleanup‖, but the regulator does not have 
prior knowledge of how the polluters will respond to a given tax rate (Stavins, 2003).  
Examples of pollution taxes include (Stavins, 2003): carbon tax schema adopted by 
the OCED (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries; unit 
charge systems for collecting municipal waste in the United States; and emission 
levies charged in China for air and water pollutants such as sulphur dioxide and 
carbon monoxide.    
2.7.3 Tradable Permits 
Tradable permits are licences issued by the government or a representative authority 
which allow the holder to produce a specified amount of a specified type of pollution 
for a specified period.  
The foundation for the theory of tradable permits was laid by Coase (1960) who 
challenged the Pigovian solution to the externalities. Coase proposed the tradable 
property rights approach as a better means of dealing with negative externalities. The 
popular Coase theorem states that if property rights are well defined, negotiation is 
costless, and transaction costs are negligible, then the parties will negotiate an 
efficient solution (a jointly maximising outcome) to the externality and no taxation is 
necessary. The theorem implies that tradable permits lead to cost efficient distribution 
of pollution rights if they are clearly defined and negotiation is possible.  
Coase‘s thoughts initiated a major shift in the direction of pollution control policy 
from regulation to market approach and opened up a new discussion on tradable 
pollution permit systems (Atkinson & Tietenberg, 1982; Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 
1972; Tietenberg, 1980).  
The pioneer of pollution permit trading systems is the United States. The US 
Environmental Protection Authority authorised the lead emission trading program in 
the 1980s to provide gasoline refineries with greater flexibility in meeting the 
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emission standards. The United States allowed the well known sulphur dioxide 
allowance trading program for acid rain control in 1990 under the Clean Air Act 
Amendment. Due to its continuing success, the sulphur dioxide trading system is 
considered as a benchmark for pollution trading systems.  
Most air pollution permit trading programs work in a similar manner. The government 
decides the total allowable level of pollution, which is distributed among polluters via 
pollution permits. The market for permits determines their price. Given the price, the 
firms which have low abatement costs will sell their permits, collect some money, and 
reduce their pollution. Those polluters who have higher abatement costs will buy 
permits at the market price, and save the cost of pollution reduction. Thus pollution 
will be reduced by those who can do it at least cost, and the required reduction will be 
achieved at the least total cost.  
A command and control strategy could also achieve this cost-minimising allocation of 
control burden, if the regulator knew the marginal abatement costs of each polluter 
and had authority to impose different levels of control on each polluter based on the 
abatement costs. This policy needs the regulator to have perfect information about the 
polluter‘s costs. In contrast, a market achieves the cost minimising allocation of 
permits without requiring the regulator to have this information. 
Despite the economic theory which favours tradable permits, all types of pollution 
control methods are present all over world (Stavins, 2003). Water pollution permit 
trading programs have not yet achieved significant success compared to air pollution 
permit trading programs, but a few exceptions are present. For example, two nutrient 
trading programs in the Minnesota River Basin in the United Sates (Fang, Easter, & 
Brezonik, 2005) and a salinity trading program in Hunter River valley in Australia 
(Environmental Protection Authority, 2003) have reported good environmental and 
economic performance.  
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Chapter 3 
3 OPTIMAL CONTROL OF WATER POLLUTION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about the non-market based (mainly command-and-control) 
approaches to efficient control of water pollution. We discuss both the general 
approaches to water pollution control and the specific approaches to nitrate pollution 
control. First, we discuss the theoretical concepts related to optimal pollution control. 
We discuss some early applications of mathematical programming techniques to 
control point source water pollution and some recent applications of the simulation-
optimisation approach to water pollution control from both point and nonpoint 
sources. The chapter highlights the requirements, limitations, and benefits of different 
non-market based mechanisms proposed for the optimal control of nitrate pollution.      
3.2 Optimal Control Theory 
Optimal control of pollution refers to the allocation of pollution rights or pollution 
reduction (abatement) responsibilities so that the environmental quality standards are 
met at the least cost to society. The pre-requisite for optimal pollution control is that 
the regulator knows the magnitude of benefits derived by each polluter from each unit 
of pollution produced (or cost incurred by each polluter from each unit of pollution 
reduction required). If such private information is available, the environmental 
regulator may model the optimal pollution control problem and solve it using some 
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optimisation technique to find the optimal allocation of pollution rights or pollution 
reduction responsibilities. The models may vary depending on the type of pollutant 
considered and the natural resources being polluted. However, all optimal pollution 
control models have some characteristics in common.  
3.2.1 A Formal Statement of the Optimal Pollution Control Problem 
Let us assume that a regional community wishes to protect their environment (water 
or air) from some pollutant species. The region has n = 1, 2, …, N sources of the 
pollutant and m = 1, 2, …, M receptors where the level of pollution is measured and 
controlled. Environmental quality standards at the receptors are given as q1, q2, …, qM. 
The environmental damage at each receptor m caused by each source n is a function of 
the source emission (the amount of the pollutant released into the environment, water 
or air) given by Dnm(en). The regional environmental regulator who represents the 
society‘s interest would like to find a set of emission levels e1, e2…, eN for the N 
sources, which minimise the joint total pollution control cost of the N sources. The 
pollution control cost of each source (the cost of adopting emission level en) is 
considered as a function of emission represented by Cn(en). The regulator‘s problem 
can be stated as follows. 
Minimise  ∑nCn(en)   
Subject to ∑nDnm(en) ≤ qm  for all m.  
en≥ 0 for all n. 
A distribution of pollution rights or abatement responsibilities which results in such an 
optimal emission vector is known as an optimal allocation of pollution permits. 
The above is a generalized version of the air pollution control model discussed in 
Montgomery (1972), McGartland and Oates (1985), and many others. It assumes that 
both emission and environmental damage occur at the same time, and therefore, the 
optimal control model is free from any inter-temporal considerations. The assumption 
holds for many water pollution control problems, mainly when only surface water 
pollution from point sources is considered, but it may not hold when groundwater and 
surface water pollution from nonpoint sources are considered. The model also 
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assumes that the environmental standards at the receptors are given after all 
unmanageable sources are accounted for.    
The cost functions are usually assumed to be convex, monotonically decreasing with 
emission (the higher the emission, the lower the abatement cost), and the response 
functions are assumed to be linear (Montgomery, 1972). Under these two conditions, 
the above pollution control model becomes a convex optimisation problem for which 
efficient solution algorithms are available. If the cost functions are linear too, the 
problem becomes a well-behaved, solvable linear programming problem.  
3.2.2 Optimal Control of Nitrate Pollution 
Due to the delayed nature of nitrate pollution, the above general pollution control 
model needs some modifications to accurately describe the nitrate control problem. 
The time lags between nonpoint source emissions and the occurrence of 
environmental damage (appearance of discharged nitrates at the receptors) raise 
temporal considerations. Therefore, the model should be extended to enforce 
environmental standards over time. The regulator‘s problem now is determining the 
maximum emission levels for the N sources, e1, e2…, eN in some single management 
period t = t0 so that the environmental standards over some t = t0, t0+1, t0+2, …, t0+T 
time periods are met at least cost to society. The regulator has to decide the total 
allocations for the management period t0, 
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the maximum level of pollution that the source emissions in management period t0 can 
jointly cause at each receptor m in each time period t. Total allocations for any 
upcoming management period should be set taking into account the unmanageable 
sources and expected emissions in the future (after the management period). The 
model presented below is for a single management period t0, but can be adapted for 
multiple management periods with minor changes. 
Minimise ∑nCn(en), subject to: 
∑nDnmt(en) ≤ qmt  for all m and t. 
en≥ 0 for all n. 
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The above formulation models the optimal emission levels for the N sources. Hence, 
for the nonpoint sources of nitrates, en is usually considered as the amount of nitrate 
loaded into a groundwater aquifer (we used the term emission to refer to the amount 
of a pollutant released into the atmosphere or a water body, not the amount of a 
pollutant released from a source). However, the nonpoint sources, mainly agricultural 
sources, cannot always control nitrate emissions (or loading) directly. What they can 
control are some variables such as fertilizer application rate, stocking density, and 
irrigation intensity, which eventually determine the actual nitrate loadings. In such 
situations, the above model is applicable only if the sources can relate the required 
optimal loading levels to their controllable variables, and if the cost functions can be 
expressed in terms of nitrate loading. Otherwise, a nitrate control model should 
optimise a set of recognized source control variables l =1, 2, …, L for the N sources 
relative to the joint total pollution control cost, the cost of adopting the pollution 
control variables x1n, x2n, …, xLn for the N sources. The model requires knowledge of 
the relationship between the control variables and the nitrate loading.  
Assume the nitrate loading caused by adopting x1n, x2n, …, xLn variables by source n is 
given as Fn(x1n, x2n, …, xln) and the cost of adopting those variables is given as C`n(x1n, 
x2n, …, xln). Then the optimal nitrate control problem is as below. 
Minimise ∑nC`n(x1n, x2n, …, xLn), subject to:   
en = Fn(x1n, x2n, …, xLn) for all n. 
∑nDnmt(en) ≤ qmt for all m and t.  
en≥ 0 for n. 
Previous research has observed that both C`n and Fn are most likely to be non-linear 
(Nikolaidis, Heng, Semagin, & Clausen, 1998; Peña-Haro, Pulido-Velazquez, & 
Sahuquillo, 2009). Hence, a nitrate control model which optimises the source control 
variables rather than the emissions can be non-convex.  As a consequence, many 
nitrate control studies have tried to optimise the emissions, expecting the sources to 
adopt their variables accordingly. Today, agricultural sources do actually have the 
capability of adopting their farming practices to control the nitrate loading because 
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they have access to on-farm nutrient management models such as OVERSEER 
(discussed in section 2.4.3).       
3.3 Approaches for Optimal Control 
An optimal nitrate control policy can be devised and implemented if reliable 
information is available to model the optimal control problem, if the problem can be 
solved efficiently using available optimisation tools and techniques, and if the 
economic, political, or social environments are flexible enough to accept the optimal 
solution. Otherwise, the acceptable policy alternatives are tested against the cost and 
environmental performance to choose a second best solution (Schou, Skop, & Jensen, 
2000; Semaan, Flichman, Scardigno, & Steduto, 2007; Yadav & Wall, 1998). 
Regardless of the social and political barriers for the implementation of a 
mathematically optimal policy, many researchers have modelled the problem on 
regional scales to obtain proven optimal solutions. In the subsequent sections, we 
describe a variety of optimisation approaches adopted for the optimal control of water 
pollution in general and optimal control of nitrate pollution in particular. 
3.3.1 Optimisation Techniques       
A variety of optimisation techniques have been used to solve water pollution control 
problems, but linear programming (LP) is most commonly used because of its 
simplicity and availability of solution methods. When linear programming is not 
applicable, other mathematical programming techniques such as nonlinear 
programming (NLP), mixed-integer linear programming (MILP), dynamic 
programming (DP), and heuristic search techniques such as genetic algorithms, tabu 
search, and artificial neural networks have also been used in solving water quality 
management problems (Greenberg, 1995; Zheng & Bennett, 2002).  
3.3.2 Early Applications of Mathematical Programming 
The first application of mathematical programming for environmental pollution 
control appeared in the early nineteen sixties  (Greenberg, 1995). Lynn, Lorgan, and 
Charnes (1962) were the first researchers to use an LP to determine the optimal levels 
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of treatment required by a set of treatment plants to minimise the total cost of sewage 
treatment while meeting the environmental standards on biochemical oxygen demand 
(BOD) in the effluents. The LP minimised total treatment cost subject to three 
constraints on mass balance at each node (input = output + reduction by treatment), 
pollutant input into the system, and the maximum amount of BOD allowed in the 
output from the system.  
In 1964, Thomann and Sobel (cited in Greenburg, 1995) developed an LP to control 
stream water pollution. This LP was formulated to determine the levels of treatment 
required by the point source dischargers to maximise the ratio of benefits to costs 
subject to flow balance equations and water quality constraints (maximum allowed 
levels of BOD and dissolved oxygen deficit in water).  
In 1966, Liebman and Lynn (cited in Greenburg, 1995) developed the first DP model 
to minimise the cost of sewage treatment subject to environmentally acceptable 
dissolved oxygen levels. In 1968, Clough and Bayer (cited in Greenburg, 1995) 
developed an NLP for optimal wastewater treatment. Many other applications of 
mathematical programming techniques in water pollution control during the nineteen 
sixties and seventies are described in Greenburg (1995).  
The early work was mostly on surface water quality and wastewater treatment 
optimisation. Aguado, Remson, Pikul, and Thomas (1974) were the first to present an 
LP to optimise groundwater extraction.  In their management optimisation model, they 
included the finite difference approximations of the differential equations that 
describe groundwater flow (Appendix A), as constraints in the model. Gorelick and 
Remson (1982) modelled an LP to control groundwater pollution using a method 
called the ―response matrix technique‖ (discussed in section 3.3.3) to include the 
physical characteristics of solute transport in groundwater in their model. The LP 
maximised the total disposal of waste solutes subject to groundwater quality 
standards. They also presented an MILP to determine how the waste disposal facilities 
should be located so that groundwater quality was maintained at least cost.   
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3.3.3 The Response Matrix Technique for Groundwater Quality Management 
Most of the early groundwater pollution control studies, for example Aguado et al. 
(1974) and Gharbi & Peralta (1994), used mathematical models that simulate 
groundwater flow and solute transport embedded into the management optimisation 
models. Groundwater quality management models based on embedded numerical 
formulations of the underlying physical systems are usually known as ―embedded 
models.‖ Gorelick and Remson (1982) presented a new approach called the response 
matrix technique to associate the physical aspects of solute transport in groundwater 
quality control models. This method is relatively simple compared to the embedded 
approach, because it uses a matrix of constants, rather than complex numerical 
formulations to describe the physical transport system.  
Gorelick and Remson used numerical simulations of solute transport in groundwater 
to obtain the matrix of coefficients which measured ―the increase in concentration that 
occurs at each constraint location, in each simulation time step, from one unit of waste 
loading at each source location during each management period.‖ This matrix is called 
the source-concentration ―response matrix‖.  As shown below, the response matrix is 
used in the management model to specify the water quality constraints over time.  
The problem was to maximise the waste loading into an aquifer from j = 1, 2, …,  J 
waste injection wells (sources) over k = 1,2, …, K management periods (injection 
periods), meeting the water quality standards at i=1, 2, …, I water supply wells 
(receptors) over t = 1, 2, …, T  time steps in the time frame of the problem (water 
quality monitoring time steps). The LP model was given as follows.    
Maximise ∑j∑kfjk, subject to: 
[R][fjk] ≤ [cit]. 
[ fjk] ≥ 0. 
 fjk = solute injection rate at injection well j during management period k. This is the 
product of waste water injection rate Wjk and the concentration in waste water Cjk.  
[fjk]= column vector of n = J×K elements, fjk.  
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cit = water quality standard imposed at water supply well j at time step t.  
[cit] = column vector of m = I×T elements, cit.  
[R] = rectangular (m by n) unit source-concentration response matrix. 
In the set of water quality constraints ([R][fjk] ≤ [cit]), the concentration at each 
receptor in each monitoring time step is calculated as the sum of the effects 
(concentration responses) of injection by each source in each management period. 
Concentration response is calculated as the product of the relevant response 
coefficient and the source injection rate. Thus the response matrix technique is based 
on linear programming superposition which guarantees linear water quality 
constraints. The principal assumption is that ―each source of groundwater pollution 
has a constant volumetric disposal rate Wjk and therefore a constant influence on the 
groundwater flow velocity field.‖ Since the solute injection rate is the product of 
solute source flux and concentration (Wjk×Cjk), treating both factors as variables 
creates non-linearity with respect to solute transport, because advective and dispersive 
transport depends on both concentration and velocity. 
With respect to nitrate leaching from diffuse agricultural sources, the volumetric 
effluent disposal rate is the rate of groundwater recharge from the source area (water 
percolation rate). Areal recharge depends on two factors, rainfall and irrigation. 
Superposition would hold if and only if both rainfall and irrigation are fixed in each 
management period. But a constant recharge rate over the management periods is not 
a necessary requirement2. Usually a fixed rate of annual recharge is calculated based 
on annual rainfall assuming that irrigation water seepage is negligible compared to 
natural rainwater recharge (Hadfield, 2008; Rekker, 1998).    
The response matrix technique has become popular since the early eighties. Today, 
this method is commonly used to solve groundwater quality management problems 
(D. S. Morgan & Everett, 2005; Peña-Haro, et al., 2009). Since the response matrix is 
                                               
2
 This means that the formulation does not require the groundwater flow terms to be constant over the whole 
simulation (over the whole period covering the management periods and the monitoring time steps). Hence, 
the response matrix technique is applicable even if the groundwater flow system is not in a steady state. 
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usually obtained from simulations, the applications of the response matrix technique 
are usually discussed under the broader category of literature on simulation and 
optimisation approaches for water pollution control.  
3.4 Simulation and Optimisation Approach for Water Pollution Control 
As we discussed in the introduction, the fate of point and nonpoint source emissions 
are determined by complex hydro-geological processes. These physical transport 
systems affect the level and timing of water pollution caused by the sources. 
Therefore, a significant portion of research has focused on incorporating the 
environmental simulations (models that simulate the behaviour of pollutants in the 
environment) in the management models designed for the optimal control of water 
pollution. Approaches which utilize both simulation and optimisation techniques to 
find the best methods, policies, or strategies for controlling water pollution are known 
as simulation and optimisation approaches (Almasri & Kaluarachchi, 2005; Ejaz & 
Peralta, 1995; D. S. Morgan & Everett, 2005; Peña-Haro, et al., 2009). Several factors 
including the huge cost associated with pollution control and reduction, the appeal in 
controlling nonpoint sources which have dispersed and delayed affects, and rapid 
development of computer technology in both hardware and software have motivated 
the simulation-optimisation approach (Zheng & Bennett, 2002).   
Under the simulation-optimisation framework, simulations predict the level of water 
pollution that occurs from possible management scenarios or alternatives (for 
example, limiting nitrogen fertilizer application rate to 70 kg/ha/year) and 
optimisation techniques determine the least costly or most profitable alternative 
subject to the water quality goals specified as constraints over the management 
alternatives (for example, keeping the nitrate concentration below 50 mg/l in a 
groundwater well). The coupling of simulation and optimisation is achieved via the 
embedded approach, the response matrix technique, or both. 
However, the prerequisite for the simulation-optimisation framework is the 
availability of well calibrated, reliable contaminant transport simulations (Zheng and 
Bennett, 2002). In the presence of uncertainty in simulation results, which provide 
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input parameters to the management models, stochastic optimisation methods are 
used.  
We next discuss a few of the proposed simulation-optimisation approaches, as 
representative of their applicability in controlling point and nonpoint source water 
pollution from nitrates and other pollutants.   
3.4.1 Response Matrix Technique Combined with Embedded Formulations (for 
General Water Pollutants) 
Ejah and Peralta (1995) presented a mathematical programming model to determine 
the optimal conjunctive water use from a stream-aquifer system, and waste loading 
into the stream from a sewage treatment plant (STP), that satisfy environmental 
quality requirements. The model included conflicting objectives of maximising water 
supply from groundwater extraction and surface water diversion and maximising the 
waste loading into the stream. To maintain water quality, constraints were imposed on 
groundwater pumping, surface water diversion, aquifer head, stream reach outflow, 
stream aquifer interflow, and concentration of modelled constituents at the control 
locations. With respect to waste loading, the variable optimised was the total waste 
loading from the STP, but since the STP discharge contains many water pollutants 
such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and dissolved solids, constraints were imposed on each 
constituent separately.      
Ejah and Peralta used a groundwater hydrology model (a MODFLOW model) to 
determine the spatial effects of pumping from each pumping location on aquifer 
heads, stream flows, and stream-aquifer interflows as influence coefficients (response 
matrix coefficients)3. They also developed a set of regression equations to represent 
the constituent transport in the stream. The regression equations were calibrated using 
a stream water quality model, QUAL2K.  
                                               
3
 The response matrix technique has been proposed as a method to describe solute transport in groundwater 
(Gorelick & Remson, 1982), but in this work, the response matrix is used to describe the flow of 
groundwater itself.  
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The influence coefficients and regression equations were applied in a multi-objective 
optimisation model. The paper states that the mathematical program was non-linear, 
and that should be due to the non-linearities in the regression equations.  The multi-
objective programming problem was reduced to a single-objective NLP using the E-
constraint method and solved using the MINOS solver.  
Ejah and Peralta contributed to water pollution control optimisation in two ways. 
First, they presented an integrated optimisation model for controlling point source 
pollutant loading (single source) and extraction of both surface water and 
groundwater. Second, they used the response matrix technique and embedded 
technique where each technique is best applicable, the response matrix technique to 
describe the groundwater flow system, and the embedded technique to describe the 
solute transport in surface water. Nothing is mentioned about the temporal issues, 
meaning that they assumed the responses to groundwater abstraction occur with no 
significant time delay.  
3.4.2 Discharge Response Coefficients (for Nitrate) 
Morgan and Everett (2005) described a simulation-optimisation approach to determine 
the optimal levels of nitrate loading reductions (relative to status-quo build out 
loading)  required from decentralized individual waste water treatment systems  
(DWTS) in the La Pine area of Oregon, United Sates, to meet groundwater and 
surface water quality standards. They used a groundwater model to simulate nitrate 
transport and obtain a response matrix which relates the source (zonal) nitrate loading 
to the concentration at each control point  (by location and depth) and nitrate 
discharge into a stream via groundwater seepage. The simulation models were 
developed using MODFLOW and MT3D. Due to the limited scale of the simulation 
model, it was not feasible to manage individual DWTS, so they were grouped into 
management zones.  
The response matrix was then used in a linear programming model which determined 
the least-cost distribution of nitrate loading reductions required by 97 management 
zones in La Pine. The constraints were the minimum reductions required in (1) 
groundwater nitrate concentration at each control location and (2) nitrate discharge 
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into each stream reach (segment), and (3&4) maximum and minimum loading 
reductions required in each management zone. The model used is given below. 
Indices:  
i = management area. j = management block = 1 for the block of existing homes or 2 
for the block of future homes (proposed); these are two blocks of areas in each 
management zone.  
m = concentration control location. k = concentration control depth. r = stream reach. 
Parameters:  
Uj = unit cost of nitrate loading reduction from existing or future homes, 
dimensionless.  
rcijmk = the increase in concentration at constraint location m and depth k, caused by 
unit (1 kg/day) loading from block j in management area i, (mg/l)/(kg/day).  
rdijr = the increase in nitrate discharge into stream reach r, caused by unit (1 kg/day) 
loading from block j in management area i, dimensionless.  
CRminmk= the minimum concentration reduction required at constraint location m and 
depth k. This is the difference between the maximum allowable concentration and the 
status quo built out concentration, mg/l.  
DRminr= the minimum groundwater discharge nitrate load reduction required in 
stream reach r. This is the difference between the simulated status-quo build out 
discharge to reach r (units of kg/d) and the maximum allowable discharge load to 
reach r, kg/d.  
NRminj and NRmaxj = minimum and maximum loading reduction limits for existing 
and future homes (kg/day). 
Decision variables:  
NRij = nitrate loading reduction required by type j homes in management area i, 
kg/day. 
Model: 
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Minimise ∑i∑jUjNRij, subject to: 
rcijmk NRij ≥ CRminmk 
rdijr NRij ≥ DRminr 
NRminj≤ NRij ≤ NRmaxj 
Morgan and Everett furthered the use of the response matrix technique in two ways.  
First, they used two types of response coefficients: concentration response 
coefficients, measuring the increase in concentration at each groundwater monitoring 
point; and discharge concentration coefficients, measuring the increase in nitrate 
discharge into the stream, due to unit nitrate loading from each management zone. 
Second, they reduced the number of rows in the matrix, by considering the 
equilibrium responses rather than the response at each time step simulated. To obtain 
these coefficients, they simulated loading from each management zone until 
equilibrium concentration levels were achieved at each control point. However, the 
mechanism of imposing constraints on equilibrium responses suits only if the same 
loading levels can be maintained over a relatively long time, because reaching 
equilibrium may take a long time (in this case 100 years).   
Comparing the cost of the optimal solution with the cost of uniform control scenarios 
(requiring all management zones to reduce nitrate loading by the same amount), 
Morgan and Everett showed that the optimal solution leads to significant cost savings.  
3.4.3 Integrated Simulation-Optimisation Models (for Nitrate) 
Amalsri and Kaluarachchi (2005) presented an integrated methodology for optimal 
management of nonpoint source nitrate loading. They used two physical models 
which simulated soil nitrogen dynamics and nitrate transport in groundwater coupled 
with an optimisation module to determine the maximum sustainable on-ground 
nitrogen loading for each region, which satisfied water quality standards. Once the 
optimal loading for each region was calculated, a series of protection alternatives were 
evaluated using a decision analysis module to select the best protection alternative.  
The optimisation problem was stated as follows.  
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Indices: 
i = drainage (management zone): 1, 2, …, N. 
k = receptor: 1, 2, …, N. 
Parameters:  
δM and δF = weighting coefficients for manure and fertilizer loadings.  
Ctk= maximum monthly nitrate concentration, at the last year of the simulation period, 
t, at receptor k. 
Decision Variables:  
NMi and NFi = sustainable annual manure and fertilizer application rates for drainage i 
respectively, lbs. 
Model: 
Maximise δM∑iNMi + δF∑iNFi subject to C
t
k ≤ MCL for k = 1, 2, …, N. 
Amalsri and Kaluarachchi used an integrated simulation model to relate the sources 
and receptors. They estimated the spatial and temporal distribution of on-ground 
nitrogen loading using the National Land Cover Database (NLCD) prepared by the 
US Geological Survey. With the on-ground nitrogen loading as an input, soil nitrogen 
dynamics were simulated using the framework adopted in the Nitrate Leaching and 
Economic Analysis Package (NLEAP). The final output from the soil nitrogen model 
was the spatial and temporal distribution of nitrate leaching to groundwater. With 
leaching as diffuse sources, nitrate fate and transport in groundwater were simulated 
using MODFLOW and MT3D. The output was the resulting nitrate concentrations at 
the receptors.  
Amalsri and Kaluarachchi used genetic algorithms (GM) to find an optimal solution to 
the above problem. To save much of the time taken to run the coupled physical 
simulation every time a candidate solution is evaluated, they used an artificial neural 
network (ANN) as a proxy to expedite the search. The ANN was trained and tested 
using the integrated simulation model which was then replaced by the ANN.  
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This integrated nitrate loading and transport model is a good approach, especially in 
the presence of non-linearities in the relationships between the management variables, 
in this case fertilizer and manure application rates, and the concentration at the 
receptors.    However, the ability of the optimisation model to sufficiently represent 
the spatial and temporal aspects of the nitrate pollution problem depends on the choice 
of the receptors and the simulation period, but they do not clearly recommend how to 
select those. Any optimal solution obtained from this model may not be able to ensure 
the attainment of water quality standards over time, because, as discussed in section 
2.6.2, the current concentration distribution in the aquifer has significant effects on 
future nitrate concentrations; and the effects of nitrates already in the aquifer are 
ignored in the model proposed by Amalsri and Kaluarachchi. 
3.4.4 Nonlinear Optimisation Models (for Nitrate) 
Peña-Haro et al. (2009) proposed a simulation-optimisation framework for the optimal 
management of groundwater nitrate pollution from agriculture. They modelled the 
optimal rates of nitrogen fertilizer application over time for spatially distributed crop 
areas with a single distinct crop assigned to each area. The economic benefit from 
growing each crop was given as a function of crop revenue and cost of water and 
nitrogen fertilizer.  The authors assumed that the crop production and nitrate leaching 
from each crop were quadratic functions of nitrogen fertilizer and irrigation water 
applications, and that other factors, such as soil properties, climate, and geography 
were uniform over the whole catchment area. Nitrate leaching from crop areas was 
related to the concentration at the groundwater control sites using a response matrix. 
To apply superposition, they considered aquifer recharge from each crop area to be 
constant and independent of irrigation. The management model was given as follows.    
Indices: 
c=crop or crop area. 
t= year in which fertilizer is applied. 
s= simulated (monitoring) time step. 
o = concentration control point. 
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Parameters: 
Ac = area cultivated in the crop area c, ha. 
 pc = crop price, €/kg. 
pn= nitrogen price, €/kg. 
pw = irrigation water price, €/m
3. 
r = annual discount rate.  
a, b,…, l = coefficients of the crop yield and leaching functions calibrated from an 
external agronomic simulation model.  
rt = the water that recharges the aquifer (m
3/ha) at time t. 
[RM] = a rectangular m×n source-concentration response matrix. Response 
coefficients were obtained from a groundwater solute transport simulation using 
MODFLOW and MT3D. The number of columns n equals the number of crop areas 
(sources) times the number of years within the planning horizon (years in which 
fertilizer is applied). The number of rows m equals the number of control sites 
(receptors) times the number of simulated time steps in the time frame of the problem 
(years in which water quality standards apply).  
[qos] = a column vector of water quality standards imposed at the control sites over the 
simulation time (kg/m3). 
[crct] is a vector of n elements which corresponds to the nitrate concentration in 
recharge (kg/m3) reaching groundwater. 
Decision variables: 
Nct = fertilizer applied to the crop c in year t, kg/ha. 
Wct = water applied to crop c in year t (m
3). 
Yct = production yield of crop c in year t, kg/ha. 
 Lct = the nitrogen leached from each crop area (kg/ha) in year t. 
Model: 
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Maximise ∑c∑tAc(pcYct – pnNct  – pwWct)/(1+r)
t , subject to: 
Yct = a + bWct + cWct
2 + dNct + eNct
2 + fWctNct 
Lct = g + hWct + iWct
2 + jNct + kNct
2 + lWctNct 
crct = Lct/rt 
[RM][crct] ≤ [qos] 
The paper presents a way to apply the model to a small hypothetical catchment and 
the results for different scenarios. The scenarios were defined based on the initial 
conditions (initial nitrate concentration in the aquifer), length of the planning horizon 
(management period), recovery time (the time from when the concentration 
constraints are imposed), and policy options (whether the fertilizer application could 
vary over space and time). The results demonstrate that both the planning horizon and 
target recovery time strongly affect the optimal fertilizer application rates and the cost 
of achieving the environmental goals: it is more expensive to achieve the targets soon; 
and longer planning horizons result in greater pollution and more restrictions on 
fertilizer use. They also demonstrated that it is cost effective to allow variations in 
fertilizer usage over the planning horizon. Even though the irrigation water 
application was modelled as a variable, it was fixed in the demonstration. 
The proposed approach combines the response matrix method with embedded 
formulations to describe the relationship between fertilizer application, leaching, and 
crop production. The embedded non-linear optimisation model was coded in GAMS 
and solved using the MINOS solver. The optimisation framework proposed by Peña-
Haro et al. has a few interesting features. Perhaps they are the first to recognize the 
importance of considering the current nitrate status of the groundwater system, as well 
as the implications of the choices of management period length and target recovery 
time.  
The model, however, can be non-convex and difficult to solve. Given that the 
recharge rt is constant, the above formulation models a quadratically constrained 
quadratic programming problem (QCQP) which is generally non-convex 
(d'Aspremont & Boyd, 2003). The formulation can be re-arranged as follows.  
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 for all i are positive semidefinite4, then the 
problem is convex (d'Aspremont & Boyd, 2003). However, depending on the values 
of the coefficients, the matrices may not satisfy the above condition.  
On the other hand,  the model has limited applicability for catchments where nitrogen 
fertilizer is the only manageable source of nitrate. Other variables such as stocking 
density may be included in the leaching function, but several independent variables 
can make the leaching and cost functions non-convex (T. Ramilan, Scrimgeour, Levy, 
& Romera, 2007). Considering the recovery time as a management option is 
questionable because the consequences are sometimes irreversible.  
3.5 Discussion 
For the optimal control of water pollution, environmental authorities need knowledge 
on the relationships between the pollution sources and threatened water bodies. Such 
information is extremely important for nonpoint source pollution control. The 
common practice is to use hydro-geological simulations to provide insight into the 
underlying physical systems. The simulation-optimisation framework is widely used 
in non-market based mechanisms for water pollution control.  
Different types of simulation and optimisation based methods have been proposed to 
date. The simulation-optimisation framework designed by Amalsri and Kaluarachchi 
(2005) for nonpoint sources is different from that of Morgan and Everett (2005). The 
former used a closely coupled simulation-optimisation approach which simulated each 
possible management alternative (at least for ANN calibration) to observe the 
                                               
4
 A real-symmetric matrix An×n is positive semidefinite if x
T
Ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ RN×1(Meyer, 2000).  
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potential impacts, while the latter used simulations to generate a set of constant 
parameters which are then used in the mathematical program. Hence, the response 
matrix technique employed by Morgan and Everett used physical simulations on a 
one-off basis and the coupled approach of Amalsri and Kaluarachchi used physical 
simulations dynamically. Both approaches have costs and benefits.  
The response matrix technique is based on the linear response superposition. To apply 
the response matrix method for the optimal control of nonpoint source nitrate 
pollution, we have to assume that nitrate loadings into an aquifer from distributed 
nonpoint sources have linear relationships with groundwater nitrate concentration. In 
essence, the groundwater recharge from each diffuse source should be constant. Since 
the concentration is calculated by dividing the mass flow rate by recharge rate, non-
linearity appears if both mass flow rate and recharge are considered as variables. 
Recent research, for example Rao, Basu, Zanardo, Botter, and Rinaldo (2009) 
empirically demonstrates that the superposition is applicable for most groundwater 
nitrate control problems. 
When the sources have non-linear effects on the receptors, the response matrix 
method is not applicable (mostly, point sources can have non-linear effects). 
However, it is possible to develop approximate non-linear mathematical models of the 
source-receptor relationships (Ejaz & Peralta, 1995). If the relationships are convex, 
for example, if quadratic functions are assumed, the optimisation models may be 
solved using available NLP techniques.  
When the underlying physical system is so complicated that the source-receptor 
linkages are hard to model, the modellers are compelled to use coupled simulation-
optimisation approaches such as Amalsri and Kaluarachchi‘s (2005) and search for an 
optimal solution. This is a time consuming and costly exercise, and the solution may 
be a near optimal rather than a unique global optimal.     
On the other hand, linear responses to nitrate loading alone do not guarantee well 
behaved optimisation models. If management variables other than loading (fertilizer 
application rate, stocking rates, etc.) were to be controlled, non-convexities may still 
arise. Coupled approaches are useful when the adoptable management variables have 
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non-convex relationships. However, our analysis does not recognize any good reason 
to prefer models that optimise such management variables over nitrate loading, mainly 
because of the availability of methods and tools to estimate loading from diverse 
agricultural practices.     
The literature suggests that many water pollution control problems can be 
approximated to convex and solvable models. The research to date has addressed two 
possibilities of non-linearities in nonpoint source nitrate control models: non-linear 
responses of nitrate loading and management variables with non-linear behaviours. 
But non-convexities may arise from other causes, such as the discontinuities in the 
actual cost/benefit functions. For example, commercial farming may not be 
economically feasible without a minimum rate of fertilizer application or stocking, 
and thus without a minimum level of nitrate loading.  
Due to the spatial and temporal effects of diffuse nitrate discharges, a mathematically 
optimal pollution control policy would impose non-uniform controls on spatially 
distributed sources. For example, a farm which is close to a threatened stream will 
face more stringent controls compared to other farms. When non-uniform controls are 
imposed, social resistance is inevitable. Hence, even though the regulator had perfect 
information on the physical and economic characteristics of the dischargers, and could 
come up with an optimal control policy, there are obstacles to implementing such a 
policy. Eventually, the world is moving towards market forces, away from the 
command-and-control policy for environmental protection.  
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Chapter 4 
4 POLLUTION PERMIT TRADING SYSTEMS
5
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we review the state-of-the-art of water pollution permit trading 
systems which are also known as water quality trading systems. We first discuss the 
context of environmental pollution permits as a tradable commodity. We provide a 
brief introduction to the types of tradable pollution permits. Then we present the 
general theoretical literature on pollution permit trading systems. Next, we focus 
specifically on water pollution, and review the existing and proposed water pollution 
permit trading systems. We conclude with a summary of the lessons learned from 
forty years of research and experience in water pollution permit trading. 
4.2 Pollution Permits as a Tradable Commodity 
Natural resources such as water are usually considered as common pool, publicly 
owned, resources. But economists have long argued the need for transferable private 
property rights for environmental resources (Coase, 1960; Dales, 1968; Ellerman, 
2005; Tietenberg, 2003). Still, there are conflicting views about private property rights 
to pollute the environment. One extreme is full property rights in perpetuity which 
                                               
5
 Parts of this chapter were included in Prabodanie, Raffensperger, and Milke (2010) and Prabodanie and 
Raffensperger  (2009b). 
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implies fully transferable explicit ownership. One familiar example for this type of 
tradable property rights is the New Zealand‘s fishing quota system (Newell, 
Sanchirico, & Kerr., 2002; Straker, Kerr, & Hendy, 2002) discussed below. 
Ellerman (2005) made a strong claim in support of full (permanent) property rights. 
He compared the tradable permits for environmental goods with existing private 
property rights for land. Centuries ago, communities faced similar problems in 
allocating rights to land, another common pool resource. With rising scarcity, people 
devised institutions for allocation and pricing of land use rights. Today, all those 
centralized land allocation systems have failed and evolved to a system of full private 
property rights.  
The environmental community at the other extreme stands by the position that 
environmental resources should be publicly owned, and hence, the government should 
take full control over the natural resources such as air and water. The middle ground 
is, as accepted by many economists and environmentalists, privatization of the rights 
to access the resource to a pre-specified degree (Tietenberg, 2003) rather than full 
privatization of the resource. Most emission permit trading systems in the United 
States fall into this category. The emission permits traded in the US, for example the 
sulphur dioxide emission permits discussed below, are clearly not permanent property 
rights, but rights to discharge pollutants at a defined rate for a defined time period 
(David, 2003; Tietenberg, 2003). Such temporary entitlements are better explained as 
property leases or rentals rather than property ownerships.    
In conclusion, whether the environment should be publicly owned, privately owned, 
or rented on a short-term basis is an unresolved issue to date. The decision has 
economic, social, and political implications. Empirical evidence suggests that each 
approach works under the right circumstances (Burtraw, 2000; Environmental 
Protection Authority, 2003; Newell, et al., 2002; Tietenberg, 2003). Regardless of 
who owns the environmental resources, the market-based approaches can help 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation.  Hence, the literature on pollution 
permit trading has made progress even though the right legal position of pollution 
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rights between the extremes of private ownership and public ownership remains an 
open question.  
4.2.1 Full Property Rights Example: New Zealand Fisheries ITQ System 
A tradable fishing quota regime was introduced in New Zealand when the government 
passed the Fisheries Amendment Act in 1987 (Straker, et al., 2002). New Zealand‘s 
fisheries quotas are known as the Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). ITQs are 
specified separately for each quota management region and fish species as a fraction 
of the Total Allowable Catch (TAQ), the maximum amount of fish that can be 
harvested. Fishing quotas were initially allocated (for free) among the regional fishing 
entities, based on the historic catch levels. Every year, the fisheries regulator (Ministry 
of Fisheries) determines the Total Allowable Catch for each quota management region 
and fish species, taking into account current population, regeneration rates, and 
environmental values which vary across regions, fish species, and time. TAQ 
effectively determines the maximum amount of annual catch allowed by the quotas 
held. Because the fisheries contain multiple species, the fishermen usually cannot 
catch one species without incidentally catching others, and therefore they have to 
rebalance their species portfolio during each year.  
New Zealand‘s fishing quotas are permanent property rights. They can be bought, 
sold, leased (in or out), or used (fished). Since 1986, New Zealand ITQ markets have 
recorded active trading, and overall, the tradable permit policy has been a success 
(Newell, Papps, & Sanchirico, 2005; Newell, et al., 2002). In 2000, New Zealand had 
275 fishing quota markets. As at 2000, about 140,000 quota leases and 23,000 quota 
sales have occurred. Interestingly, from 1986 to 2000, the annual number of leases has 
increased 10 fold and the annual number of quota sales has dropped significantly from 
3200 sales to about 1000 sales.    
4.2.2 Property Rental Example: United States Sulphur Dioxide Trading System 
The US sulphur dioxide (SO2) trading program is considered as the most successful 
tradable permit program in achieving the environmental goals at least cost (Burtraw, 
2000; Schary & Fisher-Vanden, 2004). Unlike New Zealand‘s ITQs, the US sulphur 
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dioxide allowances are defined for a specific calendar year. Each allowance authorizes 
the allowance holder to emit one ton of sulphur dioxide. If an allowance has not been 
used in the specified year, it can be carried forward to future years. The allowances 
are fully transferable between sources and other parties who wish to buy and retire the 
permits for the sake of the environment.  
For every year, the total aggregate emission level (cap) is defined by the government 
authorities. The cap is initially allocated among the sources for free based on an 
allocation formula (a small percentage of the total, less than 3% is withheld and 
auctioned). The sources are required to install continuous emission monitors and 
reporting software, so that quarterly electronic reports are submitted to the USEPA 
emission tracking system electronically. The emissions and allowance holdings are 
balanced at the end of the year. The sources whose total annual emissions exceed the 
allowance holdings are charged a penalty and required to surrender allowances in the 
next year to match the deficit. Those who performed better can carry the surplus to the 
next year. Regardless of how many allowances a source has acquired during a year, 
the annual emissions should still meet the federal sulphur dioxide emission standards. 
Therefore, the limit that applies on each source is either the allowance holding or the 
federal standard, whichever is more stringent.  
The success of the program is well evidenced. According to Burtraw (2000), the 
program has achieved 100% environmental compliance and the economic benefits are 
substantially above the cost of the program. According to Schary & Fisher-Vanden 
(2004), two factors contributed to the success of the program: (1) the creation of a 
common standardized commodity which is capable of achieving the environmental 
goals and (2) the design of the program to attractively and efficiently facilitate and 
encourage trading.  
4.2.3 Full Privatization vs Rentals 
Under full privatization, the government loses control of the natural resources and 
may have to buy back for conservation. For example, in the early movement from 
regulation to privatization, the New Zealand government allocated fishing rights as 
fixed tonnages based on past history. Later, the government found that the total 
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allocations exceeded the sustainable yield in some fisheries and had to buy back 
(Newell, et al., 2002). This happened because of the allocation of fixed quantity rights 
in a situation where the total quantity available was uncertain. If the private property 
rights are specified as a fraction of the total available (as in the current New Zealand 
ITQ system), the government can still control resource consumption by setting the 
total allocation to maintain sustainability. On the other hand, full privatization 
provides full flexibility to the users because it allows free asset markets and asset-
lease markets. Potential for market monopolies, barriers to new-comers, and fairness 
issues are some complaints about full private property rights for natural resources.   
If the government rents the rights to use the natural resources (or to pollute the 
environment) for fixed short periods, it still has a significant level of control. For 
example, the US sulphur dioxide allowances provide ―adequate, as opposed to 
complete, security to the permit holders while keeping the ability to adopt more 
stringent standards if required‖ (Tietenberg, 2003). So while the full property rights 
for the environment provide full flexibility to the users, government controlled 
resource rental systems can provide adequate security to both the users and the 
environment.   
4.3 Types of Tradable Pollution Permits  
The literature on air and water pollution permit trading discusses two general types of 
tradable pollution permits: emission permits and ambient permits (McGartland, 1988; 
Montgomery, 1972). Ambient permits, sometimes referred as pollution permits6, are 
defined based on the receptor. Emission permits are defined based on the source.  
                                               
6
 To describe the different types of permits, we use the terminology commonly found in the literature. 
However, Montgomery (1972) used the term ―pollution permits‖ to describe ambient permits. Since the 
nineteen seventies, the authors have used the terms ―ambient permits‖ and ―emission permits‖ as standard 
terms in both theoretical and empirical literature published on pollution permit trading systems.  
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4.3.1 Ambient (Receptor) Permits  
An ambient permit is a right to increase the pollution level at a specific receptor. 
Ambient permits are issued separately for each receptor. They allow the permit holder 
to discharge so that the pollution effect at any receptor does not exceed the specified 
limit. Since a pollution source generally affects a number of receptors, a source has to 
assemble a portfolio of permits to match the impacts on all receptors. When there are 
multiple receptors, a separate market is created for each receptor, but in every market, 
permits are freely tradable on a one-to-one basis.  
Ambient permits may be specified quantitatively as the permitted increase in pollution 
or as a proportion of the total allowed pollution at the receptor. For example, a point 
source discharger may be given a permit to discharge 50 kg of nitrate into a stream 
segment, or a permit for 20% of the total allowed nitrate discharge into a stream 
segment.  Proportionally defined ambient permits provide more flexibility in attaining 
environmental goals because the ability (capacity) of the environment to accept and 
dilute pollutants varies over time, and the discharge levels can be adjusted relative to 
the updated maximum acceptable pollution levels.  
The major problem with ambient-type pollution permits is the inevitable confusion for 
the users in assembling the right portfolio of permits to cover the operations in each 
period. The sources incur high transaction costs in purchasing a portfolio of permits. 
4.3.2 Emission (Source) Permits 
An emission permit allows the permit holder to discharge a pollutant at a specified 
rate. Theoretically, an emission permit is equivalent to a bundle of ambient permits.  
As the sources and receptors are spatially distributed, the emission permits held at 
distinct sources have dissimilar pollution impacts on the receptors. Transfer of 
emission permits among sources can change the level of pollution at a receptor 
positively or negatively. Therefore, emission permits cannot be freely traded one-to-
one as ambient permits. Some trading rules are required to support trade in emission 
permits. Different trading rules have been used and different types of emission trading 
systems have evolved as a consequence. The most commonly found emission permit 
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trading systems are trading ratio systems, zonal permit systems, and pollution offset 
systems. Trading ratio systems allow bilateral trade based on pre-determined quantity 
adjustment ratios, zonal permit systems categorise sources with similar spatial impacts 
into zones and allow one-to-one trade within zones, and pollution offset systems use 
environmental simulations to validate trades.  
From a user‘s point of view, emission permits are easy to understand and adhere to, 
because unlike ambient permits, emission permits directly specify the permitted 
discharge levels. With emission permits, the cost of setting trading rules raises the cost 
of market design. Validating and authorizing trades according to the pre-determined 
rules may increase transaction costs.  
4.4 Pollution Permit Trading Systems: General Models 
Early theoretical literature on permit trading covers both air and water pollution in 
general and the later studies have been specialized to specific resources: water, air, or 
land. In this section, we discuss the general approaches proposed in the early 
literature.  
4.4.1 Ambient Permit Trading Systems 
Ambient permits are similar to any other freely tradable commodity. Once the permits 
are defined and initially allocated, an ambient permit trading system would operate as 
a ―free‖ market (McGartland, 1988). Montgomery (1972) was the first to 
mathematically prove that a market in ambient permits would lead to efficient 
allocation of pollution abatement responsibilities. He proved the existence of a market 
equilibrium in ambient permits which coincides with the allocation of abatement 
responsibilities which meets the environmental quality standards at least cost to 
society. 
Under an ambient permit trading system, the pollution sources have to trade in many 
markets to assemble a portfolio of permits, and this raises the transaction costs. 
Hence, ambient permit systems are most suitable when very few receptors are 
involved and the pollution sources have quick responses, so that only one or few 
environmental constraints are involved.   
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To avoid having to purchase a permit portfolio, Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) 
proposed a highest ambient permit system, which approximates the multiple receptor 
situation to a single receptor situation. When multiple receptors are present, they 
proposed to create a single ambient permit market for the most polluted (worst) 
receptor. Using a case study, Atkinson & Tietenberg showed that the proposed highest 
ambient permit system is much simpler, even though the cost is slightly higher 
compared to the ambient permit system. 
4.4.2 Trading Ratio Systems 
Montgomery (1972), who laid the theoretical foundation for pollution permit trading, 
discussed tradable emission permits also. The emission trading system discussed by 
Montgomery was actually a trading ratio system, even though he described the trading 
ratio mechanism as a ―rule governing exchange of emission rights‖. The rule was 
explained as follows: a buyer may emit up to a level which causes pollution not more 
than that which would have been caused if the seller had emitted to the maximum 
level allowed by the permit. If source i buys an emission permit of size ek from source 
k, source i can emit up to a level ei so that hijei  ≤  hkjek for all j where hij and hkj are the 
―transport coefficients‖ which relate the sources and receptors (similar to the response 
coefficients discussed in the previous chapter, ignoring the timing of effects). Thus the 
trading ratio applies to source i for the purchases from source k = minj (hkj/hij). This 
was a non-degradation trading ratio which prevents any additional pollution as a result 
of trade, and there are other ways of selecting trading ratios, for example, Hung and 
Shaw (2005) discussed in section 4.5.1.  
 Montgomery (1972) proved theoretically that a market in emission permits also leads 
to efficient allocation of abatement responsibilities. But according to his analysis, a 
market equilibrium of emission permits is efficient only if the initial allocation of 
emission permits meets quality standards at all the receptors with equality (i.e., if the 
initial allocation of emission permits bind all the receptors). He admitted that such an 
initial allocation of emission permits might not exist.  
Generally, trading ratio systems allow bilateral trades based on pre-determined trading 
ratios. For example, a nitrate emission trading ratio of 5:1 for the sources A and B 
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means, A has to buy a 5 kg permit from B to increase his or her emission by 1 kg. 
Trading ratio systems suffer from the free-rider problem and thin trading. The free-
rider problem arises when some polluters benefit from the transactions of others 
(McGartland, 1988). For example, assume that polluters A, B, and C affect receptors 
R1 and R2 by the transport coefficients shown in Table 3.1. If B wishes to buy from 
A, a non-degradation trading ratio would be 5:1. Assume that B buys a 5 kg emission 
permit from A and discharges only 1 kg as allowed. This trade would decrease 
concentration at receptor R2 by 3×5−1×1 = 14 mg/l, and source C would gain a free 
ride to increase its emission. 
  
Table 3.1: Transport coefficients (mg/l) for sources A, B, and C and receptors R1 and 
R2.  
If the trading ratios were selected on a non-degradation basis, the high purchase cost 
increases the overall cost and discourages participation. Downward adjustments of 
trading ratios to increase cost efficiency would violate water quality standards at some 
receptors. Regardless of the way the trading ratios are selected, under such pair-wise 
or bilateral trading systems, those who are willing to buy or sell have to find trading 
partners, and the search is a costly affair. 
4.4.3 Pollution Offset Systems  
Krupnick, Oates, & Verg (1983) proposed the ―pollution offset system‖ as a solution 
to the high transaction costs associated with the many markets created by 
Montgomery‘s ambient permit system. With the pollution offset system, emission 
sources are free to trade as long as the environmental quality standards are not 
violated at any receptor. This system needs an environmental quality model to 
simulate the impact of each proposed transaction and ensure that it does not violate 
quality standards at any receptor. Krupnick et al. showed that if all gains from trade 
are exhausted, then the outcome is a least cost solution to the society‘s problem.  
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McGartland and Oates (1985) presented the ―modified offset system‖, introducing 
redefined quality standards to the original offset system designed by Krupnik et al. 
(1983). Standards were redefined so that, for every receptor, the environmental quality 
standard is equal to the predetermined standard or the current (initial) level of 
environmental quality, whichever means less pollution. The system was explained as 
follows. 
The vector of redefined quality standards, Q** = min (Q0, Q*) where Q* is the vector 
of predetermined quality standards and Q0 is the vector of current quality levels. With 
redefined standards, it is always possible to find an E0 such that E0H = Q** where E0 
is the vector of emissions implied by the initial allocation of permits, and H is the 
matrix of transport coefficients. This is the condition under which the market 
equilibrium in emission permits solves the cost minimization problem (Montgomery, 
1972). On the above premise, McGartland and Oates showed that their system is 
mathematically identical to Montgomery‘s ambient permit system, Montgomery‘s 
proofs are applicable to the modified pollution offset system, and thus it leads to 
efficient allocation of emission permits.  
Regardless of how the quality standards are defined, offset-based trading systems 
need environmental simulations to validate every transaction, and the simulations 
increase the overall transaction cost. Offset based trading systems also have the free-
rider problem. For example, assume that polluter A affects receptor R1, B affects 
receptor R2, and C affects both receptors R1 and R2. The relevant transport 
coefficients are as shown in Table 3.2.  If C sells to A, B gains a free chance to 
increase pollution at receptor R2.  
 
Table 3.2: Transport coefficients (mg/l) for sources A, B, and C and receptors R1 and 
R2.  
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Thin trading is another criticism of offset-based bilateral trading systems. A proposed 
pair-wise transaction may be infeasible if a quality standard at any receptor is 
violated. In the above example (if only A, B, and C are in the region) C can sell to A 
or B, but any purchase by C and any trades between A and B are all infeasible. 
McGartland (1988) discussed the transaction costs and free rider problems associated 
with ambient permit systems and offset systems. He argued that the polluter‘s problem 
in both the ambient permit system and pollution offset system are mathematically 
equivalent under perfect competition, a competitive equilibrium exists, but there are 
many obstacles in reaching this least cost equilibrium. He mentioned that brokers can 
help overcome these obstacles.  
4.4.4 Centrally Controlled, Multilateral Permit Trading  
McGartland (1988) identified the difficulties in attaining the least cost distribution of 
permits via trading, but he did not propose a complete solution. More than a decade 
later, Ermoliev, Michalevich, and Nentjes (2000) discussed how a permit market can 
be practically designed so that it is capable of achieving efficient permit allocations.  
Ermoliev et al. (2000) proved that bilateral sequential trades converge to cost efficient 
emissions only in the case of a single receptor (one constraint on total emission). In 
the case of many receptors, sources generally cannot increase their emissions without 
negotiating with several other sources, and multilateral emission permit trade is 
required. They presented a Multi-Agent Decentralized Market (MADIC) which 
requires an intermediate agency, a ―broker,‖ who coordinates multilateral trade, acting 
like a Walrasian auctioneer. The system was explained as follows. 
The sources and agency are connected through a computer network. The agency stores 
information such as the transport matrix, the environmental standards, and the current 
quality levels. The agency sets preliminary ambient prices7 and translates them into 
emission prices for each source using the transport matrix. Once the sources receive 
the proposed emission prices, they determine their individual demands or supplies and 
                                               
7
 An ambient price is a price for increasing pollution at a receptor. 
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send the information to the agency. The agency adjusts the prices based on excess 
demand or supply, retransmits the new prices, and continues this process until 
equilibrium is achieved. Ermoliev et al. proved that this method leads to efficient 
allocation of permits, regardless of whether the permits are defined as ambient permits 
or emission permits. Proofs were given for emission permits which can be mapped 
into sets of ambient permits.    
Compared to conventional bilateral trading systems, the proposed centrally-controlled 
market reduces transaction costs because the traders buy and sell from the auction 
without having to find a trading partner. Multilateral trading increases the 
opportunities for trade in emission, because a polluter who has impacts on many 
receptors can buy from multiple sellers to offset the effects. For example, if there were 
a MADIC system for the case given in Table 3.2, polluter C would buy 
simultaneously from polluters A and B. However, the main problem of such a 
centrally controlled auction is that equilibrium may not be achieved quickly or 
monotonically. Ermoliev et al. (2000) mentioned that convergence to equilibrium may 
take a long time.  
4.5 Water Pollution Trading Systems 
Dales (1968) was the first to demonstrate the applicability of market solutions to the 
problem of water pollution. He recommended a property rights rental system for water 
pollution, but admitted that the task is not as easy as with land. Dales suggested that 
the government must make sure that a sustainable amount of pollution rights is issued 
and some of the allowable rights are reserved as a means of altering the total supply. 
He claimed that this pollution rights market is not a true market, as even if a hike in 
price indicates an increase in waste disposal value, the government cannot increase the 
allowable waste discharge capacity in response.  
Water pollution permit markets, in operation or as proposed, vary in the scope of 
application, pollutants traded, and the program design. The scope of application varies 
from point source trading systems at the river level to integrated point and nonpoint 
source trading systems at the catchment scale.  
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Most of the earliest markets were to trade biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) in 
rivers.  BOD measures the amount of oxygen required to decay the organic 
compounds in a litre of water. BOD is an overall measure of water quality, because 
many pollutants such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and organic matter increase BOD level. 
Later, tradable permit programs have been proposed for critical water pollutants such 
as nitrate and phosphorus.     
The designs of water pollution permit trading systems vary by the rules and 
procedures that govern trade. Woodward, Kaiser, and Wicks (2002) discussed four 
commonly found market structures of water pollution permit markets in the US: 
exchanges, bilateral negotiations, clearinghouses, and sole source offsets. This was a 
general categorization, and market design is more than just the choice between 
bilateral trading and trading in exchange. It is difficult to categorize the water 
pollution permit trading systems based on the market design, because a wide variety 
of design options has been proposed. Hence, the water pollution trading systems 
discussed in the following section are categorized based on the scope of application 
rather than the market structure. 
4.6 Point Source (PS) Trading Systems 
The literature on trading water pollution permits is dominated by point source trading 
systems. The obvious reason is that point sources are easy to measure and control 
compared to nonpoint sources. They are usually designed at the river level and 
applicable to a variety of surface water pollutants. The simplest way for PS trading is 
the cap-and-trade mechanism successfully adopted in air pollution trading programs. 
Cap-and-trade programs are simple and easy to understand; a cap on total pollutant 
load (usually on annual load) is determined; the cap is distributed among the sources; 
and free one-to-one trading is allowed (Environomics, 1999; King & Kuch, 2003; US 
EPA, 2007). However the simple cap-and-trade mechanism is not always suitable for 
PS trading, mainly due to the locational effects of PS emissions. Therefore, the trading 
systems are usually designed to account for the variations in effects caused by the 
discharge point. We discuss a few interesting attempts to protect river water quality 
through PS water pollution permit trading systems, both theoretical and practical. 
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4.6.1 Early Work 
The Fox River in Wisconsin was the first body of water in the United States for which 
transferable discharge permits were allowed (O'Neil, David, Moore, & Joeres, 1983). 
The pollutant traded was BOD. The Fox River trading system was a highly restricted 
trading system. Trade was allowed only if the permitted discharge levels could not be 
met by adopting technological standards, and if the buyer and the seller were on the 
same river segment; hence only one trade has ever taken place.  
Despite the actual market regulations, O'Neil et al. evaluated a non-degradation based 
trading ratio system for the Fox River. The market was modelled for two receptors.    
They used a one-dimensional quality model (Qual-III) of the river to calculate the 
transport coefficients for varying river conditions of temperature and flow. They 
estimated bilateral trading ratios from transport coefficients, using Montgomery‘s 
method, so that water quality standards were met at all receptors, under any flow and 
temperature condition. They showed that tradable pollution permits are cost effective 
(compared to the command-and-control approach) and capable of maintaining water 
quality standards, even when the river conditions are uncertain and dischargers have 
different effects on river water quality. 
Eheart, Brill, Lence, Kilgore, and Uber (1987) emphasised the usefulness of tradable 
discharge permit systems in maintaining water quality standards under stochastic river 
conditions (varying assimilative capacity). Eheart et al. simulated a hypothetical 
trading system of dynamic emission permits for biochemical oxygen demand control 
in the Willamette River in Oregon, United States. Dynamic discharge permits allow 
the emission levels to be adjusted according to the temporal variations in the 
assimilative capacity of the receiving water body. In contrast, the conventional static 
discharge permits specify a fixed allowable discharge level. According to Eheart et al., 
dynamic permits may be defined as periodic permits or conditional permits. With 
periodic permits, allowable discharge is given as a function of the calendar date. The 
simplest is the two period permit system, the critical or drought period and the non-
critical or wet period. With conditional permits allowable discharge is given as a 
function of river conditions.  
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The market was simulated using a linear program. For comparison purposes, programs 
of non-tradable dynamic permits, tradable static permits, and non-tradable static 
permits were simulated. One important finding of this study is that dynamic permits, 
whether transferable or not, are more efficient in terms of both cost and quality, 
because the discharge levels are dynamically determined based on the river 
conditions. If the permits are tradable, further cost savings may be accrued. The 
interesting concept in this work is the effectiveness of dynamic permits (similar to 
proportionally defined ambient permits) compared to the static (fixed quantity) 
permits.   
Leston (1992) performed a study of a two-pollutant, two-season pollution offset 
system for the Colorado River of Texas, United States. The two pollutants considered 
were biochemical oxygen demand and ammonia nitrogen. Both pollutants influence 
the dissolved oxygen level of a stream, hence a pollution offset by the other pollutant 
was allowed, and only the dissolved oxygen level was constrained as a quality 
requirement. Leston‘s study indicated significant cost savings from pollution offset 
systems. According to Leston, pollution offsets from the two different pollutants 
contributed to almost all the savings, and the seasonal variation of permit design had 
little effect on cost savings. Leston‘s results indicate the usefulness of the offset 
mechanism in trading different pollutants which affect the same environmental 
constraints.  
4.6.2 Theoretical Extensions  
Weber (2001) modelled a theoretical trading system to allocate surface water use 
rights and emission rights along a river. She argued that the combined effects of water 
withdrawals and emissions must be considered in allocating surface water use and 
pollution rights. For the modelling and analysis, users (diversion points) were indexed 
according to the location along the river, in the order of increasing distance from the 
origin. The level of benefit derived by every user was considered as a function of the 
quality and the quantity of water available at the point of diversion, quantity 
consumed, and amount of effluent discharged. The optimal allocation problem was 
modelled with two types of environmental constraints: minimum levels of quality and 
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quantity of water required at each diversion point and at the end point (after the last 
user). In-out balance equations were specified for water quantity and quality at each 
diversion point.    
Weber modelled the optimal allocation of water use and discharge rights and the 
market equilibrium in permits for water and pollution damages (ambient type permits) 
to prove that the market equilibrium implements the optimal allocation. She analysed 
the locational prices (obtained from the shadow prices of the balance equations) and 
showed that the prices decline from upstream to downstream. Weber‘s results indicate 
the efficiency gains of a combined market in surface water use and point source 
discharge rights, but the results may not apply to groundwater rights and nonpoint 
source discharge rights. Also, the user‘s benefit function discussed in Weber‘s 
theoretical model would be hard to estimate in practice.   
Hung & Shaw (2005) presented a new type of trading ratio system for trading point 
source emission rights based on the unidirectional flow of water in rivers. In the 
proposed system, an environmental authority first sets environmental load standards 
for every discharge location (zone) along the river. Then the effluent cap at each 
location is set sequentially, starting from upstream, so that the cap equals the 
location‘s load standard minus the effluent load transferred from upstream. Obviously 
setting uniform standards along the river is unfair to the downstream dischargers, and 
the upstream standards should be tighter than the downstream caps. The cap is 
distributed among individual dischargers in the zone as the initial allocation so that the 
cap at every discharge location is binding. The trading ratios among sites are set equal 
to the relevant transport coefficients. Dischargers are allowed to trade with each other 
freely based on trading ratios. If a discharger j buys X units from an upstream 
discharger i, the cap at the buyer‘s location would be relaxed by hijX, allowing the 
buyer to discharge more hijX units. A purchase from downstream would not allow an 
upstream buyer to increase the discharge, and hence a rational discharger would not 
buy from downstream.  
Hung and Shaw proved that this trading ratio system leads to efficient allocation of 
emission rights under both simultaneous trading and sequential bilateral trading. As 
62 
 
 
 
they argued, the transaction costs are lower because the trading rules are simple, 
permit portfolios are not required, and either a centralised double auction or bilateral 
trading is possible with this type of emission permits. Hot spots can be avoided by 
having caps at each discharge location. The free rider problem is avoided because the 
zonal caps are fully allocated; any additional increase in discharge should come with 
more permit purchases.  The environmental constraints are binding ex-ante and ex-
post ensuring full capacity utilization. However, this is a very specific trading system 
suitable for point sources located along a river. Market competitiveness may be 
affected by the load standards and the caps, endogenously specified for every 
discharge location.  
4.6.3 Practical Approaches 
The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme in Australia (Environmental Protection 
Authority, 2003) is a good example of a real world trading system which succeeded in 
improving surface water quality. In this trading system, the river is divided into river 
blocks (zones), based on how many days the block will take to pass Singleton, a 
downstream location. Each point source located along the river belongs to one block. 
The Hunter River Scheme operates in real time. The scheme operators 
(representatives of the New South Wales government) continuously monitor the river 
flow and salinity levels and determine how much more salt can be discharged into 
each block so that river water quality standards are not violated. 
Emission permits are defined, not quantitatively, but as a percentage of the total 
allowed discharge. Initially, a total of 1000 discharge credits were allocated among 
the users. Credit holders can discharge salt into their river blocks only in proportion to 
the credits held; if a user has 30 credits, he or she can discharge only 3% of the total 
amount of salt allowed for the particular river block. Both intra and inter block trade is 
possible on a one-to-one (quantity) basis. Trades within a block require the buyer and 
seller to act accordingly on the same day, and trades between two blocks require the 
buyer and seller to act accordingly on different days. 
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For example, if source A in the 160-day block sells 20 credits to source B in the same 
160-day block today, then A has to reduce discharge by 2% of the total allowed in his 
block today and B can increase the discharge by 2% of the total allowed in the same 
block today. If A sells 90 credits to source C in the 155-day block (downstream) 
today, A has to reduce discharge by 9% of the total allowed in his block today, and B 
can increase the discharge by 9% of the total allowed in his block five days later (the 
160-day river block today becomes the 155-day river block five days later). This 
trading scheme allows trade across time. 
The prices are negotiated. A clever player would buy and sell based on river flow 
forecasts, because if the flow is high, the river can dilute more salt, and the total 
allowable discharge would be greater. 
An initial allocation of credits was made free at the commencement of the Hunter 
River Scheme in 2002, and 200 credits expire every two years from the 
commencement. New credits are sold in public auction so that the total number of 
credits is limited to 1000. All sold permits expire in 10 years. So there will be an 
auction for 10 year permits at 2 year intervals from the implementation of the project. 
The interesting feature of this schema is that it creates two markets, one in long term 
pollution rights (10 years) and another in short-term leases (one day). Therefore, the 
Hunter River trading schema is similar to the New Zealand Fisheries ITQ system, 
with some variations, mainly the time scales.  However, the same structure can be 
adopted with different (possibly longer) time scales and may be applied to other 
pollutants and nonpoint sources. 
The US has implemented many point source water pollution permit trading systems 
(Environomics, 1999; King & Kuch, 2003; US EPA, 2007), but the results are not 
impressive. Most of these trading programs are simple cap-and-trade systems or 
bilateral trading ratio systems. These trading programs allow trade in a variety of 
pollutants such as nitrogen, phosphorus, selenium, temperature, mercury, and 
ammonia. Different criteria such as non-degradation, pollution offsetting, and regional 
basis, have been adopted to determine the bilateral trading ratios. Since many of the 
US point source trading systems are for trading nutrients, we discuss them in section 
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4.9. More details on US water quality trading systems are available in US EPA (2007) 
and Environomics (1999).  
4.6.4 Conclusions on Point Source Trading 
Our literature review provides evidence that the existing and proposed point source 
water pollution trading systems are capable of attaining the intended goals. All the 
relevant issues are discussed in the literature, and both simplified and detailed trading 
systems have been proposed. The best fit trading schema should be selected 
depending on the availability of required information, level of certainty in the 
information, and the level of flexibility allowed in expected outcomes. For example, if 
water quality standards for some pollutant are to be met on a daily basis, if only point 
sources are present, and if continuous monitoring and control is possible, a trading 
structure like the Hunter River Scheme is a good solution. On the other hand, if the 
water quality goals can be achieved via an annual cap on total pollutant load and if a 
higher level of accuracy is not expected in the outcomes, a simple cap-and-trade 
mechanism would be sufficient. 
A better way for cap-based trading is proposed in dos Santos (2009). He proposes an 
auction mechanism which uses a mathematical programming model to find efficient 
market prices relative to bids submitted by the users. A hydro-electric generator which 
acts as the auctioneer receives the revenue from permit sales in exchange for 
guaranteeing minimum flow levels required to dilute the pollutants. It also takes into 
account the non-linear behaviour of pollutant transport in river systems. The auction is 
designed to price the permits taking into account the competing commercial interests 
of different parties involved, and thus provides innovation for better design of cap-
and-trade systems. 
The above discussed PS trading systems are not directly applicable to nonpoint 
sources for two main reasons. First, pollutant transport in groundwater is much more 
complicated than in surface water bodies, mainly because surface water flow is fast 
and uni-directional while groundwater flow is slow and dispersive. Second, PS water 
pollution trading systems are designed for the short term and nonpoint sources have 
long term impacts. The main focus of this thesis is therefore nonpoint sources.  
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4.7 Nonpoint Source (NPS) Water Pollution Trading Systems 
Most NPS water pollution permit trading systems have been designed for nutrients, 
because nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus are the most critical NPS water 
pollutants. They are usually known as NPS nutrient trading systems.  
NPS nutrient trading is complicated due to the difficulties in measurement and control 
and the complex hydro-geological processes that affect the fate and transport of NPS 
emissions. O'Shea (2002) highlighted that markets for diffuse sources need the close 
cooperation of scientists and economists. She suggested that the ―task for scientists is 
to improve the knowledge of the linkage between emissions at source and their 
presence within a receptor so that economists can develop their models accordingly.‖  
Theoretical designs of NPS nutrient trading systems are rare in the literature. One 
reason may be that the institutional structure in the US, the country which has 
pioneered the tradable rights approach for the environment, does not support water 
pollution permit trades between nonpoint sources. We discuss and review two 
theoretical NPS nutrient trading systems proposed to date: an ambient permit system 
and a zonal permit system.  
According to our literature survey, Morgan, Coggins, and Eidman (2000) were the 
first to suggest a complete methodology for trading nonpoint source discharge 
permits. They discussed an ambient permit system for controlling nitrate 
concentration in a single targeted groundwater well (a single receptor). Their trading 
system consists of three sub models: (1) a production model which estimates the 
profits from different production practices (crop rotation and nitrogen fertilizer 
application rate), (2) a soil model which estimates the water and nitrate leaching from 
each production practice, and (3) a groundwater model which simulates the nitrate 
movement in groundwater. They assumed that one practice is continued during the 
planning horizon. Each permit was defined as a right to cause a certain level of 
concentration at the receptor in the last year of simulation. A centralized auction 
market was designed to operate as described below. 
1. First, the auctioneer posts a price.   
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2. Farms submit the optimal production practice and the number of permits to 
trade (buy or sell) based on the posted price. Each farm knows the impact of 
each production practice on the concentration at the receptor.    
3. The auctioneer runs the soil model and groundwater model with submitted 
production practices and checks whether the water quality standards are met all 
the time. 
4. If standards are met, the auctioneer checks whether demand and supply match.  
5. If both requirements are met, the price is finalised.  
6. Otherwise a different price is posted accordingly.  
Morgan et al. designed this trading system specifically for nitrate discharge permits, 
but it is equivalent to the general emission trading system proposed by Ermoliev 
(2000). Both are centrally controlled multilateral trading systems in which the traders 
and the auctioneer are connected through electronic media.  
Morgan et al. assumed that each proposed production practice is continued throughout 
the planning horizon, meaning long-term permits. The system is acceptable only if the 
planning horizon is long enough, so that, for any combination of production practices, 
an equilibrium concentration is observed at the well by the end of the planning 
horizon. Otherwise, the system is unable to maintain the water quality standards all 
the time. 
Even if the planning horizon was selected cleverly, nitrates already in the aquifer may 
cause the concentration to peak at some time before the end of the planning horizon. 
Then the simulations would suggest that the water quality standards are violated at 
some time, and the auctioneer would post a higher price while there was an excess 
supply of permits in the market (because the permits are defined based on the end of 
planning horizon constraint).   For example, assume that the planning horizon was 60 
years, and the water quality standard was 50 ppm for every year. For a set of 
production practices and buy bids, the simulated concentrations were 55 ppm in year 
20 and 30 ppm in year 60. The auctioneer will post a higher price while there are 
excess permits available (50 ppm is available and only 30 ppm is allocated), and the 
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iterations would not converge to an equilibrium. Hence, even for a single receptor, a 
large number of auction rounds may be needed to clear the market.  
Kerr, Rutherford and Lock (2007) and Lock and Kerr (2008) proposed a NPS nutrient 
discharge permit trading system for the Lake Rotorua catchment in New Zealand. The 
primary purpose of this trading system is to control the nutrient input into the lake 
from the catchment land uses. This is a zonal trading system. Zones are specified 
based on the time lag in years between loading in the zone and discharge to the lake. 
Each nonpoint source (farm land) was assigned to one of the zones assuming that all 
nutrients from that farm land reach the lake at the same time (i.e., in one year). 
Permits were defined separately for each year, specifying the nutrient mass that the 
permit holder is allowed to discharge into the lake in the particular year (for example, 
2010-permits, 2011-permits,…, 2200-permits). Loading from a farm in a T-years lag 
zone reaches the lake after T years, therefore, the farm owner must buy T + t year 
permits to match the loading in year t. Temporal nutrient discharge targets (discharge 
goals for each year from the current date) have been set. The lake nutrient target for 
each discharge year determines the total available number of permits. 
This system creates several markets for different permit types. They have proposed to 
combine lag zones (three or five) together to create a single combined market, but 
there will still be many combined markets because the maximum time lag can be 200 
years. One-to-one bilateral trade is possible for each type of permit within and 
between zones. However, trades within a zone require the buyer and seller to act 
accordingly in the same year, while trades between two zones require the buyer and 
seller to act accordingly in different years. Hence, as the Hunter River Salinity 
Trading Scheme, this system also facilitates trade across time.  
Among the NPS nutrients trading programs proposed to date, we find Lock and Kerr 
as the best compromise system in terms of maintaining the simplicity of the program 
while sufficiently addressing the spatial and temporal aspects of nonpoint source 
pollution. However, a few issues are present, leaving space for further development.    
First, this zonal permit system is applicable only to a single receptor situation. Second, 
it assigns each farm to a single lag year or a block of a few lag years, and requires the 
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farm to buy a single permit for the particular year or block. The nutrients, for example 
nitrates, loaded into an aquifer from diffuse sources do not usually reach a receiving 
water body at once, but gradually over a relatively long period. Therefore, we cannot 
assign every farm to one specific lag zone. Third, the quantity transported to the 
receiving water body may be less than the quantity loaded from the source, and the 
amount of attenuation varies depending on the location of the source and the hydro-
geological properties of the flow paths. A trading system should take into account the 
varying levels of attenuation from farms.  
4.8 Point-Nonpoint Source (PS-NPS) Water Pollution Trading Systems 
States and environmental institutions all over the world have recognized the need for   
PS-NPS water pollution permit trading systems (Crutchfield, Letson, & Malik, 1994 ; 
Faeth, 2000; Fang, et al., 2005; David Leston, 1992; Ribaudo, et al., 1999), especially 
for controlling nutrients pollution. But the world lacks experience with such trading 
systems. One important factor that has driven the demand for such trading systems is 
the nutrient overload in surface water bodies jointly caused by point and nonpoint 
sources. The US nutrient trading programs which allow point sources to buy from 
upstream nonpoint sources are usually categorized and called PS-NPS nutrient trading 
systems, but as discussed in section 4.9 below, they are not true PS-NPS trading 
programs.  
On the other hand, PS-NPS trading is not always required or feasible (David Leston, 
1992; Ribaudo, et al., 1999).  Ribaudo et al. (1999) argued that PS-NPS trading is 
most suitable when both point and nonpoint sources contribute significantly to the 
total pollutant load. If the contribution from either source category is extremely large 
relative to the other, the cost savings from PS-NPS trading may not justify the cost of 
designing and implementing a PS-NPS trading program. According to Leston (1992), 
for point and nonpoint source trading to be useful (in the US context), two conditions 
must be satisfied. First, nonpoint source control should be a more economical way of 
achieving water quality goals than further point source abatements. Second, the cost 
of measuring and controlling nonpoint source loadings and the uncertainty in loading 
estimates should not overwhelm the potential savings.  
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In this section, we discuss just one theoretical design of a PS-NPS water pollution 
trading system. A few others are discussed under section 4.9, nutrient trading systems 
in the US.  
Horan, Shortle, Abler, and Ribaudo (2001) designed two types of trading systems to 
facilitate trading among and between point and nonpoint sources, distinguished by the 
way the NPS permits are defined. The first type allowed trading PS emissions and 
NPS loadings (emissions-to-expected loadings). The second type allowed trading PS 
emissions for diffuse source inputs, fertilizer and land (emissions-to-inputs). Both 
systems allow bilateral permit trades on a one-to-one basis within source categories, 
and using trading ratios between source categories. They derived expressions to 
calculate the trading ratios so that the total cost of pollution control is minimised. A 
single trading ratio was used in all trades between point and nonpoint sources.  
Horan, Shortle, Abler, and Ribaudo (2002) applied their prior theoretical work for 
nitrogen trading in the Pennsylvania portion of the Susquehanna River basin (SRB) in 
the United Sates. Nonpoint source pollution control cost was considered as a function 
of nitrogen loading or input use. Point source abatement cost was considered as a 
function of emissions. The proportion of nitrogen delivered to Chesapeake Bay from 
the basin was calculated using predetermined delivery coefficients. The economic cost 
of pollution was considered as a function of nitrogen delivered to the Bay. The 
outcomes of the system were evaluated using simulation experiments. According to 
the observed results, the trading system in which NPS permits were defined in terms 
of nitrogen loading was more efficient than the trading system in which permits were 
defined based on inputs; the type of input permits affects the performance of input 
based trading systems; and a trading system with land permits performs less 
efficiently than a trading system with fertilizer permits.  
The major problem with the above trading system and many other point and nonpoint 
source trading systems in the US is having a single trading ratio which applies for all 
trades between point and nonpoint sources. The quantity of nitrogen transported to a 
water body from spatially distributed nonpoint sources may differ from source to 
source, and different trading ratios are needed for different pairs of sources.   
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4.9 Nutrient Trading Systems in the United States 
The United States is the only country which has many active water quality trading 
programs. Water quality trading, and thus nutrient trading, in the US is governed by 
the Clean Water Act of 1972 (US EPA, 2007). The main focus of the Clean Water Act 
is to control point sources. Under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES), state environmental agencies authorized by the US EPA grant 
permits to point source dischargers such as municipal and industrial wastewater 
treatment plants (Faeth, 2000). The US regulatory approach for controlling nonpoint 
sources is completely different from that for controlling point sources. Both US EPA 
and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) largely subsidise farmers to 
implement and improve nutrient management practices8 rather than restricting them 
via permits (King & Kuch, 2003).  
According to the US EPA‘s Water Quality Trading Policy published in 2003, a pre-
specified Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for the water body of concern serves 
as the baseline for trade. Trading partners covered by the same TMDL can trade 
relative to NDPES permits or NDPES permit holders may buy nutrient reduction 
credits9 from nonpoint sources to offset additional discharges. US EPA (2007) 
identifies five ways that nutrient trade may take place. 
1. Bilateral trade between two point sources. 
2. Multilateral trade among many point sources.  
                                               
8
 Nutrient management practices which are also known as nutrient best management practices (BMPs) are 
farming methods that minimise nutrient loss from land uses. Some of those are using nutrient budgets and 
soil testing for optimal nutrients application, maintaining soil cover by leaving crop residues on the surface, 
establishing buffer areas between farms and environmentally sensitive areas, and slowing overland water 
flow through counter tillage, diversions, and sediment ponds.   
9
 In the US nutrient trading systems, nutrient reduction credits are traded rather than nutrient permits. The 
two terms are different.  A nutrient credit refers to a certain amount of nutrient load reduction. Credits are 
generated by nutrient management practices and abatement.  
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3. PS credit exchange: point sources which perform well below the permitted levels 
can save credits in an exchange which is overseen by a third party: government, 
private, or non-profit. Other point sources can buy credits from the credit exchange 
rather than buying directly from another point source.  
4. Bilateral trade between point and nonpoint sources: point sources can buy credits 
from nonpoint sources which generate credits via best management practices that 
reduce pollutant loading to the receiving water body. 
 5. NPS credit exchange: A nonpoint source credit exchange is a centralized pool of 
credits maintained by a third-party who buys credits from nonpoint sources and sells 
to point sources. Nonpoint sources who implement best management practices can 
generate credits and sell to the exchange.  Point sources may then purchase credits 
from the credit exchange.  
Below we provide a brief overview of three nutrient trading programs in the US. More 
details on US nutrient trading systems are available in US EPA (2007). 
The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program (Connecticut) allows 
trades between point sources of nitrogen. Seventy-nine municipal sewage treatment 
plants in Connecticut can participate in trading and the Connecticut Department of 
Environmental Protection (CDEP) oversees the trading system. The purpose is to 
control nitrogen loading to the Long Island Sound (LIS) estuary, a single receptor. 
CDEP use a water quality model of LIS and its major tributaries to determine the 
relationships between the discharge points and the actual delivery of nitrogen to the 
estuary. Trading ratios were determined to adjust for variability in delivery among 
sources. A set of zonal delivery factors (calculated from the LIS water quality model) 
accounts for the variability between actual discharge at the discharge point and 
delivery to LIS. Trading ratios are calculated directly from these delivery factors. In 
2005, 50 municipalities had purchased credits and 28 had sold credits. 
The Red Cedar River Watershed Nutrient Trading Pilot Program (Wisconsin) allows 
trades between point and nonpoint sources of phosphorus. Participants are the publicly 
owned treatment plants in the city of Cumberland and the farmers in the Red Cedar 
watershed. The treatment plants can buy phosphorus reduction credits from upstream 
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farmers who implement nutrient management practices. The trading ratio applicable 
for all trades between point and nonpoint sources was 2:1, meaning that the treatment 
plants have to buy 2 kg nutrient reduction credits from farmers to match each 
unpermitted 1 kg of phosphorus discharge into the river. This fixed trading ratio was 
selected purely on negotiation between the environmental authority and the city‘s 
point sources. As at 2007, the treatment plants had purchased more than 60 best 
management practices (BMPs) from farmers. 
The Lower Boise River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project (Idaho) allows trades 
between point and nonpoint sources of phosphorus. The TDML for Lower Boise 
River serves as the basis for trading. Point sources (waste water treatment plants and 
industrial dischargers) and nonpoint sources (farmers in the irrigation district) can 
participate in the trading system. Trading ratios apply for trades between point and 
nonpoint sources. The Idaho Soil Conversion Commission which oversees the trading 
system should approve the BMPs before being purchased. For each approved BMP, it 
assigns a specific trading ratio taking into account site location, phosphorus losses in 
the watershed, and losses due to irrigation withdrawals from the river. As at 2007, no 
trade had taken place. 
US nutrient trading systems have two design-related pitfalls. The trading ratios used in 
the US, for point and nonpoint source trades in particular, are safety oriented and 
sometimes stricter than the theoretical non-degradation based ratios (Hoag & Hughes-
Popp 1997). Such trading ratios restrict the opportunities for trade and increase the 
cost for buying point sources, but improve the water quality, or at least prevent any 
water quality deterioration as a consequence of trade. Some programs have a fixed 
trading ratio which applies to all trades, but some allow a series of pair-wise trading 
ratios which varies depending on the location of traders, the nutrient transport 
characteristics of the watershed, the pollutant traded, the level of uncertainty in 
delivery, and program goals (US EPA 2007). Even with a series of trading ratios, 
these bilateral trading ratio systems have high transaction costs and thin trading 
(David, 2003; Faeth, 2000; Fang, et al., 2005; Hoag & Hughes-Popp, 1997; King & 
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Kuch, 2003). There are only a few exceptions to this general trend; one is the nutrient 
trading systems in the Minnesota River Basin (Fang, et al. 2005). 
Another problem in the US nutrient trading systems is ignoring the temporal impacts 
of nonpoint sources. All the trading systems discussed above are single receptor, 
single time period markets. In calculating the trading ratios, none of the US nutrient 
trading programs has taken into account the time lag between the implementation of 
nonpoint source BMPs and occurrence of nutrient loading reduction at a receiving 
surface water body. As a consequence, point source purchases of nonpoint source 
credits may increase pollutant loads in the short run. 
Nutrient trading systems in the United States have many obstacles to trade. The first is 
that only point sources (mainly industrial) are regulated, while nonpoint sources 
(mainly agricultural) are not. Point sources, if they cannot meet the discharge limits 
specified by the permits, can pay upstream land users to implement best management 
practices which offset the excess nutrient load. Under the above circumstances, US 
nutrient trading systems are not true PS-NPS nutrient trading programs mainly 
because they do not require any purchases by NPS, and trades always occur in one 
direction. For at least 20 years, both economists and environmentalists have 
emphasised the need for regulating nonpoint sources as a means of encouraging them 
to actively participate in nutrient trading programs (Faeth, 2000, King and Kutch 
2003).          
4.10   Empirical Evidence: Lessons Learned 
After almost 40 years of research and discussion on water pollution trading, only a 
few countries like the United States and Australia have active water pollution trading 
programs. The number of actual trades is growing slowly. As at 1997, five water 
pollution credit trading systems were in place in the United States but no trade had 
been made (Hoag & Hughes-Popp, 1997). As at 2003, there were about 37 nutrient 
trading programs in the US, but only seven trades had actually taken place (King and 
Kuck, 2003). As at 2007, many trades had been reported from the US water quality 
trading programs, but several trading programs reported no trades (US EPA, 2007). 
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The slow growing water pollution trading in the US has motivated a discussion on the 
factors that affect the success of such trading programs. 
Hoag and Hughes-Popp compared the pollution permit trading theory with one 
application, the Tar-Pamlico nutrient-trading program in North Carolina. They 
identified six factors that had encouraged and discouraged trade: transaction costs, 
number of participants, abatement costs, enforcement costs, trading ratios, and loading 
limits.    
According to Hoag & Hughes-Popp (1997) the Tar Pamlico trading system allowed 
trades at a fixed price (based on average cost). Trades at a fixed price reduced 
transaction costs but the traders were unable to derive the marginal cost benefits. By 
allowing trade between point and nonpoint sources, the system gained the advantage 
of having a greater number of participants and increased opportunities for trade. Hoag 
& Hughes-Popp argued that the safety netted (non-degradation based) trading ratios 
had increased the cost of trades. For point sources, allowable levels of emissions (as 
specified by the permits) exceeded the expected loadings, eliminating the need for 
trade. Based on the above observations, Hoag & Hughes-Popp recommended that the 
designers of such trading systems have to find a compromise between cost 
effectiveness, administrative simplicity and political acceptance. Including both point 
and nonpoint sources, improved knowledge of the relationships between sources and 
receptors, more cost effective trading ratios, and marginal cost pricing were also 
recommended for the success of water pollution trading systems.     
David (2003) carried out a similar study on the failure of a discharge permit trading 
system for the Fox River in Wisconsin, United States. She also outlined some 
conditions required for a water pollution permit market to perform effectively: (1) 
potential cost savings from trade are substantial, (2) the expected emissions from the 
sources are greater than the current permit allocations, (3) treatment costs significantly 
differ among dischargers, (4) firms experience difficulties in meeting current 
discharge limits, (5) transaction costs are low enough to allow gains from trade, (6) 
property rights traded are well defined, (7) firms are certain of the opportunity to buy 
back in the future, (8) there are a sufficient number of potential buyers and sellers for 
75 
 
 
 
a market to exist, (9) the process of validating trades is quick, and (10) firms know 
that they are penalised for violating permit limits. 
King and Kuch (2003) studied the factors that kept nutrient trading in the United 
States rare and limited to a few trades. They found that institutional obstacles do exist 
but they are manageable, but insufficient demand and supply caused by federal and 
state subsidy programs that pay farmers to implement nutrient management practices 
are the main obstacles to trade. King and Kuch pointed out that the prevailing 
government policies do not stimulate demand and supply and policy changes are 
unlikely. Therefore, they argued that nutrient pollution trading systems should be 
implemented only in those watersheds where favourable demand and supply 
conditions exist.  
Fang, Easter, and Brezonik (2005) discussed two exemptions from the general trend 
of few PS-NPS trades occurring in water quality trading systems in the United States. 
The two trading systems were found in the Minnesota River Basin. Two companies 
which owned point source discharge permits, Rahr Malting Company and Southern 
Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative, established the two trading systems to buy 
nutrient reduction credits from farmers. Pollutants traded were nitrogen and 
phosphorus. The researchers found that the offsetting nature of the two projects which 
required additional point source discharges to be fully offset by NPS best management 
practises and availability of information on potential nonpoint source trading partners 
have contributed to a relatively higher number of PS-NPS trades. These trading 
systems have not only reduced pollution, but contributed to further environmental 
protection and regional economic growth. Additional environmental benefits were 
achieved because both trading projects used a trading ratio equal or greater than 2:1 to 
account for uncertainties in equalizing nonpoint source loading to point source loading 
and to provide extra pollutant load reductions. 
4.11 Conclusions 
While permit trading programs have been successful in controlling air pollution, the 
results in the water quality area are not impressive (Faeth, 2000; Kochtcheeva, 2009). 
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Progress has been observed in trading point source water pollution permits, but the 
world has little experience with nonpoint source trading in general, and nitrate trading 
in particular. The United States is the only country which has active nutrient trading 
programs, but they are neither true nonpoint source trading systems nor point and 
nonpoint source trading systems. New Zealand has proposed tradable approaches for 
nonpoint source control, but the programs are at the design stage. The rest of the 
world is also still considering policy changes towards market based instruments and 
designing market mechanisms for controlling nonpoint sources. 
Analytical literature highlights the importance of program design. Kochtcheeva 
(2009) emphasised that the program design, institutional settings, and supply and 
demand have significant effects on the performance of water pollution permit trading 
programs.  Experience with air pollution trading suggests that two important factors 
have contributed to the success of air pollution trading: (1) creation of a tradable 
standardized commodity which is capable of achieving environmental goals and (2) 
ability to achieve the environmental goals at least cost by designing the trading 
program as efficiently and attractively as possible (Schary & Fisher-Vanden, 2004). In 
the next chapter, we will show in detail how difficult it is to define a common 
standardised commodity for trading water pollution. What could be done is to design 
the trading programs to be as efficient and attractive as possible so that the 
environmental goals can be achieved at least cost.  
 
77 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
5 THE PROBLEM OF TRADING NITRATES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the difficulties of trading nitrate discharge permits, and thus the 
important considerations for market design. We consider agricultural nonpoint sources 
from which nitrate leaches into the aquifers and consequently migrates to surface 
water bodies via groundwater flux, and municipal and industrial point sources from 
which nitrate is discharged directly into surface water bodies.  
We first discuss the hydro-geological factors that should be considered in designing a 
market mechanism for allocating nitrate discharge permits. We discuss the additional 
issues that arise in trading nitrate discharge permits in the presence of multiple 
receptors and both point and nonpoint sources. We identify the basic requirements of 
a market-based mechanism for allocating nitrate discharge permits. We analyse the 
state-of-art solutions, previously proposed and currently available tradable permit 
systems, and show explicitly that these systems are unable to meet the environmental 
standards at least cost to society. Thus, we recognize the need for research into 
program design for trading nitrates. We analyse the designs of the market-based 
instruments for trading other resources such as electricity which have similar 
characteristics. Then we argue on the applicability of those market mechanisms for 
allocating water pollution permits, especially in the case of nitrates.          
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We use the term ―farm‖ to refer an agricultural nonpoint source, an area of land within 
a catchment where some agricultural activities are carried out. The term ―regulator‖ 
refers to a regional environmental authority that is responsible for maintaining water 
quality in the region. The regulator represents the government and acts on behalf of 
the public interest. We use the term ―loading‖ to refer to nitrate loading or leaching 
into the aquifer from nonpoint sources and the term ―emission‖ to refer to nitrate 
emission into a surface water body from point sources. Accordingly, a ―loading 
permit‖ refers to a right to load a specified amount of nitrate into the aquifer during a 
specified time period, and an emission permit refers to a right to emit a specified 
amount of nitrate into a surface water body during a specified time period. The term 
―flux‖ refers to the discharge of nitrate into a surface water body through groundwater 
flux. Nitrate trading refers to trade in nitrate loading and emission permits.   
5.2 Effects of Catchment Hydro-geology 
We describe the hydro-geological factors that affect the trade in loading permits, using 
a small hypothetical catchment example discussed in Appendix B.  Figure 5.1 
provides a rough view of the catchment which drains to a stream. Rectangles indicate 
the nonpoint sources (farms) and circles indicate the point sources. The two crossed 
circles indicate drinking water supply wells (they are also water quality monitoring 
wells).   
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Figure 5.1: Hypothetical Stream Catchment  
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Assume that the regulator wishes to allocate loading permits among the farms for the 
upcoming year through a tradable permit program (a market mechanism), so that the 
nitrate flux into the stream does not exceed the predetermined water quality standards 
at any time. The graphs in Figure 5.2 below show the amount of nitrate expected to be 
delivered to the stream in each year since 2010, if 1 kg of nitrate were loaded into the 
aquifer during year 2010 from each of two farms in the catchment: farms 1 and 8.  
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Figure 5.2: Amount of nitrate delivered to the stream from 1 kg nitrate loading in 
2010 from farms 1 and 8. 
The 1 kg of nitrate loaded from each farm is not delivered to the receiving water body 
at once. After a certain time delay, the pollutant mass is gradually delivered to the 
stream over a relatively long period. For example, nitrates leached from farm 1 do not 
appear in the stream until 2018 and thus farm 1 has a time lag of 8 years between 
loading and delivery to the receiving stream. From farm 1, 0.024 kg is delivered in 
2018, 0.032 kg is delivered in 2019,…, and 0.022 kg is delivered in 2035. The 
delivery time span is 18 years (from 2018 to 2035). The delivery peaks in 2025 (0.055 
kg). For farm 8, the time lag is just one year, the delivery time span is 12 years (from 
2011 to 2022), and delivery peaks after 3 years (in 2013). Therefore, the time lag, time 
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span of delivery, peak time, and the quantity delivered in each time period vary from 
source to source. 
On the other hand, the total amount of nitrate loaded into the aquifer is not transported 
to the receiving water body in full, but only a portion is delivered due to hydro-
chemical processes such as denitrification in the groundwater system.  For example, 
only 0.743 kg of nitrate loaded from farm 1 (74% of the loading) is transported to the 
stream; the rest is lost in transport. From farm 8, 0.852 kg out of a 1 kg load (85%) is 
transported to the receiving water body. The amount of attenuation varies depending 
on the location of the farm relative to the receiving water body and the flow paths.   
Let us assume a linear relationship between the quantity loaded from each farm and 
the quantity transported to the stream in each year.  Then a 1000 kg loading permit 
held by farm 1 in 2010 causes no nitrate flux into the stream in year 2013 and a 55 kg 
nitrate flux in year 2025. Transferring this permit from farm 1 to farm 8 would cause a 
114 kg nitrate flux in year 2013 but no flux in 2025. Therefore, a simple permit 
transfer between farms 1 and 8 would change the quantity of nitrate delivered to the 
stream in each year. The changes vary across time. The quantity delivered may be 
increased in some years and may be decreased in other years. Thus a transfer may 
degrade water quality in some years and improve water quality in other years. 
Nitrate transport profiles (for the stream) of all fifteen farms in the catchment are 
shown in Figure 5.3. The graphs indicate that the time lags, attenuations, delivery time 
spans, and delivery peak times vary from farm to farm10.  
                                               
10
 The delivery profiles of the farms seem to have some patterns (for example, the longer the delay, the 
longer the delivery time span and the greater the attenuation). This is a specific feature of our example 
because it assumes that all the hydro-geological properties of the aquifer are uniform. This is not the general 
case because the aquifer properties usually change over space. 
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Figure 5.3: Amount of nitrate (kg) delivered to the stream from 1 kg nitrate loading in 
2010 from each farm. 
Based on the above observations we identify three important factors that should be 
taken into account in trading nitrate loading permits.  
1. Time lags between leaching and appearance in a water body. Nitrate, once 
mixed in slow-moving groundwater, keeps on flowing with groundwater for 
decades until being discharged into a surface water body or the ocean. The 
time lags vary depending on the location of loading and varying hydro-
geological properties of the flow paths. 
2. Attenuation in transport. Nitrate flowing in water may be biologically or 
chemically transformed into other forms of nitrogen in the groundwater 
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system11. The amount of attenuation varies according to the properties of the 
subsurface strata and the length of the flow paths.  
3. Protracted delivery profiles. The quantity of nitrate transported from a farm to 
some surface water body is not delivered in one step, but gradually over a 
relatively long period. 
5.3 The Multiple Receptor Problem 
The mass nitrate flux into a surface water body from its catchment alone may not be a 
reliable indicator of the catchment groundwater quality, but it is practically impossible 
to monitor and control nitrate levels at all locations in the aquifer. Therefore, 
catchment environmental authorities usually select a few groundwater monitoring 
wells where nitrate concentrations are monitored and controlled.  
In the above example, we had only one receptor, the stream. We assumed that the 
regulator wanted to allocate loading permits though a tradable permits program to 
meet the water quality standards at a single receptor (the stream). Now assume that the 
regulator wants to allocate loading permits to meet the water quality standards in the 
stream and the drinking water wells. Then the situation becomes a multiple receptor 
problem, which is more complex.   
Figure 5.4 shows the increases in concentration at wells 1 and 2 caused by 1 kg nitrate 
loading from each farm. On well 1, farms 1, 2, and 6 have considerable impacts, while 
other farms have zero or negligible impacts. On well 2, farms 7 and 11 have 
considerable impacts while others have zero or negligible impacts. In this example, 
each farm affects one well at most, but in general, a given farm may affect many 
groundwater wells. The graphs in the figure indicate that the farms have different 
temporal effects on the concentration of each well. On the other hand, the farms affect 
the wells and the stream in different time scales.  For example, nitrate from farm 1 
takes 8 years to reach the stream, but only two years to reach well 1.   
                                               
11
 For example, by pyrite oxidation and biological denitrification (Conan et al. 2003).  
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Figure 5.4: Increases in nitrate concentration at wells 1 and 2 caused by 1 kg nitrate 
loading in 2010 from each farm. Only farms 1, 2 and 6 have considerable effects on 
well 1. Only farms 7 and 11 have considerable effects on well 2. 
Multiple receptor situations occur not only when the groundwater nitrate 
concentration is monitored and controlled at some monitoring wells, but also when 
large catchments have several connected stream segments and lakes, and the 
regulators want to control nitrate discharge into each of those surface water bodies. 
For example, the Lake Taupo catchment of New Zealand has several streams flowing 
into the lake. The Waitaki River catchment in New Zealand‘s South Island has several 
connected streams and lakes. In such cases, each connected stream segment or lake 
may be considered as a receptor. 
Another possibility found in the literature is multiple (concentration monitoring) 
receptors on the same surface water body. Rather than controlling total nitrate 
discharge into the surface water bodies, the regulator may want to control nitrate 
concentrations at different points in a receiving surface water body. This is not a good 
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idea, because the surface water concentration may vary due to the variations in surface 
water flow and quantity caused by rain, evaporation, and water diversions, rather than 
nitrate fluxes from the catchment. In this work, we do not consider multiple 
(concentration- monitoring) receptors on a single surface water body.  
When multiple receptors are considered, the farms in a catchment may affect different 
receptors over different time scales. As a consequence, a permit transfer may improve 
the water quality at some receptors in some years, and degrade the water quality at 
some receptors in other years. Hence, when multiple receptors are involved, trades 
should satisfy water quality standards in every time period at every receptor. 
5.4 Presence of Point Sources 
Surface water bodies such as lakes and streams usually receive nitrates from both 
point sources and nonpoint sources. Ideally, all manageable sources including 
industrial and municipal point sources and agricultural nonpoint sources should be 
included in a catchment nitrate trading system. However, point and nonpoint sources 
differ significantly, and these differences can limit the effectiveness of integrated 
trading programs. These differences can also be illustrated using the hypothetical 
catchment example presented above.  
1. Time lags. Since point sources discharge directly into the stream, with respect 
to the stream (receptor), the time lag for point sources is zero while the time 
lag for nonpoint sources may be decades. For example, a municipal sewage 
treatment plant may discharge directly into a stream with zero time lag, while 
nitrates loaded into the aquifer from an upstream farm may take decades to 
reach the stream via groundwater flux. 
2. Attenuation and protraction: Point source emissions are received by the stream 
instantly in full quantity. As discussed above, nonpoint source loadings are not 
usually transported to a receptor in full or at once, but gradually over a 
relatively long period. Point source effects are not as protracted as nonpoint 
source effects. 
85 
 
 
 
3. Multiple receptors. While nonpoint sources affect groundwater receptors, point 
sources do not usually affect groundwater receptors (we have considered a 
catchment where groundwater flows towards a surface water body but not vice 
versa). But this may happen under extreme circumstances such as a flood. A 
flood may cause the surface water head to rise above the groundwater head 
allowing surface water to flow into the aquifer.  
5.5 Requirements of a Workable Nitrate Trading System 
The essential concerns for the optimal control of nitrate pollution for both market 
based and non-market based mechanisms were discussed in section 2.7. This section 
outlines the essentials of a market-based mechanism in particular. The success of any 
pollution permit trading system is determined by its ability to allocate pollution rights 
efficiently. As discussed above, an efficient market mechanism for trading nitrate 
must incorporate specific factors (for example, the catchment hydro-geology) in 
addition to the general factors that affect the success of any trading program (for 
example, low transaction costs).  
5.5.1 The Commodities Traded 
The major factor that has driven the success of air pollution trading systems is the 
creation of a tradable standardized commodity which is capable of achieving 
environmental goals (Schary & Fisher-Vanden, 2004). For any tradable permit 
program to be successful, to be accepted by the stakeholders, and to be implemented 
and maintained at a reasonable cost, the commodities traded should be clearly defined 
and standardised.    
5.5.2 Information Requirements 
Due to the delayed and dispersed nature of nitrate transport in natural systems, trading 
requires significant information about the fate of nitrates released from sources. First, 
trading systems need knowledge of the relationship between loadings and emissions at 
sources and their effects at the receptors (O'Shea, 2002).  
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Second, trading systems need reliable estimates of sustainable nitrate levels at the 
receptors to achieve the water quality standards in groundwater and surface water. 
These may be defined as maximum acceptable mass pollutant discharge into a 
receptor or maximum acceptable pollutant concentration at a receptor. Tradable 
concentration or mass should be set taking into account the contributions of 
unmanageable sources.  
Third, to achieve the optimal allocation of pure public goods, even with a market-
based instrument, some kind of government intervention is required, and the 
government who acts as a central planner needs critical information about the users, 
mainly, the user benefits of pollution (Baliga & Maskin, 2003). The market structure 
should be selected so that it incentivises the users to act on their true benefit functions 
(Egteren & Weber, 1999).  
Fourth, availability of information about potential trading partners encourages trading 
(Fang, et al., 2005). This requirement is significant for free bilateral trading. In 
contrast, a centrally controlled market which operates as an exchange or a marketplace 
does not require much interaction and exchange of information between buyers and 
sellers (Woodward, Kaiser, and Wicks 2002).  
5.5.3 Demand and supply 
The major reason that few trades take place in the US nutrient trading systems is 
insufficient demand and supply (King & Kuch, 2003). Demand and supply are 
directly related to the number of buyers and sellers. Therefore, for a water quality 
trading system to function actively, there should be a sufficient number of potential 
buyers and sellers (David, 2003; Hoag & Hughes-Popp, 1997). 
Demand and supply are strongly related to other factors such as prevailing restrictions 
on nitrate discharge (in a non-market situation), nitrate reduction targets at the 
receptors, the initial distribution of discharge rights, and the differences in nitrate 
abatement costs, discharge levels, and operations among the participants.  
For the most part, demand and supply is beyond the control of market designers (King 
and Kuch 2003). However, some design features such as the scope of the trading 
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system (focus on the catchment rather than a particular water body) and the method of 
initial allocation may be selected to improve demand and supply.    
David (2003) found that for a trading system to function properly, firms should be 
certain of the opportunity to buy back in the future; this is also related to having 
sufficient demand and supply.  
5.5.4 Trading rules 
For a permit market to function properly, trading rules should be well established, 
understood, agreed upon, and adhered to. The trading procedure should be simple 
enough to understand. Over-restrictive trading rules cause thin permit markets and 
market failures (Faeth, 2000; Hoag & Hughes-Popp, 1997). On the other hand, loosely 
defined trading rules may end in unfair trading and non-attainment of environmental 
goals. Some trading rules allow ―free-rider‖ problems which arise when some 
polluters benefit from the transactions of others and lead to thin markets (McGartland, 
1988).   
5.5.5 Transaction costs 
Theory and experience in pollution permit trading suggest that the transaction costs 
can cause market failures (Hoag & Hughes-Popp 1997; McGartland 1988; David 
2003). In a nitrate permit market, the cost of finding trading partners, negotiating 
prices and contracts, obtaining approvals (validating trades), preparing agreements, 
and related legal deals contribute to the overall transaction cost. The market structure 
should be selected to minimize the transaction costs. 
5.5.6 Monitoring and Enforcement 
A healthy market requires sufficient monitoring and enforcement. Discharge rights 
should be well defined, stating what the permit holders are allowed and not allowed 
by the permits. Firms should know that they will be penalised for violating permit 
limits (David 2003). 
Monitoring point source nutrient discharge is easy with the available technology, but 
monitoring nonpoint source nitrate loading is difficult. Since nitrate loading from 
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agricultural nonpoint sources depends on the type of land use and land management 
practice, land uses may be monitored in addition to the quantitative nitrate losses. To 
accomplish proper monitoring and enforcement, the methods, procedures, and devices 
used should be well defined under trading rules.       
5.6 State of the Art: Alternative Solutions      
Based on our literature survey and the requirements of nitrate permit trading, we 
identified two quite different market approaches as candidate solutions for the 
problem of trading nitrate permits: free trading of receptor permits and centrally 
controlled multilateral trading of loading (source) permits.  
5.6.1 Free Trading of Receptor Permits 
A receptor permit is a right to increase pollution (nitrate level) at a specified receptor 
in a specified time period. Under a receptor permit system, farms have to maintain a 
portfolio of permits to match the effects on each receptor in each period. For the 
above example, receptor permits may be defined separately for the stream and the 
drinking water wells, as rights to discharge nitrate into the stream in each year, and 
rights to increase the nitrate concentration in the well in each year. A farm‘s 
maximum allowed nitrate loading is determined by the bundle of receptor permits 
held12.  
The dispersed nature of nitrate transport requires the farms to maintain a wide variety 
of permits in each year. In the example given above, loading from farm 1 during a 
single year affects the stream over 18 years and groundwater well 1 over 15 years (if 
the effects of magnitude less than 0.00005 mg/l were ignored). The farm will have to 
surrender different quantities of 18 permits for the stream and 15 permits for the well 
to cover the operations in each year. Farmers may be utterly confused by such a 
                                               
12
 The receptor permit system discussed here is a generalised form of the ambient permit system discussed 
in the literature. The conventional ambient permits are not time specific, but the receptor permits discussed 
here are rights to pollute a receptor in a specified time period.  
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permit system. We have already discussed the administrative difficulties and 
transaction costs associated with such ambient permit systems (section 4.4.1).  
To avoid sources having to maintain a complex portfolio of permits every year, and to 
eliminate the associated confusion and transaction costs, recent research has 
developed some simplification methods. First and foremost, for a receptor based 
permit program to work, only one or few receptors should be taken into account. For a 
catchment scale permit program, it is reasonable to consider the main water body 
towards which the catchment drains (in our example, the stream), as the single 
receptor. The permits can be defined as rights to discharge nitrates into the receptor. 
However, a single receptor alone does not free the farms from the burden of having to 
assemble a portfolio of permits because their nitrate loading in a single time period 
may affect the receptor in many time periods. Hence, another simplification criterion 
has to be adopted to avoid the farms having to assemble a portfolio of temporal 
receptor permits.    
Kerr and Lock (2008) proposed to assign each farm to a single year or a block of few 
years (of lag time), and to require each farm to buy a single permit for the particular 
year or block (section 4.7). This approach approximates the bell-shaped temporal 
transport profile to a straight line representing the average impact as shown in Figure 
5.5. Trading based on such approximations ignores some of the temporal impacts of 
nonpoint sources and may end in unexpected or increased levels of nitrates at the main 
receptor.  
The biggest challenge in implementing the method proposed by Kerr and Lock (2008) 
is distinguishing non-overlapping blocks and assigning each farm to a single block. As 
shown in Figure 5.4, farm 1 peaks during the 14th to 18th years of loading and farm 2 
peaks during the 3rd to 7th years of loading. There is no way to define sequential and 
continuous 5 year blocks so that each farm can be assigned to a single block based on 
peak 5 year effects. Further reducing the block length would lead to further unrealistic 
approximations.  
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Figure 5.5: Approximation of the temporally varying effects of nonpoint sources to a 
series of uniform effects. The average effects of farms 1 and 8 over the peak five 
years.     
Such systems limit inter-block trading opportunities to trades across time. As shown 
in Figure 5.5, in 2010, farm 1 needs 2023 to 2027 permits and farm 8 needs 2012 to 
2016 permits.  Any farm cannot purchase current permits from the other for 
immediate use. However, farm 8 may buy permits from farm 1 and use them in future. 
Such trades which induce compliance activities at different stages of time are usually 
known as trades across time.  
Another simplification adopted by Morgan et al. (2000) assumes continuously valid 
permits (permits valid for T years) defined based on the last year of the planning 
horizon. A permit gives the owner an explicit right to increase the concentration at the 
selected receptor by a specified amount in the last year of the planning horizon. As we 
have discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.7), this work is theoretically incorrect and such 
permits cannot achieve the water quality standards.  
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Kerr and Lock (2008) and Morgan et al (2000) have considered only a single receptor 
situation with nonpoint sources, but both cases include a large number of constraints 
(a constraint for every year during a long planning horizon). The common pitfall in 
those proposed trading programs is that they ignore some important constraints to 
simplify the problem. Such systems are unable to ensure water quality over time and 
can lead to unexpected results.  
5.6.2 Centrally Controlled Multilateral Trading of Loading Permits 
Loading permits are similar to emission permits discussed in the literature. 
Characteristics of the nitrate trading problem discussed above and the literature 
discussed about emission trading systems, for example, Ermoliev (2000) and Morgan, 
Coggins, and Eidman (2000), provide evidence that a centrally controlled multilateral 
trading framework is required to facilitate trade in loading permits (Chapter 4). We 
have already discussed the problems associated with other emission trading systems 
such as pollution offset systems and trading ratio systems (Chapter 4). In brief, those 
bilateral trading systems have free rider problems, high transaction costs, thin 
markets, and they cannot lead to efficient allocation of loading permits.   
Loading permits can be traded in an exchange-type centralized market in which 
multilateral transactions are coordinated by an authorized entity. For trading nitrate 
permits, a centralized ex-ante market (possibly a year-ahead market) is suitable to 
achieve environmental feasibility, but they require the market coordinator to find the 
equilibrium prices ex-ante. The problem is how to find a set of equilibrium prices 
which rations the permits relative to each farm‘s profit/cost function while meeting 
the environmental standards over multiple receptors and time periods. Ermoliev et al. 
(2000) proposed that a market coordinator who acts as a Walrasian auctioneer could 
lead a centrally controlled permit market towards a set of equilibrium ambient 
(receptor) prices and emission (loading) prices (section 4.4.5). However, the auction 
may take a long time to converge to an equilibrium.  
To find the equilibrium prices, a Walrasian auction is not required if the dischargers 
provide the coordinator information on quantities they would trade at each possible 
price step, beforehand. The optimal allocation may be modelled as a mathematical 
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program, possibly as an LP, from which the equilibrium prices may be obtained 
straight off. This is the lesson that the environmental policy makers could learn from 
the modern electricity markets, which use LPs to clear the markets and set the prices 
instantaneously (Alvey, Goodwin, Xingwang, Streiffert, & Sun, 1998; Hogan, Read, 
& Ring, 1996). The similarity is that both are common pool, multilateral trading 
problems with complex interactions and a large number of interdependent and 
interrelated constraints. Given that the gains from trade and constraints on trade can 
be modelled linearly, the two problems have a close analogy. An added benefit is that 
not only the environmental constraints, but all relevant political, regional, and private 
constraints could be included in the pricing models, if justified by the stakeholders.  
In the next section, we discuss the structure of modern electricity markets to 
understand how electricity is traded. Electricity, unlike other commodities, cannot be 
physically exchanged between any two parties as and when they wish. Trading should 
take into account a wide range of physical and economic constraints. This is the core 
issue with trading nitrate permits also. The design of electricity markets provides 
guidance for centrally controlled multilateral trading of nitrate permits.        
5.7 Electricity Markets 
In many parts of North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific, the electricity sector is de-
regulated. The governments have established market mechanisms to meet demand as 
efficiently as possible, in a way which is acceptable to both producers and consumers. 
Most modern electricity markets are centrally controlled online trading programs 
which facilitate multilateral trading through a common pool. They use optimisation 
algorithms to determine the generation dispatch schedules and prices (to clear the 
market), maximising the gains from trade relative to the submitted bids and offers. 
Electronic markets supported by optimisation methods are sometimes called ―smart 
markets‖ (McCabe, Rassenti, & Smith, 1991). The main features of smart electricity 
markets are listed below.  
1. A common pool of resources or commodities. 
2. Decentralized buyers and sellers. 
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3. A centralized decision maker or a regulator. 
4. A framework for multilateral trading.  
5. Bids and offers revealing willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept.  
6. A mathematical programming model to clear the market periodically.  
7. Constraints on capacity, budget, and/or transport. 
8. Online trading. 
In a smart market, buyers are buying from and sellers are selling to an exchange 
market or an auction rather than trading bilaterally with a trading partner. Ownership 
rights are transferred, and resources or commodities are added in and removed from a 
common pool rather than being physically transferred between individuals. For 
example, in electricity markets, buyers and sellers submit bids and offers to an online 
auction and pay or receive money according to the prices and quantities cleared. 
Suppliers supply electricity to the transmission network (pool), and consumers 
consume electricity from the network. This mechanism significantly reduces the costs 
of searching for trading partners and trading information, arranging contracts and 
agreements, and related legal procedures. Therefore, smart markets have low 
transaction costs.  
When complicated interactions and externalities arise in trading resources through a 
common pool (for example, a farm‘s nitrate loading into groundwater has complicated 
impacts on the nitrate concentration in drinking water wells and nitrate fluxes into 
surface water), the process of market design is also complicated. Electricity markets 
and other smart markets (for example, the Victoria gas market in Australia) handle 
such interdependencies efficiently by including all those interactions in the 
mathematical programming models used to clear the market. Hence, the real strength 
of this market mechanism is the use of mathematical programming.  
Electricity market clearing models used in New Zealand, Australia, Singapore and 
parts of North America are based on Linear Programming (Read and 
Chattopandhayay, 1999). 
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5.7.1 LP Models for Clearing Electricity Markets 
Read and Chattopandhayay (1999) provide a nice overview of the structure of LP 
based electricity market clearing models. The basic purpose of electricity market 
models is to ―maximise the benefits from trading in a spot market subject to the 
operating constraints‖. The electricity sellers (generators) and buyers (loads) in each 
region (node) submit offers and bids. The linear program finds the optimal set of 
generation offers and load bids which maximise the benefits from trading (as shown 
by the shaded area in Figure 5.6), taking into account a complex set of constraints on 
generator capacities, consumption, transmission line capacities, and system security 
and reliability requirements. The nodal demand and supply balance constraints ensure 
that the primary purpose of meeting the demand is achieved. 
Price 
$/MWh
Market clearing 
price
Load bids
Generation 
offers
MWCleared MW  
Figure 5.6: Overview of Electricity Market Clearing Models, Source: Read and 
Chattopandhayay (1999).  
The main outputs of the LP models are the generation dispatch schedule (how much 
power is bought from each generator, how much power is sold to each retailer or user) 
and a set of nodal energy prices.  
The markets are usually cleared at fixed time intervals, for example, every thirty 
minutes. Market clearing for any time interval means solving the LP with the set of 
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bids and offers submitted for the particular period and finding the optimal dispatch 
schedule and prices for the period. Since electricity markets are frequently cleared, 
payments and charges are not cleared immediately but at longer time intervals, for 
example, the end of every month. 
5.7.2 The New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM) 
New Zealand was a pioneer in electricity market research, design, and implementation 
(Alvey, et al., 1998; Hogan, et al., 1996). New Zealand‘s electricity market, known as 
the NZEM, is an online trading system run by agreed rules. Electricity generators 
offer electricity to the wholesale market for dispatch via the countrywide transmission 
system known as the ―national grid‖. Electricity retailers bid online to buy electricity 
to supply their customers. The online trading system processes the bids and offers and 
updates the prices every five minutes. Virtually, electricity is supplied to the end users 
via retailers. Consumers are free to select and change their retailers any time.    
The government oversees the trading system through an authorized institution called 
the Electricity Commission. The commission has out-sourced the services required for 
the market. Most of the operational activities are contracted to a company called NZX, 
while the transmission network is operated and maintained by a state owned company 
called Transpower. Generation companies, retailers and large electricity users 
participate in the market. 
5.7.3 Smart Markets for Environmental Pollution Rights 
MaCabe et al. (1991), in their paper on smart markets, mentioned that this mechanism 
is applicable for the allocation of pollution rights where spatial contiguity is 
important.   Murphy, Dinar, Howitt, Rassenti, and Smith (2000) designed a smart 
computer-assisted spot market for allocating water. Using a case study of the 
California water transfer system in the United States, they showed the efficiency gains 
of a smart market relative to conventional bilateral trading. Murphy et al. also 
mentioned that smart markets are applicable for allocating tradable pollution rights.  
Raffensperger and Milke (2005) went a step further to design a  smart market for 
groundwater, taking into account the hydro-geological effects of groundwater 
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extraction in a more precise manner. In many ways, this market design is similar to 
the NZEM, mainly the market is cleared using an LP which maximises gains from 
trade relative to submitted bids and offers subject to constraints which describe the 
physical interactions of the system. However, the underlying interactions in water 
trading and electricity trading are different and the constraint structure is different. 
Raffensperger and Milke used a groundwater hydrology model (MODFLOW) to 
obtain a set of response coefficients which measure the drawdown in groundwater 
head at each head control location due to a unit groundwater withdrawal from each 
well. Using these coefficients, the groundwater head and total drawdown response at 
each control location are stated as a linear functions of extractions. The LP determines 
the optimal abstraction rates for all the wells, which maximise the gains from trade 
(consumer and producer surplus), subject to constraints on minimum and maximum 
acceptable groundwater head and drawdown at each control point. The smart 
groundwater market of Raffensperger and Milke would perform best as long as the 
responses to groundwater extraction are linear.  
Even though the applicability of the smart market approach to trading environmental 
pollution permits has been recognized, a detailed market design has never been 
proposed, particularly for the nonpoint source pollution problem. The difficulties of 
modelling the physical interactions in the system, lack of information, and the cost 
involved may have hindered the effort. In the next section we show that none of the 
above problems are significant in designing a nitrate trading program.      
5.8 Discussion 
As promised in the previous chapter, we showed that defining a common standardised 
commodity to enable a free market in nitrate loading permits is impossible. Despite 
the economic theory on the ability of free markets to achieve the optimal allocation of 
resources without government intermediation, resources such as electricity, 
groundwater, and pollution rights cannot always be freely traded one-to-one based on 
private negotiations. However, the efficiency gains from market-based mechanisms 
compared to government regulation are well-recognised. Hence, despite the 
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difficulties, market-based instruments have been devised to trade them efficiently. 
These are necessarily centrally controlled trading programs rather than ―free‖ markets.   
Modern electricity markets use LP models to find the generation and dispatch 
schedules and nodal prices that maximise the benefits from trading while satisfying 
complex sets of constraints which describe the physics and economics of the overall 
system. Water pollution permit trading is also a common pool resource allocation 
problem with complex interactions and externalities, similar to the problems of buying 
and selling electricity. Therefore, we conclude that the design concepts of the 
electricity markets have a great potential for application in water pollution permit 
trading. The literature discussed on non-market based mechanisms for the optimal 
control of water pollution (Chapter 3) provided evidence that it is possible to acquire 
the information required and to model the physical interactions in the system.  
However, there are some criticisms of electricity markets and other smart markets.  
First, the efficiency gains of those centrally controlled bid/offer-clearing markets are 
questionable. According to fundamental economic theory, a market is efficient if it 
produces the maximum social benefit, taking into account the benefits derived by 
consuming and the costs incurred in producing. For a centrally controlled bid/offer 
based market to be efficient, the seller offers should indicate the true marginal costs 
and buyer bids should indicate the true marginal utility, so that the aggregate bid and 
offer functions (Figure 5.6) indicate the overall industry demand and supply functions. 
Otherwise, the outcomes may be inefficient. In practice, active market participation of 
a large number of rational buyers and sellers who cannot affect the prices creates 
relatively efficient markets. Hence, if the number of pollution sources (mainly 
agricultural entities) in a watershed is large, a permit market is likely to perform 
efficiently. 
Second, the initial cost of setting up a smart market and the cost of operation may be 
significant. It is an interdisciplinary effort which needs engineers, economists, 
modellers and other relevant professionals. They need a lot of information. For 
electricity markets, the technology infrastructure should be in place and reliable, 
continuous monitoring and enforcement are required, and errors and pitfalls in the 
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market design may end in catastrophe. However, electricity trading is a more dynamic 
business compared to trading nitrate permits. The demand for nitrate discharges does 
not vary as frequently as the demand for electricity. Hence, we can take only the 
relevant features of electricity markets, mainly the use of mathematical programs to 
determine the optimal prices and traded quantities, but not the dynamic operational 
aspects such as online trading and electronic monitoring and surveillance systems, 
though these features would be great if they could be done.     
The main purpose of this thesis is to design a market mechanism for allocating point 
and nonpoint source nitrate discharge permits using mathematical programming 
techniques for pricing and allocation. We contribute to program design aspects with a 
focus on using the mathematical programs for pricing and allocation.  
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Chapter 6 
6 TRADING NITRATE LOADING PERMITS
13
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a market mechanism for allocating nitrate loading permits 
among nonpoint sources. The chapter focuses on the design of a trading program to 
use an LP to price and allocate loading permits over time and space. The trading 
schema is initially designed assuming that the environment, and thus the ability of the 
water bodies to tolerate pollutants (in this case, nitrate), are owned by the government 
(regulator) on behalf of the public. The trading system allows the government to 
lease-out the ability of the environment to accept pollution for short term use of the 
agricultural nonpoint sources, through nitrate loading permits. The sources can lease-
in loading permits (buy) for up to a fixed number of years, and sub-lease previously 
leased permits (sell).  
We first clarify the type of commodities (resources) traded in the market followed by 
a discussion on defining the scope of the trading system. Then we explain how to 
calculate the tradable quantities of those resources. We present an adaptation of the 
response matrix technique to relate the loading permits allocated to diffuse sources 
and the pollution that occurs at the receptors. We discuss the factors that should be 
taken into account in selecting the time frames for trading and make recommendations 
                                               
13
 This chapter is based on Prabodanie, Raffensperger, Read, and Milke (2010). 
100 
 
 
 
for best compromise solutions. Finally, we present an overview of the market design, 
trading procedures, regulations, and operational aspects.  
6.2 Commodities Traded 
Trade is the exchange of commodities, and markets are places where commodities are 
traded. In an electricity market, it is clear that the commodity being traded is 
electricity. Both supply and demand are measured in Mwh of electricity. However, in 
a market for nitrate loading permits (or water pollution permits in general), the 
commodity or the resource being traded is not obvious.  
Consumers wish to buy rights to load nitrates into the aquifer or some water body. A 
―loading permit‖ is a right to load a specified amount of nitrate into the aquifer from a 
specified location, in a specified time period. As discussed in section 6.6, we consider 
loading permits defined for each year separately.  
The demand is for nitrate loading measured in kg, but the supply of loading rights is 
not directly limited in terms of total available kilograms, but indirectly restricted by 
the water quality standards specified in different units. Generally, water quality 
standards specify the maximum sustainable amount of nitrate that a water body can 
accept and dilute in a given time period without compromising its ecological health, 
survival, and quality. Therefore, the scarce resource which limits the farm nitrate 
loading is the ability of the concerned water bodies to accept nitrates. The commodity 
actually traded in a market in nitrate loading permits is the right to consume these 
resources.  
We define a ―receptor capacity right‖ as a right to increase the nitrate level at a 
specified receptor in a specified time period.  A loading permit is therefore equivalent 
to a bundle of receptor capacity rights (commodities). The trading system should be 
designed to facilitate the farms to trade different bundles of commodities in the same 
exchange market.  
For agricultural nonpoint sources, the tradable permits may be defined as ―input 
permits‖ which allow the farms to adopt farming practices that cause nitrate loading. 
For example, permits may be defined in terms of maximum allowed nitrogen fertilizer 
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application rate, stocking density, or effluent irrigation rate. However, the literature 
provides evidence that loading permits are more efficient than input permits (Horan, 
Shortle, & Abler, 2002). Under an input-based permit system, the farms may have to 
assemble different types of input permits to cover their operations. This is an 
unnecessary burden, because the commercial farmers have sophisticated tools (such as 
OVERSEER to relate the inputs to loading and to calculate the potential nitrate 
loading from intended farming options (section 2.4.3).  
6.3 Scope of the Trading System 
The trading system is designed at the catchment scale, but the traded commodities are 
defined relative to the set of receptors considered. Hence, the scope of the trading 
system is actually determined by the set of receptors selected. A catchment is 
generally defined as a land area from which water drains towards a common water 
body. Therefore, any catchment-scale water pollution trading system should consider 
the common sink, towards which the catchment drains, as the main receptor. Mass 
nitrate flux into the main receptor via groundwater is a good indicator of diffuse 
nitrate discharges in the catchment. Large catchments can have sub-catchments 
draining to small connected streams or lakes which may also be considered as 
receptors to avoid excessive local pollution. In addition, groundwater monitoring 
wells may be considered as receptors where the nitrate concentration in the well is 
controlled rather than the mass nitrate discharge.  
Groundwater quality management models are sometimes developed considering a set 
of groundwater receptors only (C. L. Morgan, et al., 2000; Peña-Haro, et al., 2009). 
However, since a groundwater monitoring well is affected only by the sources whose 
nitrate travels through the well, the monitoring network should be designed to capture 
the effects of all sources. A large number of receptors may cause difficulties to the 
market authorities because they will have to set quality standards for each receptor 
and monitor each receptor. On the other hand, groundwater receptors cannot capture 
the effects of point sources. Therefore, we recommend a main surface water receptor 
with or without groundwater receptors.     
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Once the set of groundwater and surface water receptors are chosen, manageable 
nonpoint sources in the catchment, and manageable point sources that discharge 
effluents directly into the surface water receptors can be included in the trading 
program.    
6.4 Tradable Capacities 
We define ―receptor capacity‖ as the amount of nitrate that a receptor can tolerate in a 
given time period without compromising its health and quality (nitrate intake capacity 
of a water body). The ability of the receptors to accept nitrate can vary depending on 
the weather, water use, and other factors. However, during a relatively long period 
like a year (which covers a whole hydrological cycle or several cycles), the receptor 
capacity can be estimated as a fixed value. Receptor capacities are estimated based on 
the general water quality standards discussed in section 2.6.3.   
General water quality standards specify maximum acceptable pollutant concentrations 
in water used for specific purposes, for example, the maximum acceptable nitrate 
concentration in drinking water is 50 mg/l. Based on these general standards, regional 
environmental authorities develop specific water quality standards for specific water 
bodies or receptors. For example, the estimated maximum acceptable nitrogen load for 
Lake Rotorua is 435 tons per year (Rutherford, 2008). This is the amount of nitrate 
that the lake can tolerate in each year and hence the annual nitrate intake capacity of 
the lake. Receptor capacities may be specified in several ways, depending on the type 
of receptor.   
1. The maximum acceptable mass nitrate discharge to a receptor during a time 
period, measured in mass units, e.g., kg, and specified for receptors such as 
lakes.  
2. The maximum acceptable nitrate concentration at a receptor, at a time, 
measured in concentration units, e.g., mg/l, and specified for receptors such as 
groundwater wells.  
3. The maximum acceptable mass pollutant flux at a receptor, at a time, measured 
in flux units, e.g., kg/day, and specified for receptors such as streams.  
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In this work, we consider the first two types of receptors only, surface water receptors 
for which the capacity is given as a maximum acceptable mass load, and groundwater 
receptors for which the capacity is given as a maximum acceptable concentration. The 
total capacity of the receptors may not be tradable due to the presence of 
unmanageable sources.  
6.4.1 Tradable Sources 
All the manageable nonpoint sources in a catchment (section 2.6.2) are usually 
considered as tradable sources. The main tradable sources are the agricultural land 
uses and we continue to use the term ―farm‖ to refer to tradable nonpoint sources in 
the catchment. However, any land use which causes nitrate leaching should be 
considered as a tradable source. To be tradable, a source should be manageable or 
controllable by human intervention and be identifiable with an individual or an 
organization that is responsible for the source. Waste land fill areas and leaky 
wastewater or sewage tanks can be considered as tradable nonpoint sources, but some 
manageable sources may not be considered as tradable for social and political reasons.  
6.4.2 Non-tradable Sources 
Non-tradable sources are the sources of nitrate which are unmanageable and cannot be 
related to an individual entity responsible for that source.  
The major non-tradable source is the groundwater nitrate storage: nitrates already in 
the aquifer leached from earlier land uses and currently travelling with groundwater. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.6.2), nitrate in upstream groundwater is a source 
of nitrate in downstream groundwater, and groundwater seepage is a source of nitrate 
in surface water. Nitrate flowing with groundwater is usually unmanageable. Natural 
sources, such as rain water, head waters, aquatic species, and unmanaged storm water 
are also non-tradable.   
The ―tradable receptor capacities‖ should be calculated after all non-tradable sources 
are accounted for. For example, according to Rutherford (2008), the total annual 
nitrate intake capacity of Lake Rotorua, is 1926 tonnes (equal to 435 tonnes of 
nitrogen, assuming all nitrogen that enters the lake is in the form of nitrate). The 
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estimated annual nitrate contribution from sewage is 133 tonnes (30 tonnes/ of 
nitrogen) and is considered non-tradable. If there are no other non-tradable sources, 
then the tradable nitrate intake capacity of the lake is 1926 – 133 = 1793 tonnes/year 
(405 tonnes/year of nitrogen). 
Apart from non-tradable sources, allocations may be made for other concerns such as 
uncertainties in capacity estimates and future demand. In Chapter 9, we discuss more 
about calculating tradable receptor capacities.    
6.5 Linkage between the Sources and Receptors 
We use the response matrix technique (Chapter 3) to relate nitrate loading from 
spatially distributed farms to the water quality deterioration at the receptors. 
Following previous work on optimal management of nitrate loading such as that of 
Morgan and Everett (2005), we assume a linear relationship between the loading and 
the increase in nitrate level at each receptor in each time step. By assuming linearity, 
we can calculate the increase in nitrate mass or concentration caused by each source at 
any receptor, in any time step, as the product of the source loading and the relevant 
response coefficient14.  
An important requirement for the application of the response matrix technique is that 
the source water flow rates are fixed, and therefore, the diffuse sources have fixed 
impacts on the groundwater flow velocities (Gorelick & Remson, 1982). The 
assumption implies that the aquifer recharge from each farm is fixed, and independent 
of the operating scale (stocking rate, fertilizer application rate, etc.) which can be 
affected by the permit allocations. In simulating nitrate transport in groundwater, 
recharge is usually estimated based on rainfall and evaporation data, ignoring the 
effects of land use and irrigation (Hadfield, 2008; Rekker, 1998).  
                                               
14
 With regard to response coefficients, the terminology found in the literature is inconsistent. Different 
terms such as transport, diffusion, response, or influential coefficients have also been used. In this thesis, we 
use the terms response coefficients and response matrix 
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For the assumption of linearity to hold, both the receptors and what is controlled at the 
receptors should be selected carefully. It is generally accepted that mass nitrate 
discharge to a surface water body from its catchment, and nitrate concentration in 
groundwater discharge from a catchment, have strong linear relationships with nitrate 
loading in the catchment (Rao, et al., 2009). Therefore, as mentioned in section 6.4, 
the most suitable receptors are streams, rivers, or lakes where mass nitrate input from 
the catchment is controlled, and groundwater monitoring wells where nitrate 
concentration is controlled.   
6.5.1 Response Matrix 
As receptor capacities, the response coefficients may be defined in several equivalent 
ways depending on the sources and the receptors concerned. As in Morgan & Everett 
(2005), this work uses two types of response coefficients.  
1. Discharge (mass) response coefficients: the mass nitrate discharge into a 
receptor during a given time period, from one unit of nitrate loading from a 
pollution source during a certain time period, measured in mass units, e.g., kg, 
and used with receptors such as lakes. 
2. Concentration response coefficients: the concentration that occurs at a 
receptor, at a given time, from one unit of loading at a pollution source during 
a certain time period, measured in concentration units, e.g., mg/l, and used 
with receptors such as groundwater wells. 
The previous applications of the response matrix method to describe nitrate transport 
in groundwater, for example, Peña-Haro et al. (2009) had a response coefficient to 
measure the increase in nitrate level that occurs at each receptor, in each monitoring 
time step, from one unit nitrate loading from each source, during each management 
period. Having a response coefficient for each management period is useful when the 
length of the management period can vary and can start from different points in time, 
but the set of management periods should be pre-defined, and a large number of 
simulations may be required to construct the response matrix. 
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In our problem, the management period length is fixed to one year (because loading 
permits are defined for a single year), but can start from different points in time. For 
example, a farm may want to buy a permit for the next year (2011), for a later year 
(2015), or for each of the next five years from 2011 to 2015 (five permits starting 
from different points in time). The set of management periods cannot be pre-defined 
because it depends of what the farms will need to buy (subject to market regulations). 
Therefore, we have to adapt the response matrix technique to suit our purpose.         
Assuming that the groundwater flow system is in a steady state where groundwater 
flow terms do not vary over time15, we develop a reduced (delay-based) response 
matrix which specifies the response coefficients relative to source, receptor, and time 
delay, allowing dynamic calculation of response coefficients for different 
management periods. Since the response coefficients used in this work are not indexed 
over the management periods, our method is more efficient than the response matrix 
used in previous work.  
6.5.2 Reduced (Delay-Based) Response Coefficients 
If the groundwater flow system is in a steady state, and hence the groundwater flow 
terms are constant over the whole period, nitrate loading from one farm in any year 
would have the same profile of effects on a given receptor. The series of effects would 
start from a different point in time depending on the time of loading. Based on the 
hypothetical catchment example discussed in Appendix D, Figure 6.1 shows the series 
of effects that nitrate loading in farm 1 during years 2010, 2011, and 2014 would have 
on the stream (observed from a steady state simulation). Each series is the same 
quantitatively, starting from 8 years of loading. Hence, we can construct the aggregate 
effect profile of loading over the five consecutive years starting from 2010 by 
aggregating the five offset copies of the same one year profile.  
 
                                               
15
 Note that the response matrix technique is generally applicable under both steady-state and transient 
conditions (Gorelick & Remson, 1982).  
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Figure 6.1: Response profiles under steady-state conditions.  
Based on the above principle, if the groundwater flow system is in a steady state, the 
temporal increases in nitrate level caused by a unit (1 kg/year) loading during any year 
or during any number of consecutive years can be calculated from a single set of 
coefficients which measure the increases in nitrate level in each successive time 
period caused by a unit loading during a single time period. Thus the number of 
columns in the response matrix can be reduced to the number of sources (rather than 
number of sources × number of management periods). 
Therefore, we re-define the response coefficients using the following indices.  
f = farm: 1, 2, …, F. 
r = receptor: 1,2, …, R. 
d = delay (number of delayed time periods): 0, 1, …, D.  
Hfrd = increase in nitrate level that occurs at receptor r, d periods after unit (1 kg) 
nitrate loading in farm f during a single year, kg or mg/l. This is the response 
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coefficient for source f, receptor r, and delay d. The structure of a typical transport 
matrix is shown in Figure 6.2.  
Farms
1 2 … F
1,0 H 110 H 210 H F 10
1,1 H 112 H 212 H F 12
…
1,D H 11D H 21D H F 1D
2,0 H 120 H 220 H F 20
2,1 H 122 H 222 H F 22
…
2,D H 12D H 22D H F 2D
…
R ,0 H 1R 0 H 2R 0 H FR 0
R ,1 H 1R 2 H 2R 2 H FR 2
…
R ,D H 1RD H 2RD H FRD
Receptors ×
Delay periods
 
Figure 6.2: Transport matrix.  
Let the length of each time periods be one year. Then based on the definition of 
transport coefficients, and the assumption of linearity, if farm 1 loads 100 kg of nitrate 
into the aquifer underlying the farm in year 2010, the nitrate concentration or mass in 
receptor 2 would increase by 100×H120 in the same year (2010), by 100×H121 after a 
year (in 2011), and by 100×H12D after D years (in 2010+D). Similarly, if farm 1 loads 
250 kg of nitrate into the aquifer underlying the farm in year 2011, nitrate 
concentration or mass in receptor 2 would increase by 250×H120 in the same year 
(2011), by 250×H121 after a year (in 2011), and by 250×H12D after D years (in 
2011+D). Hence if farm 1 were given loading permits of 100 kg for 2010 and 250 kg 
for 2011, the farm could increase the nitrate concentration or mass at receptor 2 by up 
to 100×H120 in 2010, 100×H121 + 250×H120 in 2011, …, and so on until year 2011+D.  
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6.5.3 Estimating Response Coefficients 
Response coefficients may be estimated by observation or by simulation. The former 
is quite unrealistic in the case of groundwater nitrate transport, because, to estimate 
response coefficients from observation, one has to experiment and collect data for 
many years. Therefore, simulation is the best possible way to estimate the response 
coefficients, and reliable estimates may be achieved by calibrating the simulation 
models as data becomes available. 
To obtain the two types of response coefficients required, we simulate one kilogram 
of nitrate loading from each farm. While there are many computer models suitable for 
the work, we use MT3D (Zheng, 1990) to simulate groundwater nitrate transport, 
together with MODFLOW (Harbaugh, Banta, Hill, & McDonald, 2000) to simulate 
groundwater flow.  
We assume a fixed rate of water flow (recharge) from each farm to the aquifer (Fixed 
recharge means that recharge does not vary with the rate of mass nitrate leaching, but 
the flow rate may vary over the farms.). We assume a steady state groundwater flow 
regime, so the recharge and abstraction rates are constant over time, and hence the 
groundwater flow terms are constant over time. This is a commonly made assumption 
in applying the response matrix technique (Morgan and Everett, 2005). Based on these 
assumptions, we first simulate the groundwater flow system using MODFLOW. The 
groundwater flow file generated from the groundwater flow simulation is a major 
input file for the solute transport MT3D model.   
Though the permits are defined in terms of mass nitrate loading, nitrate loading 
actually occurs via concentrated water percolating into the soil and leaching into the 
aquifer. MT3D allows specifying contaminant loading into the aquifer from such 
nonpoint sources as ―recharge concentration.‖ To simulate 1 kg loading from each 
farm with MT3D, we assume that the rate of aquifer recharge (the volume of water 
that percolates into the aquifer per unit area of land, m3/m2) is known. Then we 
specify source loading as the concentration of recharge for the model cells (zone) 
which represent the aquifer below the source. The recharge concentration, equivalent 
to 1 kg of nitrate loading from each farm, is calculated as follows. 
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Ari = the area of farm I (m
2). 
Rci = rate of aquifer recharge from farm I (m). 
Nonei = set of model cells that represent farm i. 
Cri = recharge concentration for Nonei which simulates 1 kg of nitrate loading from 
Nonei, mg/l (g/m
3). 
Assuming the loading is uniformly distributed over the whole area of the farm, the 
rate of loading from farm i is 1000/Ari, g/m
2.  
Cri = rate of mass loading / rate of recharge = 1000/(Ai × Rci) g/m
3 
In MT3D, we have to set the observation times to record the increase in concentration 
or mass in each successive time period. The simulation should be carried out until the 
nitrate mass loaded from the source passes all receptors, i.e., until the observed 
increases in nitrate concentration or mass tends to zero. Rather than setting the 
simulation period and number of observation time steps separately for each source, it 
is easier to set the simulation time to the maximum nitrate residence time in the 
catchment.   
A simulation of 1 kg nitrate loading from farm f gives the response coefficients Hfrd 
for all r and d.  Therefore, we need F simulations to obtain the complete three-
dimensional response matrix for F farms, M receptors, and D time periods.  
The response coefficients are calculated assuming that the loading is equally 
distributed over the whole area of the farm. If the area of farm A is 10 ha, the trading 
system assumes that the loading rate is 50/10 = 5 kg/ha/year. It also assumes that 
loading occurs at a constant rate during the year. Accordingly, the monthly loading 
rate for farm A is 5/12 kg/ha/month. However, both the above assumptions are not 
limitations, because the transport coefficients can be calculated otherwise also. For 
example, if nitrate leaching from farms in the catchment occurs mostly in the winter 
months, then the transport coefficients may be obtained accordingly.  
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The tradable receptor capacities and the response coefficients are the basic parameter 
inputs for the trading system. They are used to model the water quality constraints 
which provide the basis for trading. 
6.5.4 Water Quality Constraints 
Tradable receptor capacities of each time period serve as the limiting factor in this 
trading system.  The response coefficients indicate how the farms consume the 
capacity of the receptors. Using those parameters, we can formulate mathematical 
constraints to require the farms to collectively meet the capacity of receptors to accept 
nitrate. These constraints are usually known as water quality constraints or 
environmental constraints. They are a specific type of resource capacity constraints 
analogous to the capacity constraints applied in other markets (e.g., generator 
capacities in electricity markets). Hence we use the term ―receptor capacity 
constraints‖ to refer to the constraints which require the sources to meet the tradable 
receptor capacities.  
Define the following indices and parameters.    
s = permit period: 1,…, S. The upcoming period is given by s =1. The last period for 
which the permits are traded is given by s = S. S is also the number of periods for 
which permits are traded.  
t = monitoring period: 1,…, T. The upcoming period is given by t = 1. The last period 
for which the permits are traded is given by t = T. T is also the number of periods for 
which permits are traded. T>S. 
Assume that the delay periods, permit periods, and monitoring periods are of the same 
length (for example, one year periods).  
Let Crt be the tradable capacity of receptor r in period t, kg or mg/l; and qis be the size 
of the loading permit for period s (period-s permit) allocated to farm f after trade.  
Under the assumptions above, if farm f load qfs kg of nitrate into the aquifer during 
year s, then for all t ≥ s the nitrate concentration or mass at receptor r would increase 
by Hfr(t−s). By using the loading permits allocated, the farms can jointly increase the 
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nitrate level at receptor r in period t by  f s fsstfr qH )( . In order to meet receptor 
capacities, the total nitrate mass or concentration jointly caused by all farms should 
not exceed the tradable receptor capacity of any receptor in any monitoring period. 
Assuming that nitrate does not accumulate at any receptor (i.e., if nitrate does not 
reside in any receptor more than one period)16, the receptor capacity constraints are 
modelled as follows. 
rtf s fsstfr
CqH    )(  for all r and t. 
These water quality constraints are imposed at each monitoring period t. Related to 
the time frame of trading, three questions are to be answered: what is the length of 
each time period considered in the model, for how many time periods ahead should 
permits be allocated (S), and for how many time periods ahead should water quality 
constraints be imposed (T). T is also the maximum number of time periods considered 
in the model and is usually called the planning horizon. These are inter-related and 
inter-dependent decisions.    
6.6 Time Frames of Trading 
The trading program can have a single standard time period as a unit of measuring 
time so that the delay periods for which response coefficients are obtained, permit 
periods for which permits are allocated, and monitoring periods for which capacity 
constraints are imposed are of the same length. However, all time periods being 
equally long is not a requirement, they may be otherwise, for example, loading 
permits may be allocated for five year periods (valid for five consecutive years) and 
capacity constraints may be imposed every year. Capacity constraints may be imposed 
at time intervals of different length. For example, capacity constraints may be 
imposed for every year until a certain point, and for every ten years thereafter. 
                                               
16
 If nitrate could reside in a receptor for more than a year, additional constraints are required to describe 
and restrict pollutant accumulation in the receptor. In Chapter 7, we discuss methods to deal with such 
situations.  
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However, it is simpler and possible to have equally long time periods so that the 
trading system has a single measure of time. 
6.6.1 Length of the Model Time Steps 
The length of each time period in the model is mainly determined by the goals of the 
trading program. Generally, water quality standards should be met continuously 
throughout the planning horizon. This is achieved by imposing water quality standards 
(as capacity constraints) at discrete time intervals. The time interval may be a day, a 
month, a year, or a decade. However, a few things must be considered in selecting the 
length of the time periods.  
First, the length of each time period should be short enough to guarantee that the 
quality standards are met continuously, and long enough to avoid a large number of 
redundant water quality constraints in the mathematical programs used to clear the 
market.  
Second, as the water quality constraints are set for each time period, the length of the 
time periods should be consistent with available water quality standards. For large 
water bodies such as Lake Taupo, the environmental authorities have set sustainable 
nitrate loading levels on an annual basis rather than on a monthly or daily basis. 
Therefore, it is preferable to have annual time periods in the trading programs.     
Third, the problem will be simpler if the model time period is selected so that it is 
possible to set the permit period (length of time during which any permit is valid) 
equal to one or a few time periods. Commercial farmers may need permits to be valid 
at least for a year, because they usually plan for long-term, and farm land uses are not 
frequently altered.  
Fourth, the physical characteristics of the groundwater solute transport system 
determine how fast the status changes and how often monitoring is required. Usually, 
in groundwater systems, the effects of external stresses do not appear quickly.     
Taking the above considerations into account, we set the length of the modelling time 
period to one year. The trading system is designed to achieve the mass nitrate intake 
capacities of the receptors on an annual basis and the nitrate concentration based 
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capacities of the receptors on an end-of-the-year basis. Therefore, the response 
coefficients are required for every year. The permits will also be allocated on an 
annual basis.  
6.6.2 For How Many Periods Should Permits Be Allocated? 
At a time of trading, permits may be allocated only for the current period (s = 1), for a 
few periods ahead (s = 1, 2, …, S ≤ T), or for all T periods ahead (s = 1, 2, …, T). The 
decision has environmental, economic, and political implications.  
Land uses which require huge capital commitments will be risky if the investors are 
uncertain about the availability of sufficient permits to cover their operations in the 
future. Therefore, farms would prefer to buy permits for more periods (S to be large).  
Permits are allocated subject to future constraints, but these constraints are formulated 
from uncertain parameters. Both the response coefficients and tradable capacities are 
estimated values, and the actual nitrate transport profiles and available receptor 
capacities may vary from the estimates. Under such uncertainty, it may be wise to 
adopt a ―wait-and-see‖ policy of allocating permits only for a few immediate periods, 
updating the models through learning, and allocating gradually into the future. 
Countries have various regulations governing environmental resource allocations and 
those regulations may restrict the length of time for which permits can be allocated. 
The Resource Management Act (RMA 1991) is the governing legislation which 
specifies the rules regarding the allocation of resource consents17 in New Zealand. 
Under the RMA, the duration of a loading permit may vary between 5 and 35 years. 
The permits are issued by the regional environmental authorities who set the duration 
within RMA limits. These regulations would also affect the decision on the number of 
years for which permits are allocated.    
The permit structure designed in this work is not consistent with New Zealand‘s RMA 
regulations as we consider permits valid for a single year only. However, the proposed 
                                               
17
 In New Zealand, rights to use environmental resources are called consents rather than permits, and a 
nitrate loading permit is usually known as consent to discharge nitrate into groundwater. 
115 
 
 
 
mechanism provides more flexibility, as the farmers can buy permits for as many 
years as required within the market limits. To deal with the consents allocated under 
the RMA, we may consider the consents as an initial paper right which is adjusted 
annually (as discussed in Chapter 10).    
The right number of years for which permits should be allocated is a compromise of 
the above conflicting environmental, political, and economic concerns. In most parts 
of this work, we assume that permits are allocated for five years ahead of the current 
period. The number is somewhat arbitrary, and the trading system can deal with any 
number of permit periods. In Chapters 10 and 11, we demonstrate how the number of 
permit periods would affect the performance of the trading program. 
6.6.3 Planning Horizon 
Nitrate loading in a single present period affects receptors over many future time 
periods. The question is, at any time trading takes place, how far have we to look 
forward into the future (how many future periods should be considered)? Ideally, a 
market should look forward as far as the impacts of traded permits extend. We call 
this period the ―planning horizon.‖  
We can find the maximum possible travel (delay) time DR years that nitrate loaded 
from any point or farm in the catchment would take to pass all the receptors; this is the 
maximum nitrate residence time in groundwater18. Hydrologists usually estimate the 
maximum nitrate residence time as a tail percentile such as 99th or 95th, because the 
nitrate transport profiles (as shown in Figure 5.5) usually have long skewed tails. We 
can find DR from available hydro-geological data on the catchment or by using a 
groundwater solute transport simulation. Then, response coefficients can be obtained 
for D = DR time periods. Theoretically, DR is such that, for all d ≤ DR, at least one 
response coefficient Hfrd > 0 exists, and for all d >D
R, all response coefficients Hfrd = 0. 
                                               
18
 We assume that the main water body towards which the catchment drains is considered as a receptor (as 
we have recommended in section 6.1.3). If only groundwater monitoring receptors were selected, T
R
 may be 
less than the maximum nitrate residence time. In any case, T
R
 cannot be greater than the maximum 
residence time.  
116 
 
 
 
In large catchments, DR may be many decades, e.g., 200 years in the Lake Rotorua 
catchment of New Zealand (Lock and Kerr 2008). Hence, for a tradable permit 
program, a workable estimate of DR may be used (D = DR such that Hfrd ≥ δ ≈ 0 for all 
t ≤ DR and Hfrd < δ, for all d >D
R), ignoring the tail effects. 
We discussed how to set D, the maximum delay time for which response coefficients 
are required, not the planning horizon T.  We suggest that the correct planning horizon 
for a trading system is T= S+D years, i.e., D years from the last year for which permits 
are allocated. If we selected a planning horizon T < S+D, nitrates loaded from some 
farms may reach a receptor in year T+1, year T +2,…, or year S+D and these farms 
and their impacts will not be taken into account. As a consequence, the trading 
schema becomes unable to meet the nitrate intake capacities after T years.  
The planning horizon T = S+D is a generally feasible solution which is physically 
correct, capable of achieving long run water quality goals, and is fair in that every 
farm would be priced to pay for all their impacts on all receptors over time. However, 
a rational economic entity or an investor may not like to compromise current 
economic benefits to avoid some environmental damage that is expected to occur after 
many decades, because the uncertainly is high. Hence, the stakeholders may oppose a 
planning horizon of 50+ years. In Chapter 10, we will show that depending on the 
distribution of response coefficients (i.e., the catchment hydrogeology), and the 
current concentration distribution in groundwater, the length of the planning horizon 
can be reduced (below S+D) without compromising the environmental goals. 
6.7 Market Design and Operation 
The market is designed to operate as a periodic auction19 which uses an LP to find the 
optimal permit allocations and prices. The farms will be able to buy permits from the 
auction which takes place at the beginning of every trading year. To buy and sell 
                                               
19
 We use the word ―auction‖, but unlike many other auctions, the proposed market is not (always) an 
iterative process by which an equilibrium price is found.    
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permits, the farms have to submit bids indicating how much they are willing to pay (or 
accept) for loading permits.  
6.7.1 Market Type: Gross Pool or Nett Pool20?   
The proposed market operates as a gross pool market which requires the participants 
to bid for quantities starting from zero, ignoring any initial permit holdings. The 
participants bid prices for a set of quantity tranches. The maximum number of bid 
tranches is fixed, but the participants can choose the size of each tranche. For 
example, Farm1 may submit five bids as 60 kg @ $20, 40 kg @ $12, 70 kg @ $6, 80 
kg @ $2, and 50 kg @ $1. Based on the theory of diminishing marginal utility, the 
bids mean that this farmer would pay $20/kg for the first 60 kg of nitrate loading, 
$12/kg each for the next 40 kg of loading and so on. If another farm (Farm 2) which 
already owns a permit of 250 kg has submitted the above bids, the bids mean that it 
would sell 80 kg if the price is $2/kg or above, another 70 kg if the price is $6/kg or 
above and so on.  The five bid tranches are given as a bid function in Figure 6.3. 
$20.00
$18.00
$16.00
$14.00
Bid Price $12.00
$10.00
$8.00
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00
50 100 150 200 250 300
Nitrate Loading (kg)
60 kg
40 kg
80 kg
50 kg
70 kg
 
Figure 6.3: Shape of the bid Functions. 
                                               
20
 The material discussed about gross pool and net pool markets and LP formulations was obtained from 
Raffensperger (2009)and personal communication with E. Grant Read.  
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A gross pool market does not accept sell offers. A participant who already has a 
permit and is willing to sell if the price is high enough, has to submit the offer as a 
gross poll bid rather than an offer.  For example, if Farm 3 which currently has a 
permit of 100 kg is willing to sell 30 kg of it at $20/kg, the remaining 70 kg at 
$1000/kg,  and is willing to buy another 50 kg at $8/kg, its gross pool bids should be 
70 kg @ $1000, 30 kg @ $20, and 50 kg @ $8.  
After clearing the market, the net purchases or sales are calculated from the difference 
between the quantity cleared and the initial position. For example, if the permit prices 
as determined by the LP solution were $10, $20, and $10 per kg for farms 1, 2, and 3 
respectively21, then Farm 1 will be buying by 100 kg at $10, Farm 2 will be selling all 
of its 250 kg at $20, and Farm 3 will not buy or sell any.  
Gross pool market operations may be difficult to understand from the participant‘s 
point of view. Alternatively, the market may operate as a net pool market which 
allows the participants to submit bids to add to the initial position and offers to sell 
from the initial holdings. Net pool operation is easy to understand. The market may 
operate either way, because net pool bids and offers can be easily transformed into 
gross pool bids and vice-versa if the initial positions are known. Following the 
popular electricity market example, we design a gross pool market, which is 
consistent with the gross pool LP formulation used to clear the market (discussed in 
Chapter 7).  
All the farms in a catchment are assumed to be participating in the trading system. 
The farms that do not actually participate in the market by submitting bids, are 
assigned two default bid tranches: one with a price of infinity (a relatively large value) 
and a quantity equal to the initial position, and the other with price zero. These two 
default bids indicate that the farm does not wish to either buy or sell. 
                                               
21
 Prices assigned to each farm can vary depending on their locations. In Chapter 7, we discuss how to set 
the prices.  
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If the farms wish to buy future permits, they have to bid indicating how much they are 
willing to pay now (discounted present value), because all payments are settled 
immediately, once the market is cleared.   
6.7.2 Market Regulation 
A government authorized institution (possibly a regional environmental authority that 
is responsible for monitoring and controlling water pollution in the catchment) should 
oversee the trading system. We use the term ―market authority‖ to refer to this 
institution22.  
At implementation, the responsibilities of the market authority include collecting and 
maintaining all data and information required, setting up the trading program, 
developing the physical simulation models, authenticating and calibrating the models, 
setting receptor capacities, specifying the trading and settlement procedures, and 
initiating any required corrections or improvements. 
The operational responsibilities include calling for bids, clearing the market, settling 
payments, and regulating the permits via monitoring and enforcement. The market 
authority may hire an independent entity to carry out market operations. We use the 
term ―market operator‖ to refer to the institution which operates the trading system.  
6.7.3 Market Clearing Procedure 
Once the farms have submitted their bids, the market operator uses the LP to clear the 
market. The bids provide objective function coefficients for the market-clearing LP. 
The LP solution produces market-clearing commodity prices, locational permit prices 
and optimal allocations. The market operator then calculates the net trades from the 
initial (pre-trade) and optimal (ex-post) permit positions, collects money from net 
buyers, pays net sellers, and clears the market. All payments, including the payments 
                                               
22
 A regional environmental authority‘s roles as the ―regulator‖ who owns the environment on behalf of the 
public and as the ―market authority‖ who oversees the trading program are different. So the same 
government institution may have different independent roles in the trading program.  
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for future permits traded, are cleared immediately. Some trial market rounds would 
provide price signals to the farms so that they can adjust the bids accordingly. 
6.7.4 Monitoring and Enforcement 
Once the market is cleared for some trading year, all the participants should comply 
with the cleared permit positions until the next auction. The market authority should 
oversee the trading system and enforce the loading limits specified by the permits. 
Monitoring devices may be located in the farms to measure the nitrate concentration 
in the leachate and thus the actual loading. However, it is not possible to measure the 
actual loading from the farms during a year with 100% accuracy. 
The amount of nitrate loading is determined by the type of land use (Chapter 9). 
Instead of monitoring the quantitative loading, the environmental authorities may 
restrict the farms to the land use practices allowed by the size of the loading permit 
held. Better monitoring may be achieved via a combination of the above two 
monitoring methods.    
6.7.5 Online Trading 
Such a trading system is best implemented as an online trading system (although this 
is not a requirement) so that the farms can trade multilaterally in a virtual market 
place. An official web site will coordinate all transactions. The participants will log 
into the trading system web page and submit bids online. After solving the LP with 
the set of outstanding bids, the market operator can post the prices and quantities 
cleared on the auction web which facilitate online transactions.  
The electronic auction should authenticate participants at login and accept bids. 
Access to information should be customised, so that everyone can view public 
information such as trade history and prices, but not private information such as other 
traders‘ pending bids. Bids can be stored in a database, along with other relevant 
information such as each land user‘s details and initial allocations. The market 
operator should have administrative rights and be capable of clearing the market and 
posting the cleared quantities and prices on the web page. The tools available for the 
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farms to optimise their own bids (Chapter 9) can be linked to the online trading 
system.  
Despite the complexity of actual market operations, the user interface can provide a 
simplified, understandable picture of the market and its operation. Since a gross pool 
market is difficult to understand, the users should be allowed to submit either a set of 
gross pool bids or net pool bids and offers. Users may also specify the size of the 
permits in different units: in kg or in kg/ha/year. Such facilities can be provided 
through the interface. When the market operator initiates market clearing, a computer 
algorithm would convert all inputs into the specific format used in the LP. After 
clearing the market, the prices and allocations should be available in user friendly 
formats.   
In this chapter, we discussed the structure and architecture of the proposed market 
mechanism. We mentioned both necessary and preferential features. The basic idea is 
using an LP to find the optimal prices and allocations. We discussed how to define the 
permits and how to use available data, tools and techniques to estimate the parameters 
required for the LP models. In the next chapter, we present alternative LP models to 
be used for market clearing under different hydro-geological and socio-economic 
conditions.        
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Chapter 7 
7 LP MODELS FOR PRICING NITRATE LOADING 
PERMITS
23
 
7.1 Introduction 
The proposed market mechanism enables the farms to trade nitrate loading permits in 
an ex-ante market (possibly in a year-ahead market). The mechanism requires the 
market operator to find the equilibrium prices ex-ante. As in many electricity markets, 
an LP is used to determine the optimal quantities and prices, the size of each year-s 
permit allocated to each farm, and the price of each year-s permit assigned to each 
farm. The LP is formulated to maximise benefits from trade subject to the water 
quality constraints. Objective function coefficients are obtained from the bid prices. 
Response coefficients and tradable capacities are exogenous parameters which 
describe the underlying physical system and thus the physical constraints. Clearing the 
market means solving the LP with a set of bids submitted by the participants. The LP 
solution gives the prices and final permit positions for each farm. The prices charged 
to the market are obtained from the shadow prices of the model constraints.  
This chapter is about modelling the LP and deriving the prices and allocations. To 
serve as a base case, we first present a basic LP which models the essentials of a 
                                               
23
 This chapter is based on Prabodanie et al.  (2010). 
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nitrate permit market. After discussing the limitations of the basic model, we present 
different types of relevant constraints, how to model them in a generally applicable 
market-clearing LP, and a how they affect market prices. Based on the theory of nodal 
pricing applied in electricity markets, we interpret and explain the prices and 
allocations; and describe the price structures and relationships. For this purpose, we 
drew up ideas from Ring (1995), who presented a dispatch-based pricing model for 
electricity markets. We describe the settlement process, revenue distribution, and 
gains from trade, assuming no previously allocated permanent or long term loading 
rights.   
7.2 Optimal Loading (Basic) Model 
In this section, we present a basic LP which models the essentials of a market in 
diffuse nitrate discharge permits. The basic model provides a foundation for the 
development of more detailed general models.  
Indices: 
f = farm: 1,…, F. 
r = receptor: 1,…, R. 
d = delay (travel time) in years: 0,…, D. D is the maximum nitrate travel time 
(residence time) in the catchment. 
s = permit year: 1,…, S. The upcoming year is given by s =1. The last year for which 
the permits are traded is given by s=S. S is also the number of years for which permits 
are traded.  
t = monitoring year: 1,…, S+D. The upcoming year is given by t = 1.  
Rather than expressing s and t relative to the upcoming year, we may express them in 
terms of the absolute year, for example, as 2011,…, 2014. If the upcoming year is Ŝ, 
the permit year s = Ŝ,…, Ŝ+S-1 and the monitoring year t = Ŝ,…, Ŝ+S-1+D.  
k = bid tranche: 1,…, K.  
Parameters: 
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Hfrd= increase in nitrate level that occurs at receptor r, d years after unit (1 kg) nitrate 
loading in farm f during a single year, kg or mg/l.  
Crt = tradable nitrate intake capacity of receptor r in year t, kg or mg/l.   
Ufsk = quantity specified in bid tranche k submitted by farm f for year-s permits, kg. 
Pfsk = bid price specified in bid tranche k submitted by farm f for year-s permits, $/kg.  
Decision variables: 
xfsk = quantity accepted from bid tranche k submitted by farm f for year-s permits, kg. 
qfs = size of the year-s permit allocated to farm f after trade; this is the maximum 
loading allowed for farm f during year s, kg.  
Model: OLM 
Maximize ∑f∑s∑k Pfskxfsk, subject to: 
Upper and lower bounds on bid tranches 
xfsk ≤ Ufsk for all f, s, and k.      (P-1) θ
+
fsk  
−xfsk ≤ 0  for all f, s, and k.      (P-2) θ
−
fsk  
Calculation of final permit positions 
∑kxfsk − qfs  = 0  for all f and s.      (P-3) μfs 
Receptor capacity constraints 
    fsf
St
Dts stfr
qH
),min(
),1max( )(
Crt  for all r and t.     (P-4) λrt 
The LP is formulated as a gross pool market which is independent from the initial 
distribution of permits. The traded quantities should be calculated from the difference 
between the initial position and the optimal position obtained from the LP solution. A 
simplified form of the above LP may be given as follows. Since all the parameters are 
non-negative, the LP is always feasible. 
Maximize ∑f∑s∑k Pfskxfsk, subject to: 
rtf
St
Dts k fskstfr
CxH    
),min(
),1max( )(
for all r and t.   
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0 ≤ xfsk ≤ Ufsk for all f, s, and k. 
7.2.1 Objective Function 
The objective function coefficients Pfsk indicate how much each block of nitrate 
loading is worth to the bidder, the price each farm would pay (or accept) for each 
incremental block of quantity, starting from zero. Hence, the objective function which 
maximises the sum of Pfsk multiplied by xfsk essentially maximizes the total benefits 
from trade.  
A rational farm would buy another X units of loading permits if the incremental profit 
from each unit is above the price, and therefore bid to buy at the marginal profit24.    
Thus, the bids indicating the additional quantity preferred at each price step 
correspond to a piece-wise linear marginal profit function of the farm. Hence, if the 
bids indicate the true economic contributions of the farms, the objective function also 
maximizes the true social benefit25.  
We do not use time discounts in the market clearing model, relying on the farms to 
discount their bids at their own rates. Hence, the bids for future permits should 
indicate the discounted present value of the future permits, based on each farm‘s own 
private discount rate.  
                                               
24
 If the market is not perfectly competitive, the buyers and sellers could game the bids above or below the 
marginal profit to affect market prices. However, a catchment usually has a relatively large number of farms 
and a catchment scale market is expected to be workably competitive. 
25
 Markets in pollution permits are usually modelled to minimise abatement cost rather than to maximise 
profit (Montgomery 1972; McGartland 1988; Ermoliev et al. 2000). However, allocation of diffuse nitrate 
discharge permits is a problem of optimising the allocation of land uses rather than the abatement 
responsibilities. In the case of nitrate loading permits, forgone profit from a more nitrate intensive farming 
option may be considered as an abatement cost. Therefore, maximising profit is the same as minimising 
abatement cost. 
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7.2.2 Constraints 
The quantity accepted in each bid tranche cannot be negative (P-2), while upper 
bounds on bid tranches (P-1) ensure that it does not exceed the maximum quantity at 
that bid price specified by the bidder. The final position of each year-s permit for each 
farm f is calculated (P-3) as the sum of the quantities accepted from the farm‘s bids 
for year-s permits.  
Markets in nitrate loading permits should necessarily include constraints that require 
the market to meet the maximum acceptable nitrate mass or concentration at each 
receptor in each time period. As mentioned in the previous chapter, we refer to these 
essential constraints as receptor capacity constraints (P-4).  
The variables listed to the right of the constraints are the associated shadow prices 
(dual variables). The dual formulation of the problem provides insight into the 
commodity prices that match the demand and supply. 
7.2.3 Dual Formulation and Shadow Prices 
While the OLM models the resource allocation problem, the dual of the OLM models 
the resource valuation problem. In the following dual formulation, the primal 
variables associated with the dual constraints are listed to the right of the constraints. 
Minimise ∑f∑s∑kUfskθ
+
fsk + ∑r∑tCrtλrt, subject to: 
θ+fsk − θ
−
fsk + μfs  = Pfsk for all f, s, and k.    (D-1) xfsk 
−μfs  +  

 r rt
Ds
st stfr
H )( = 0 for all f and s.     (D-2) qfs 
μfs free for all f and s.   
λrt ≥ 0 for all r and t.  
θ+fsk and θ
−
fsk ≥ 0 for all f, s, and k. 
The shadow price λrt of the receptor capacity constraint (P-4) for some r and t 
indicates how much the benefit-maximising objective function would increase if the 
nitrate intake capacity of receptor r in time period t were increased by one unit. Farms 
would make an incremental profit of λrt if they were allowed to increase the nitrate 
127 
 
 
 
level at receptor r in time period t by one kg or mg/l. To stop the farms doing so, they 
should be charged at λrt per unit increase in nitrate mass or concentration at receptor r 
in period t. If the bids are truthful, λrt is a true marginal cost based price which results 
in efficient allocation of the receptor capacities. Regardless of whether the bids 
indicate the true marginal profit functions, λrt is a market price which matches the 
demand and supply, maximising the benefits from trade.  
As λrt is the current market price of the capacity of receptor r in time period t, we call 
it a ―receptor capacity price,‖ the price for increasing the nitrate level at receptor r in 
time period t. As a loading permit is equivalent to a bundle of receptor capacity rights, 
the price that should be charged from (or paid to) any farm per each 1 kg of loading 
permit bought (or sold) can be derived from the prices of the receptor capacity rights 
in the bundle as  

 r rt
Ds
st stfr
H )( . 
Even if the ability of a receptor to accept and dilute nitrate is constant over the years 
(for example, 400 tonnes in any year), the tradable capacities, and thus the associated 
receptor capacity prices, may vary over time due to the temporal variations in non-
tradable sources. For example, a huge plume of nitrate already in the aquifer may be 
flowing towards the receptor and expected to reach the receptor after another 20 years. 
Then the tradable resource capacities of the years after the 20th (Cr21, Cr22, … ) will be 
lower and the associated capacity prices are likely to be higher.  
Demand for the resources varies depending on the farm locations and their individual 
characteristics. For example, if most of the farms are far upstream, having longer 
delay times, the demand for the capacity of later years may be greater than the 
demand for earlier years, particularly if they have already been operating in an 
unconstrained way for some time. Hence the (undiscounted) price for the capacity of 
later years may be greater than the price for capacity in earlier years.  
The shadow price μfs of the constraint (P-3) which calculates the final year-s permit 
position of farms f indicates how much the objective function would increase if farm f 
were given another 1 kg of year-s permits. Unlike the receptor prices (λrt) which 
describe the market equilibrium in receptor capacity rights, μfs is indexed to a 
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particular farm, and it describes the economic characteristics of the farm. Therefore, 
we call μfs the ―participant price‖. Since the farms have a specific location in the 
catchment, the participant prices are similar to the ―nodal‖ or locational prices used in 
electricity markets. For this simple formulation, these prices could be described as 
―market clearing prices‖. But they have not been derived from strictly locational 
demand and supply balance constraints and, as discussed in section 7.4.3, they may be 
affected by private constraints. 
The shadow price θ+fsk of the bid upper bound constraint (P-1) indicates how much the 
social benefit would increase if farm f would utilize another 1 kg at the marginal price 
Pfsk (i.e., if farm f could offer to buy another 1 kg at  price Pfsk). If the k
th bid of farm f 
corresponds to some land use option26, then θ+fsk is the value of expanding that land 
use (in terms of fertilizer application rate, area cultivated, stocking density, etc.) by 
another 1 kg nitrate loading. Hence, if the bid is accepted, θ+fsk > 0. The shadow price 
θ−fsk of bid lower bound constraint (P-2) indicates how much the society would lose if 
one unit were accepted from that bid. Hence, if the bid is not accepted, θ−fsk > 0. 
7.2.4 Dual Constraints   
The dual constraint (D-1) associated with the primal variable xfsk describes the 
relationship between participant prices and bids (steps of the marginal profit 
functions) as μfs = Pfsk − θ
+
fsk + θ
−
fsk. From duality and complementary slackness we 
can derive the following relationships. 
If a bid is fully accepted, i.e., if xfsk = Ufsk, then θ
+
fsk > 0 and θ
−
fsk = 0.  
Therefore, μfs = Pfsk − θ
+
fsk.   
If a bid is not accepted, i.e., if xfsk = 0, then θ
+
fsk = 0 and θ
−
fsk > 0.  
Therefore, μfs = Pfsk+ θ
−
fsk. 
                                               
26
 The step tranches of the farm profit functions, and thus the bids, would possibly correspond to different 
land use options. Chapter 9 provides information about the relationships between the land uses and 
marginal profit functions and how the farms would choose the bids.     
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If a bid is partially accepted, i.e., if 0 < xfsk < Ufsk, then θ
+
fsk = 0 and θ
−
fsk = 0.  
Therefore, μfs = Pfsk.  
Figure 7.1 provides a graphical view of the relationships. It indicates that the 
participant price is the dollar value at the point where the vertical line corresponding 
to quantity = qfs intersects farm f‘s marginal profit function for year-s permits.    
Hence, the price which rations the final permit allocation is the participant price. If the 
price charged or paid to each farm equals the participant price, the market allocation 
agrees with the price-quantity preferences indicated in the bids. In electricity market 
terminology, such an allocation is called a ―merit order‖ allocation.  
Price ($)
P fs 1
P fs 2 θ
+
fs 1 θ
+
fs 2 
μ fs = P fs 3
θ - fs 4 θ
-
fs 5 
P fs 4
P fs 5
U fs 1 U fs 1+U fs 2 q fs U fs 1+U fs 2+…+U fs 5 Quantity (kg)  
Figure 7.1: Participant prices and the bid functions.  
The dual constraint (D-2) associated with the primal variable qfs indicates that the 
participant price equals the market price per unit nitrate loading from farm f (or from 
the location of farm f) calculated from the receptor capacity prices. Hence, if the 
receptor capacities were the only limiting factor in the market (as in the above basic 
model), the participant price equals the market price of nitrate loading from the 
participant‘s location, and hence the market allocation always satisfies the participant 
preferences indicated in the bids. In the next sections, we discuss general situations in 
which participant prices can deviate from the market prices of locational loading.  
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7.2.5 Limitations of the Basic OLM 
The basic OLM presented above has two major limitations. First, it models the 
essential receptor capacity constraints as the only factor which restricts nitrate loading 
from the farms and thus the permit allocations. However, catchment water systems 
may have other constraints. For example, the environmental authorities may impose 
temporary restrictions on total nitrate loading into highly polluted areas of the 
groundwater aquifer27. The farms may also have their own private limitations such as 
minimum operating levels. If any applicable constraint is ignored, the tradable permit 
system may fail to achieve the environmental goals.  
Second, the basic OLM generates market prices for receptor capacity only. The 
market price of nitrate loading from any farm (location) can be calculated from the 
market capacity prices, but the model itself does not always provide locational prices 
which can be charged to the farms directly (as mentioned earlier, the participant price 
cannot always be considered as a market clearing price). A true locational price for 
nitrate loading should describe the social marginal cost of nitrate loading from the 
particular location, whatever the entity or entities operating in that location. And they 
should be consistent for all farms in a similar location. To obtain such market clearing 
prices, we have to separate the locational effects of nitrate loading and the effects of 
participants‘ private characteristics.  
The next section discusses different types of applicable constraints, and about 
separating farms and locations; the following section presents how to model these 
constraints in a generalised LP which may be used for pricing and allocating nitrate 
loading permits in any catchment. We show how to upgrade the model so that it 
always generates locational loading permit prices which are similar to the nodal prices 
used in electricity markets.  
                                               
27
 A specified area of a groundwater aquifer may also be considered as a receptor, but estimating response 
coefficients and tradable capacities for such a receptor is difficult. Hence, constraints imposed temporarily 
to control nitrate loading into some area of the aquifer are not considered as receptor capacity constraints.    
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7.3 Generally Applicable Constraints     
A market in nitrate loading permits can have two major types of constraints: (1) 
market constraints that describe the system of nitrate transport in groundwater and 
surface water, and the capacity of water bodies to accept nitrates, and (2) private 
constraints that describe the operational limitations of individual sources.  
In the above basic market model, the nitrate transport system was described by the 
response coefficients. The ability of the water bodies to accept nitrates was described 
by the receptor capacity constraints (P-4), using the response coefficients. The 
receptor capacity constraints alone would sufficiently model the underlying physical 
system and its quality requirements if the selected receptors were reliable indicators of 
the overall water quality in the catchment, if the nitrate intake capacity of each 
receptor were specified on a yearly basis, if the receptors were completely 
independent from each other, and if nitrate did not reside at any receptor for more than 
a year, implying no carry forward to the next year. Large and hydro-geologically 
complex groundwater catchments do not necessarily satisfy all those conditions and 
therefore, additional environmental constraints may be required to describe the 
physical system and to model additional water quality requirements. We recognize 
two major types of applicable market constraints: receptor constraints specified in 
terms of nitrate levels at the receptors and source constraints imposed on nitrate 
loading from the sources (Private constraints are also related to individual sources, but 
we use the term source constraint to refer to non-private market constraints imposed 
on cumulative nitrate loading from multiple sources.) 
7.3.1 Receptor Constraints  
The receptor capacity constraints (P-4) require the market to meet the nitrate intake 
capacity of each receptor in each time period. They are clearly receptor constraints. 
Since we have already discussed them in detail, this section discusses additional types 
of receptor constraints. 
Even if the receptors sufficiently represent the overall water quality in the catchment, 
the constraints on each receptor‘s nitrate intake capacity in each year alone may not 
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model all the receptor-based water quality requirements, especially in the presence of 
multiple surface water receptors. Nitrate may take many years to travel through large 
receptors such as lakes, for example, water, and thus nitrate, entering into Lake Taupo 
in New Zealand may take 11 years to pass through the lake to the Waikato River 
(Morgenstern 2008).  In such cases, multi-period constraints are required to restrict 
the cumulative effects over many consecutive years.  
The environmental authorities of large catchments may select several connected 
receptors to maintain water quality in the sub-catchments (Figure 7.2). For example, 
in a river catchment with many sub-catchments draining to different river segments, 
the catchment authority may wish to control nitrate discharge into each segment 
(considered as one receptor) as well as the total discharge into the river (total 
discharge into all receptors). Such cases require multi-receptor constraints to control 
the aggregate effect over several receptors in a single time period. 
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Figure 7.2: Connected receptors.  
Both the multi-period and multi-receptor constraints discussed above are related to 
nitrate residence and transport in surface water receptors. Even though nitrate 
residence and transport in groundwater (and thus across groundwater receptors) are 
implicitly described by the response coefficients, the model does not have a 
representation of nitrate transport across surface water receptors. Hence, if the 
receptors are connected so that nitrate travels from one receptor to another, and/or if 
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nitrate travel times (delay) in surface water receptors are significant, explicit 
representations of those physical transport systems are required for a proper market 
clearing model. However, including detailed mathematical models of nitrate fate and 
transport in surface water in the market clearing models can create extra complexity. 
The middle ground is to use some simplified linear approximations to describe the 
spatiotemporal effects of nitrate transport in surface water (such as the regression 
equations proposed by Ejah and Peralta (1995), discussed in Chapter 3). 
Apart from the receptor capacity constraints, and the multi-receptor/period constraints 
that describe nitrate fate and transport in surface water, the environmental authorities 
may impose other multi-receptor/period constraints. Due to uncertainties in mixing 
and residence of nitrate in slow moving water bodies such as lakes, and fluctuations in 
water quantity, the environmental authorities cannot rely only on either a restriction 
on cumulative discharge over many periods or independent restrictions on the 
discharges in each period. Hence, a workable solution is imposing relatively relaxed 
limits on the effects in each time period together with a stringent limit on cumulative 
effects (for example, if the nitrate intake capacity and maximum nitrate residence time 
in a lake are roughly given as 40-50 tonnes/year and five years, a restriction of a 50 kg 
nitrate load in each year together with a restriction of 200=40×5 tonnes aggregate over 
any five consecutive years). Such constraints give also more flexibility to the permit 
users in scheduling their operations. 
7.3.2 Source Constraints  
Imposing water quality standards at a few receptors alone may not be sufficient to 
guarantee local groundwater quality. On the other hand, it is difficult in practice to 
monitor a large number of receptors. Therefore, environmental authorities may 
impose source based constraints as caps on nitrate loading. Loading caps may be 
imposed on individual loading rates, regional totals, catchment totals, or on the total 
loading from any defined geographic area within the catchment28. Usually, regional 
                                               
28
 For example, an area covered by a circle drawn around a lake (a ring), or a rectangular area along the side 
of a stream.  
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loading caps are used to control local groundwater nitrate concentration, because 
imposing regional caps is simpler and easier than having a large number of 
groundwater receptors29. 
If a loading limit affects many farms competing for nitrate loading permits, the market 
models should include the constraint, but if it affects only one farm, the constraint 
may be imposed outside the market, requiring the farm to meet the restriction 
regardless of the size of the permit held. For example, under the US sulphur dioxide 
trading program, each utility has to meet the federal emission standards regardless of 
the size of the emission permit held (Schary & Fisher-Vanden, 2004). Similarly, a 
uniform standard on per hectare loading rate can be imposed outside the market to 
avoid or reduce the number of source based constraints in the market. However, the 
inefficiencies resulting from such uniform standards are well known (Ragan, 2001). 
The complexities arise from having many source based constraints in the market 
clearing models, and methods to deal with them are discussed in section 7.5.  
7.3.3 Private Constraints 
The basis OLM presented above assumes that all demand side private constraints are 
internalized into the bids. However, the farms may have some private constraints, 
which they cannot easily internalize into their bids. Some common examples are inter-
temporal constraints and minimum permit requirements.  
A farm may need the same quantity for the next 10 years, or a farm may not need 
more than 200 kg in total over the next two years because if much fertilizer is applied 
on the farm this year, the fertility may remain without need for applying that much 
fertilizer in the next year. It is difficult to internalise such inter-temporal constraints 
into bids submitted for each year separately. Trial market rounds would help the farms 
                                               
29
 Loading caps can be modelled as receptor constraints assuming the whole aquifer or a defined area of the 
aquifer as a receptor in which the mass nitrate level is monitored and controlled. However, confusions can 
arise in defining response coefficients for such receptors. Hence, we model the loading caps as source 
constraints imposed directly on source loading, rather than as receptor constraints.     
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to iterate towards a set of bids which meet the additional constraints, but this may 
need a large number of trials. 
The farms may also have minimum permit requirements such as ―I need at least 50 kg 
or none otherwise‖, because crop and livestock farms will not be economical below a 
certain scale. Therefore, to continue farming, the farms may need a permit to cover the 
minimum possible discharges. 
Some electricity markets allow the participants to impose additional conditions such 
as non-divisible quantity bids, start-up costs, and ramp rates on the quantity/price bids 
(Contreras, Candiles, Fuente, & Gomez, 2001). Similarly, the market authorities may 
allow the farms to submit additional conditions such as minimum permit sizes and 
inter-temporal constraints.  
Private inter-temporal constraints can be included in the market models as constraints 
imposed on individual allocations. Such private constraints may provide space for 
strategic price manipulations (Oren & Ross, 2004), but such manipulation is equally 
possible in principle by manipulating simple offers over multiple market rounds. 
Conversely, private constraints can provide more flexibility to the market, in choosing 
solutions that are feasible and acceptable to permit users, thus avoiding the need for 
many market rounds. Provided the private constraints form a convex LP feasible 
region, the model can still generate efficient market prices for the bids submitted.  
However, conditions such as minimum permit requirements and non-divisible bids 
may lead to non-convexities too (Bjørndal and Jörnsten 2008). Therefore, at this stage, 
we do not include any private constraint that requires integer variables in the market 
clearing models, assuming that the farms can internalize those constraints into their 
bids based on past learning, or by iterating through trial market rounds. In Chapter 12, 
we discuss some methods to deal with such non-convexities in permit markets.  
7.3.4 Side Constraints  
Apart from the physical and private constraints discussed above, the market-clearing 
LP models may include restrictions such as the maximum total permit allocation to the 
farms having some specific characteristic (for example, the dairy farms or effluent 
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irrigation farms). Even though such constraints stem from the institutional level, they 
are not related to the underlying nitrate transport system or the ability of the water 
bodies to accept nitrate, and even though such constraints are related to private 
characteristics of the farms, they are not private because they are imposed by the 
institutional level. Therefore, we call such constraints ―side constraints.‖ 
7.4 Separation of Locational Loading and Permit Allocations 
The receptor and source based (market) constraints discussed above restrict the 
locational nitrate loading (the quantity of nitrate that goes into the groundwater 
system), regardless of whose nitrate that was30. In contrast, the private and side 
constraints restrict individual permit allocations, regardless of the location, and then 
nitrate loading indirectly. Locational prices should be derived from the constraints 
which restrict locational loading, but not those which describe private restrictions and 
limit individual allocations. Therefore, a proper market model should separate the 
locational loading and individual permit allocations to produce truly locational prices. 
There are two ways to separate the location of nitrate loading and the private 
characteristics of the market participants. One method is to define a set of locations or 
nodes, n = 1,… , N, to obtain response coefficients Hnrt for each node rather than for 
each participant, and assigning each participant to a node. A clearer market model 
would calculate the total loading at each node using a variable qnodalns for each node as 
qnodalns = ∑f∈nqfs. Then the receptor and source based (market) constraints can be 
imposed on nodal loading variables and private and side constraints can be imposed 
on individual allocations to produce nodal prices which match nodal demand and 
supply.  
Another method is to define two separate variables for permit allocation to each farm 
and net nitrate loading from each farm location, qfs and q
load
fs respectively. We can 
                                               
30
 These market constraints are analogues to the constraints which restrict the net nodal electricity injection 
into the transmission networks, mainly the physical limits of the transmission network. They restrict the net 
injection from the nodes, whatever the entities operating in the affected nodes. 
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then impose the receptor and source constraints on locational loadings qloadfs, and 
private and side constraints on permit allocations qfs.  
Since the former method has the additional advantage of being able to group the 
adjacent small farms into one node, and eliminate repetitions in the response matrix, 
we use the first method. 
Using the nodal loading variables, all receptor and source based (market) constraints, 
including the receptor capacity constraints, can be modelled in the general form as 
∑n∑sAnsq
nodal
ns ≤ V, where V and Ans are some constants. However, to recognize the 
price structures and relationships, the receptor capacity constraints, multi 
receptor/period constraints, and source loading constraints should be separately 
specified.  
We can separately specify the receptor constraints using a receptor end variable yrt 
defined as the total allocation of receptor capacity31, for each receptor and time period 
so that ns
nodal
f
St
Tts stnrrt
qHy    
),min(
),1max( )(
. Then the receptor capacity constraints can 
be specified directly as yrt ≤ Crt, and the multi-receptor/period constraints can be 
formulated as ∑r∑tBrtyrt ≤ W, where W and Brt are some constants. Source constraints 
can be specified as ∑n∑sAnsq
nodal
ns ≤ V. Private constraints can be modelled as 
∑f∑sEfsqfs ≤ Z, where Z and Efs are relevant constants. Other side constraints can also 
be modelled the same way as private constraints. The next section presents a 
Generalised Optimal Loading Model which includes all those types of constraints. 
7.5 Generalized Optimal Loading Model 
The generalized OLM uses the indices, parameters, and variables (other than the 
individual response coefficients) used in the basic OLM. The additional indices, 
parameters, and variables are defined below.  
Indices: 
                                               
31
 The separation of receptor constraints is more important in extending the trading systems to include point 
sources. Chapter 11 discusses how to include point sources.    
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n = node (location): 1,…, N. 
i = source constraint: 1, …, I. 
j = multi-receptor/period constraint: 1, 2,…, J. 
g = private or side constraint: 1, …, G. 
Parameters: 
Hnrd = increase in nitrate level that occurs at receptor r, d years after unit (1 kg) nitrate 
loading in node n during a single year (kg or mg/l).  
Vi = loading limit specified by source constraint i (kg).  
Wj = the right-hand-side constant for multi-receptor/period constraint j (kg or mg/l). Wj 
is a restriction on one or many receptors over one or may time periods. 
Zg = the right-hand-side constant for private or side constraint g (kg). Zg can be either 
a private restriction or an externally imposed restriction on permit allocations. 
Ansi, Brtj, and Efsg are unitless constraint coefficients (possibly zero or one). 
Decision variables: 
qnodalns = nitrate loading from node n in year s. This is the total year-s loading permit 
allocation to the farms in node n (kg). 
yrt = total allocation of receptor capacity (capacity of receptor r of year t) (kg or mg/l).  
Model: Generalized OLM 
Maximize ∑f∑s∑k Pfskxfsk, subject to: 
Upper and lower bounds on bid tranches 
xfsk ≤ Ufsk for all f, s, and k.      (P-1) θ
+
fsk  
−xfsk ≤ 0  for all f, s, and k.      (P-2) θ
−
fsk  
Calculation of individual and nodal allocations 
∑kxfsk − qfs = 0  for all f and s.      (P-3) μfs 
∑f∈nqfs – q
nodal
ns = 0  for all n and s.     (P-5) βns 
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Loading constraints  
∑f∑sAnsiq
nodal
ns ≤ Vi for all i.      (P-6)  πi 
Private and side constraints 
∑f∑sEfsgqfs ≤ Zg for all g.      (P-7)  ζg 
Calculation of receptor capacity allocations 
0
),min(
),1max( )(
    rtns
nodal
f
St
Tts stnr
yqH  for all r and t.    (P-8) γrt 
Receptor capacity constraints 
yrt ≤ Crt  for all r and t.       (P-9) λrt 
Multi-receptor/period constraints 
∑r∑tBrtjyrt ≤ Wj  for all j.      (P-10) δj 
Since each additional constraint has an associated shadow price, the constraint 
structure, and hence the price structure of the generalized OLM, is more complicated 
than that of the basic OLM.  
7.5.1 Dual Formulation and Shadow Prices 
The dual of the generalized OLM models the problem of valuating the receptor 
capacities and all the other receptor and source based restrictions imposed on the 
permit market. 
Minimise ∑f∑s∑kUfskθ
+
fsk + ∑iViπi+ ∑gZgζg + ∑r∑tCrtλrt + ∑jWjδj, subject to: 
θ+fsk − θ
−
fsk + μfs = Pfsk for all f, s, and k.    (D-1) xfsk 
−μfs + βns + ∑gEfsgζg = 0 for all f and s.     (D-3) qfs 
−βns + ∑iAnsiπi + 

 r rt
Ds
st stnr
H )( = 0 for all n and s.  (D-5) q
nodal
ns 
−γrt + λrt + ∑jBrtjδj = 0 for all r and t.     (D-6) yrt 
θ+fsk and θ
−
fsk ≥ 0 for all f, s, and k. 
μfs free for all f and s. 
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βns free for all n and s. 
ζg ≥ 0 for g. 
πi ≥ 0 for i. 
γrt free for all r and t. 
λrt ≥ 0 for all r and t. 
δj≥ 0 for all j. 
The shadow price βns of the constraint (P-5) which defines q
nodal
ns, for some n and s, 
indicates how much the objective function would increase if another 1 kg of year-s 
loading permits were given to node n; this is the social marginal cost of nitrate loading 
from node n in year s. We call βns the ―nodal loading price‖. Unlike the participant 
price, the nodal loading price is a locational price which is not indexed to a particular 
participant, and it does not vary among individual farms in the same node based on 
any private constraint (or other side constraint) which applies to qfs. Since the nodal 
loading price is a market price determined by the nodal demand and supply, it can be 
directly charged to each farm in node n. 
The shadow price πi associated with a source constraint i (P-6) indicates the marginal 
economic contribution of a unit relaxation (increase) in the associated loading limit Vi. 
The farms in the affected nodes would pay a price of πi for relaxing the limit by 1 kg. 
For example, if Vi is a regional loading limit, πi is the price that the farms in the region 
would pay per unit increase of the limit. The ability of a groundwater aquifer to accept 
nitrates and thus the regional loading limits may be increased by nitrate reduction or 
remediation methods such as building wetlands and laying permeable reactive barriers 
(Kalmar & Byrnes, 2008). Importantly, the price πi signals the value of investment in 
those remediation and reduction projects. 
The shadow price ζg of a private constraint (P-7) specified by farm f indicates the 
additional profit that the farm could have gained if the relevant restriction was relaxed 
by 1 kg. For example, if a farm submitted a condition requiring the same quantity in 
the next two years, then the shadow price of the associated constraint indicates how 
much additional profit the farm would gain if it allows a difference of up to 1 kg 
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between the final permit positions for the next two years, rather than requiring exactly 
the same quantity. Hence, this is the opportunity cost of a private restriction.  
On the other hand, if g is a side constraint which affects one or many farms, then the 
associated shadow price ζg indicates how much the objective function would increase 
if the restriction was relaxed (increased) by 1 kg. In this case, the price ζg provides 
feed-back information to the authorities who have imposed the restrictions, indicating 
the cost incurred by the restriction.  
The dual variable γrt associated with the primal constraint (P-8) which defines yrt 
indicates that the farms would make an incremental profit of γrt if they were allowed 
to increase the nitrate level at receptor r in year t by another one unit. Thus, they 
should be charged at γrt per unit increase in nitrate level at receptor r in year t (based 
on the marginal cost pricing approach).  
Once more, the shadow price λrt of the receptor capacity constraint (P-9), for some r 
and t, describes the marginal value of the nitrate intake capacity of receptor r in year t 
and hence the market price of the receptor capacity.  
Since Wj is a restriction that affects one or many receptors over one or many time 
periods, the shadow price δj of a multi-receptor/period constraint j (P-10) indicates the 
marginal value of a unit increase in the relevant receptor-end restriction. The farms 
would pay δi per unit relaxation (increase) of the limit on cumulative capacity 
allocation.  
7.5.2 Price Structures and Relationships 
As discussed above, λrt is the market equilibrium price of receptor capacity, and γrt is 
the farm price for receptor capacity, the marginal cost based price that should be 
charged from (or paid to) the farms for receptor capacity. However, the capacity 
owners who lease out receptor capacities (the regulator, if the farms have not 
previously bought the total capacity of receptor r in year t)32 should be paid at rate λrt 
for each unit of receptor capacity sold (leased out).  
                                               
32
 Note that we have assumed no permanent or long term nitrate loading rights held by the farms. 
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The dual constraint (D-6) associated with primal variable yrt describes the relationship 
between γrt and λrt  as γrt = λrt + ∑iBrtiδi. This relationship shows that the receptor 
capacity price charged to the farms, for some receptor r and period t, is determined by 
the associated capacity constraint and other receptor end constraints affected by 
receptor r in period t. If none is binding, the receptor price charged to the farms can be 
zero.  
As mentioned earlier, multi-receptor/period constraints (indexed by j) possibly 
correspond to nitrate residence and transport in surface water. Hence, for groundwater 
receptors, and for unconnected surface water receptors with nitrate residence times of 
less than a year, the farms will have to pay only the cleared capacity price, i.e, γrt = λrt. 
But if a surface water receptor r is an upstream water body from which water flows 
down to another receptor, and/or if nitrate residence time in the receptor is 
considerably longer than a year, then the farms will have to pay the cleared capacity 
price plus a price for each other affected receptor-end constraint. 
If the nitrate level at receptor r in year t has critical impacts on the many multi-
receptor/period constraints, farms may have to pay a higher price for receptor 
capacity, even if the associated capacity constraint itself is non-binding. For example, 
relatively clean sub-catchments performing well below the maximum acceptable 
nitrate discharge into local streams or lakes may still incur non-zero prices, because 
major downstream rivers or lakes are at a critical state, with binding environmental 
constraints. This is a proper reflection of the impact that their discharges will 
eventually have on those downstream receptors. Conversely, relatively polluted sub-
catchments will have to pay a higher price, reflecting local pollution impacts, even 
though downstream rivers or lakes may not be in a critical state. 
The dual constraint (D-5) associated with primal variable qnodalns describes the 
components of the nodal prices which are used to clear the market. The nodal price is 
composed of the receptor capacity prices charged (or paid) to the farms, and the prices 
associated with other source based (market) constraints.  
βns =  

 r rt
Ts
st stzr
H )( + ∑iAnsiπi 
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If no source constraints were present, or if all were non-binding (πi = 0), the nodal 
loading  price equals the value of the bundle of receptor permits equivalent to a unit (1 
kg) loading permit allocated to node n, i.e., βns =  

 r rt
Ts
st stzr
H )( . If a source 
constraint binds the solution, then the farms in the affected node(s) will have to pay 
the price of an equivalent receptor permit bundle plus the price associated with the 
binding source constraint. Hence the nodal prices include the market values attached 
to the restrictions on locational nitrate loading. 
The dual constraint (D-4) associated with primal variable qfs describes the relationship 
between the nodal prices and the participant prices as μfs = βns + ∑gEfsgζg. In the 
absence of any binding private or side constraint, each farm‘s participant price would 
equal the nodal price. In this case, the market allocation is in strict merit order, 
because the price actually charged and paid to the farm is equal to the participant price 
which rations the final permit allocation.  
However, if a binding private constraint or a side constraint stops a farm from buying 
more until his or her marginal profit equals the nodal price βns, the participant price 
(the farm‘s marginal value of the next 1 kg) is still above the nodal price. In this case, 
the nodal price alone would not justify the final allocation, in terms of the bid prices.  
But the nodal price, in combination with the shadow price(s) on binding private and 
side constraint(s), forms a participant price that at which the final allocation is 
optimal, in terms of the bid prices. 
In summary, the market values of nitrate loading permits are driven by three main 
factors: (1) receptor capacity constraints, (2) multi-receptor/period constraints, and (3) 
source constraints. The prices associated with these constraints (λrt, πi, and δj) 
ultimately determine how much each farm has to pay or will receive for loading 
permits. These prices can be considered as commodity prices, whereas γrt and βns are 
locational prices derived from the commodity prices.  
However, only a few of the above constraints will tend to bind the generalized OLM 
solution. If the farms in some node do not affect any of the binding constraints, the 
nodal price will be zero, allowing the farms to buy all they bid at price zero.   
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7.6 Settlement and Surpluses 
As discussed above, the nodal prices are determined by all the market constraints 
(receptor capacity constraints, multi-receptor/period constraints, and source 
constraints). The settlement process will be simpler if only capacity constraints were 
present or if the other market constraints were non-binding. Therefore, we first discuss 
the settlement issues ignoring all market constraints other than capacity constraints. In 
this case, the initial distribution of permits is the main factor which determines the 
revenue distribution. 
Regardless of whether the farms possess any permanent or long term loading rights, 
they may possess previously purchased loading permits (leased-in previously from the 
market), because the trading program allows them to trade permits for S years from 
the upcoming year. Let Q*fs be the initial (pre-trade) year-s permit position of farm f 
in kg.  
If qfs > Q*fs, then farm f is a net buyer of year-s loading permits. The payment due 
from farm f in node n for buying year-s loading permits is βns × (qfs − Q*fs). If qfs < 
Q*fs, then f is a net seller of year-s loading permits. The payment due to farm f in node 
n for selling year-s permits is βns × (Q*fs − qfs). If qfs = Q*fs, farm f is neither buying 
nor selling year-s loading permits. 
Let Ω be the net revenue for the market operator after clearing the payments for all the 
farms for all the S years (after collecting money from all the buyers and paying all the 
sellers).  
Ω = )*( fsnf fsn s ns Qq    . 
Theorem 1: if the initial distribution of loading permits is feasible (i.e., if the initial 
distribution of permits meet all the market constraints in the market clearing LP), then 
operator revenue Ω is non-negative.  
Theorem 2: if the initial distribution of loading permits fully allocates all the receptor 
capacities (i.e., if the initial allocation binds all the capacity constraints), then Ω is 
zero. 
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Theorem 3: if the initial distribution of loading permits is infeasible, then Ω can be 
negative.  
From complementary slackness,  
  0),min(
),1max( )(
    rtn
St
Dts rt
ns
nodal
stnr CqH   for all r and t.    (S1) 
Since   nf fsns
nodal qq , 
  0),min(
),1max( )(
    rtn
St
Dts rtnf fsstnr
CqH   for all r and t.    (S2) 
If the initial distribution of loading permits is feasible, then 
rtnf fsn
St
Dts stnr
CQH     *
),min(
),1max( )(
 for all r and t.     (S3) 
Since λrt ≥ 0,   0*),min( ),1max( )(     rtn
St
Dts rtnf fsstnr
CQH   for all r and t. (S4) 
From (S2) − (S4),   0)*(),min(
),1max( )(
    rtn
St
Dts nf fsfsstnr
QqH   for all r and t. 
Hence,   0)*(
1
),min(
),1max( )(
   

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net
fsnf fs
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trnfunqH ns
netSt
Dts stnr
   . (S5) 
Then 0),,(
1
  

 rtn r
DS
t
trnfun  .       (S6) 
The terms fun(n,r,t)λrt for t = 1 to S+D can be written as follows. 
fun(n,r,1)λr1 = (Hnr0q
net
n1)λr1 
fun(n,r,2)λr2 = (Hnr0q
net
n2 + Hnr1q
net
n1)λr2  
fun(n,r,3)λr3 = (Hnr0q
net
n3 + Hnr1q
net
n2 + Hnr2q
net
n1)λr3 
.... 
fun(n,r,S)λrS       = (Hnr0q
net
nS + Hnr1q
net
n(S─1) + Hnr2q
net
n(S─2) ... + Hnr(S─1)q
net
n1)λr3 
fun(n,r,S+1)λr(S+1) = (Hnr1q
net
nS + Hnr2q
net
n(S─1) + Hnr3q
net
n(S─2) ... + HnrSq
net
n1)λr(S+1) 
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fun(n,r,S+2)λr(S+2) = (Hnr2q
net
nS + Hnr3q
net
n(S─1) + Hnr4q
net
n(S─2) ... + Hnr(S+1)q
net
n1)λr(S+2) 
.... 
fun(n,r,S+D−1)λr(S+D−1) = (Hnr(D−1)q
net
nS + HnrDq
net
n(S−1))λr(S+D−1)   
fun(n,r,S+D)λr(S+D)        = HnrDq
net
nSλr(S+D)    
By summing the above terms: fun(n,r,1)λr1 to fun(n,r,S+D)λr(S+D),  
 
By substituting in (S6),  
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, then 
0)*(    fsnf fsn s ns Qq , and hence Ω is non-negative (Theorem 1).  
If the initial allocation binds all the capacity constraints, inequalities S3 and S4 
become equalities. Then, 0)*(    fsnf fsn s ns Qq , and hence Ω is zero 
(Theorem 2). Further, if either λrt = 0 or 0
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Hence, all the ex-post binding constraints being bound by the initial allocation is a 
sufficient condition for Ω = 0.     
Similarly, if the initial distribution of permits is infeasible, inequalities (S3) and (S4) 
do not hold for some r and t, and hence Ω can be negative (Theorem 3). 
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Since we assume no permanent permit holdings, only the permits previously 
purchased from the trading program are considered as initial holdings. A previous 
market allocation cannot cause infeasibility unless the previous capacity estimates 
were inaccurate or some unexpected event occurred (e.g., a flood). Therefore, the 
operator revenue Ω cannot be negative. 
7.6.1 Interpretation of Operator Revenue 
As proved above, if the initial distribution of permits is feasible, Ω is non-negative, 
but what does a positive operator revenue mean? We defined Ω as the operator 
revenue after clearing the payments for the farms, but the receptor capacities bought 
from the farms could have been sold by either the farms (who bought previously) or 
by the regulator who is assumed to be the owner of the receptor capacities. If the 
farms do not possess any previously purchased permits, Ω is the total payment made 
by the farms for buying (or leasing in) receptor capacity rights from the regulator. 
Then, Ω is the total lease payment due to the regulator. If the farms currently possess 
loading permits, and if the initial distribution of loading permits binds all the capacity 
constraints (or at least the ex-post binding capacity constraints), Ω is zero. The market 
re-allocation being bound by a capacity constraint which was not binding the initial 
allocation means that the farms have bought receptor capacity from the regulator up to 
the maximum available, and that Ω is non-zero. If the initial allocation was infeasible, 
Ω may be negative, as the regulator has to buy back the over-allocated receptor 
capacities. Such payments will tend to offset one another if the capacities of some 
receptors and/or years were previously over-allocated, and some under-allocated.  
The regulator can collect the lease payments as a public property owner, or can re-
distribute the total revenue or a portion of the revenue among the market participants, 
based on some free initial allocation criteria. In the latter case, all the farms will be 
deemed to have an initial permit position (in addition to previous purchases). 
However, it is difficult to find a fair initial allocation of loading permits which binds 
all the ex-post binding capacity constraints. Therefore, if the regulator wants to 
redistribute the total revenue among the farms (to set Ω = 0), the free initial allocation 
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can be made in terms of receptor capacity rights rather than loading permits. In 
Chapter 10 there is more discussion on setting the initial positions.  
7.6.2 Settlement Surpluses    
The operator revenue Ω discussed above is not a settlement surplus resulting from 
price differences; it is just a rental payment due to someone who owns the receptor 
capacity. Hence if the receptor capacities were the only physical limitation, the market 
is free from any surplus issues. This section considers a market which has all types of 
physical constraints: capacity constraints, multi-receptor/period constraints, and 
source constraints. We define a settlement surplus as a surplus left after settling the 
payments for the farms and the owners of receptor capacity.   
In the presence of multi-receptor/period constraints and source constraints, the nodal 
prices are calculated as βns =  

 r rt
Ts
st stnr
H )( + ∑iAnsiπi. The price charged to the 
farms for receptor capacity γrt is given as γrt = λrt + ∑iBrtiδi. When the buyers (farms) 
are charged at γrt and the capacity owners (other than farms) are paid at λrt, the market 
would clear with surplus revenue, because the same final commodity is traded at 
different prices. The surplus is explained by the amount paid by the farms for the 
binding multi-receptor/period constraints. Similarly, when the farms which affect a 
binding source constraint are charged at a rate which includes the price associated 
with that constraint, and the others are paid at a price which does not include the price 
associated with that constraint, the market will clear with surplus revenue.  
To handle the settlement surpluses related to the binding multi-receptor/period and 
source constraints, the market regulations require a precise interpretation of each 
market constraint. The farms cannot utilize the receptor capacities beyond the limits 
specified by other market constraints such as regional loading limits. Hence, the rights 
to affect multi-receptor/period constraints and source constraints can be considered as 
essential environmental services required to utilize the core commodity (receptor 
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capacity) traded33. The prices associated with those constraints, πi and δj, are the 
market values of those environmental services. When they are included in the nodal 
prices, they generate settlement surpluses34. The question is: who should collect the 
money paid for those constraints? The market requires a mechanism for handling the 
possible surpluses. The problem of handling the surpluses generated by those 
constraints is similar to the problem of handling the rental surpluses associated with 
transmission line capacity constraints in electricity markets. The issues and 
alternatives are discussed in Hogan (1992), Oren et al. (1995), and Read (2002).  
One way to handle surplus payments is to avoid any surplus by defining tradable 
rights for each market constraint (including capacity constraints) and let them be 
traded separately in a combined market, so that the farms can simultaneously trade 
receptor capacities and other environmental services35. To understand this, we use a 
general representation of the market constraints.  
As discussed in section 7.4, all source and receptor based (market) constraints may be 
generally modelled as ∑f∑sAnsĩq
nodal
ns ≤ Vĩ, where ĩ = 1, …, Ĩ is an index for the market 
constraint, and Ansĩ and Vĩ are some constants.    
We may define ―constraint rights‖ as tradable rights to affect each constraint ĩ, and 
expect the farms to assemble a portfolio of constraint rights to match the nitrate 
loading in each year. A constraint right may correspond to a right for receptor capacity 
or an environmental service, and Vĩ is the tradable capacity of the constraint right 
(constraint capacity). This is the same as the ambient or receptor permit system 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, which is not practically applicable for trading nitrate, 
                                               
33
 Similarly, electricity users in a node cannot use electricity beyond the physical limits of the incoming 
transmission system. Hence the transmission system is an essential service required to utilize the core 
product, electric power.    
34
 Similar to the rental surpluses associated with transmission line capacity constraints in electricity 
markets. 
35
 Defining tradable rights relative to some constraints such as multi-period constraints may cause 
confusion. Trading rights to pollute a receptor in each year, together with rights to pollute a receptor any 
time within a period of several consecutive years, are confusing. 
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because the number of constraints involved is relatively large. However, if only a few 
market constraints other than receptor capacity constraints are present (for example, 
one source constraint on total nitrate loading with a hundred receptor capacity 
constraints), the farms may be allowed to trade loading permits (bundles of capacity 
constraint rights) and separate constraint rights for other market constraints, in a 
combined market.  
Rather than trading rights defined relative to any constraint separately, the market 
could allow the farms to trade fully packaged products, bundles of constraint rights for 
receptor capacities and other environmental services. This is easier for the farms, 
because the loading permits are already defined as bundles of receptor capacity rights, 
and they can be re-defined as bundles of not only receptor capacity rights but all the 
(market) constraint rights. This is reasonable, because each market constraint specifies 
the ability of some water body (or a portion of a water body) to accept nitrate.  
Under any of the above options, the total revenue from sales will be distributed among 
the market participants (the farms which sell permits) and the owners of constraint 
rights who do not participate in the market. If the constraint rights are not fully 
distributed among the farms ex-ante, the regulator can be considered as a property 
owner who leases out the rights to use them. 
Another way to handle surplus payments associated with a market constraint is to treat 
the constraint as a restriction on the capacity of an environmental service provided to 
the market by someone outside the market; the service is not traded among the market 
participants, and the facility owner does not participate in the market. Then the surplus 
revenue associated with the constraint should be paid to the external capacity owner36. 
For example, the surpluses may be paid to the regional environmental authority as a 
payment for undertaking remediation projects to clean the threatened water bodies. 
                                               
36
 This is similar to the concept of paying the surpluses generated from binding transmission line capacity 
constraints in electricity markets to the transmission network operator. 
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Another option is re-distributing the surplus among the market participants based on 
some criteria, for example, in proportion to the final permit positions.  
7.7 Gains from Trade 
An interesting question is how much benefit each farm gains from participating in the 
trading program. As shown in Figure 7.3, if the initial position is to the left of qfs, f is a 
net buyer of year-s permits, and if the initial position is to the right of qfs, f is a net 
seller of year-s permits (the unaccepted gross poll bids of the net sellers are equivalent 
to accepted net pool offers). The graph highlights the buyer and seller surpluses 
relative to the participant prices; in the absence of any binding private or side 
constraint the nodal price and the participant price are equal.  
Generally, if P(q) is the profit function, buyer and seller surpluses can be given by 
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).( . If the nodal price differs from the 
participant prices, the nodal price βfs should be used to calculate the surpluses. As 
shown in the figure, buyer and seller surpluses can also be calculated using the 
shadow prices associated with the upper and lower bounds on the bids. For example, 
if the initial position of farm f was zero, f is a net buyer of year-s permits, and the 
buyer surplus is ∑k∑xfsk θ
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Figure 7.3: Buyer and seller surpluses. Depending on the initial position, a farm can 
be either a buyer or a seller of some year-s permits, but cannot be buying and selling 
the same year-s permits; hence the two cases are just two possible initial positions. 
7.8 Limitations of the OLM 
The proposed market model allows only farms to participate in the market and trade 
loading permits. Unless the farms possess previously purchased permits and offers to 
sell, the proposed trading program is a single-sided, buyer‘s market. The prices are 
determined solely by competition among the farms. The regulator who owns the 
previously unsold receptor capacities does not actively participate in the market. 
Regulator owned capacity may be sold for price zero, because the regulator is 
assumed to have a continuous reserve of price zero. 
The market allocates the future nitrate intake capacities of the water bodies for current 
consumption of the farms. As a consequence, future opportunities for nitrate loading 
(farming) could be forgone. The opportunity cost of being unable to discharge nitrates 
in the future is not represented in the models. On the other hand, the ecological cost 
and the water user‘s cost of having nitrate in water are also disregarded. The regulator, 
who is assumed to be the owner of the environment on behalf of the public interest, 
could possibly have imposed those costs on the polluters.  
The proposed LP calculates the optimal prices and allocations based on the tradable 
receptor capacities Crt. The tradable capacity (capacity released to the market) is a 
management decision based on the currently available capacity C0rt (how much more 
nitrate each receptor can take in each time period). Since, the available capacity of 
some year t may be allocated in any year before year t, subject to the demand, the 
tradable capacity (capacity released to the market in this year) may be set below the 
available capacity (Crt ≤ C
0
rt) to reserve some of the capacity for future allocation.  
If the total available capacity was released to the market right away, i.e., if Crt = C
0
rt 
(all-in-market), the participants collectively decide whether they consume the total 
capacity now, or leave some for the future. Then, whether or not the receptor 
capacities are fully allocated currently (ex-ante), any capacity constraint may be fully 
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allocated by the market (ex-post). If a capacity constraint for some year t becomes 
binding in the solution, the capacity of year t is fully consumed by year 1 to year S 
permits traded in the current auction. As a consequence, farms may not be able to buy 
any permit that affects year t in the future, unless someone who had bought a future 
permit which affects year t, offers to sell, or the capacity can be augmented.  
Another disadvantage of fully allocating the resource capacities immediately is that 
the available capacity C0rt is an estimate that may not be accurate. If the actual 
capacity availability is below the estimate, the environmental goals will not be 
achieved. Therefore, it is always risky to fully allocate the estimated capacity to be 
consumed immediately in a few years. Then, the market authorities are left with a 
potentially difficult optimisation problem: how much capacity should be released to 
the market each time trading takes place? This is a problem of balancing resource 
consumption over time. In the next chapter, we discuss alternative mechanisms to 
solve the problem. 
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Chapter 8 
8 TRADE IN LOADING PERMITS AND CAPACITY 
RIGHTS
37
 
8.1 Introduction 
The major problem in the generalized OLM is the risk of premature consumption of 
future capacities. A trivial method to avoid premature capacity consumption and to 
balance resource consumption over a long planning horizon is releasing only a portion 
of the currently available receptor capacity into the market and reserving some for the 
future. However, the market authorities have to decide how much should be released 
to the market each time. Another method is to set a penalty on each unit of resource 
consumed beyond some limit. Again, the authorities have to choose the penalty 
margin and the rate. Those control-based methods require the environmental 
authorities to decide the total allocations or penalties based on forecasted demands. 
Such mechanisms push the market further away from free trading. A potentially better 
method is to facilitate the market itself to collectively decide when and how much to 
consume. 
The proposed market model had only farms trading loading permits and no one 
trading receptor capacity rights (directly), or more generally speaking, no one trading 
                                               
37
 This chapter is based on Prabodanie et al.  (2010). 
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constraint rights (directly). As discussed in the previous chapter, the regulator plays a 
passive role, leaving the farms to determine the lease prices, and hence the true social 
cost of allocating capacity is not represented in the model. If the regulator could 
participate in the market and sell receptor capacity rights, it can impose the associated 
costs on the market, and balance allocations over time.  
Apart from the regulator, if other entities such as environmental organizations and 
farm organizations could participate in the market and trade receptor capacity rights, 
they can buy future capacity from the market (by competing with the farms) and save 
for the future, or retire for the enhancement of environmental quality. Such entities 
can help the balancing of capacity utilization over time. Therefore, the market should 
be expanded to allow trade in capacity rights, or more generally, to allow trade in 
―constraint rights,‖ together with loading permits and to encourage participation of 
third parties to balance pollution (capacity consumption) over time and to avoid over-
consumption of capacity by low value uses.  
8.2  Trading Loading Permits and Constraint Rights 
In this chapter, we present a market model with two types of players, farms trading 
loading permits, and ―resource banks‖ trading constraint rights in the same combined 
market.  Ideally, anyone, including the farms, should be able to trade constraint rights. 
However, to avoid confusion, we assume that the farms trade only loading permits 
because the constraint rights purchased from the market cannot be directly utilized 
(surrendered to cover nitrate loading). Those who buy constraint permits can only re-
sell to recover costs and make profits, or retire the permit for the sake of the 
environment. A farm wanting to trade both loading permits and constraint rights is 
considered to be participating in the market as two independent players: a farm and a 
bank. The market itself is indifferent to any vertical integration or bilateral contract 
agreed outside the market38.  
                                               
38
 This is an essential feature of a gross pool formulation. In electricity markets, regardless of the fact that a 
generator and a retailer are vertically integrated, or have a bilateral trading contract (for example, to hedge 
against the market price volatility, a retailer may agree with a generator to buy power at an agreed price), 
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A catchment scale market would be likely to have just one bank, the regional 
environmental authority or a representative organization (the regulator). The regulator 
who owns the currently unallocated resource capacities would offer to sell constraint 
rights and the farms would bid to buy (as bids for loading permits). The market 
participation of the regulator creates a market place in which each unit of receptor 
capacity and environmental service in the market has an owner who sets a value on 
the commodity.  
The regulator may set a single reservation price on each type of constraint right, or a 
stepped offer function. The market operator can transform the offer function to an 
equivalent stepped bid function. If the capacity of a market constraint is fully or 
partially owned by the regulator, it can set the prices for each offer tranche based on 
the associated costs (which are hard to estimate, as discussed in Chapter 9), or some 
planned allocation schedule. For example, if the total available capacity is 500 kg, and 
if the regulator wishes to allocate only about 100 kg to the farms in the current trading 
year, it may set a relatively low price on the first 100 kg tranche. If the regulator 
wishes to reserve some of the capacity for the future, it can set a high price on the last 
offer tranche, for example, an infinitely high price on the last 200 kg tranche offered.  
8.3 Optimal Resource Allocation Model (ORAM) 
We present a model to facilitate any number of banks participating in the market. The 
banks bid for each constraint separately and farms bid for loading permits equivalent 
to bundles of constraint rights. The banks also have to bid for steps of quantities 
starting from zero (offers can be converted to gross pool bids as discussed in Chapter 
6). Since the market clearing LP itself does not discount the bids, the bids for future 
                                                                                                                                            
the market treats them as two independent traders having independent marginal cost or profit functions. 
Once the market is cleared, everyone should make payments based on cleared prices. Outside the market, 
the contracts are exercised based on the differences between the contract prices and the market prices.    
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capacities should indicate the discounted present value of the future capacities, based 
on each bank‘s own private discount rate39.  
For this model, we assume that tradable constraint rights are defined for each market 
constraint, and the farms trade fully packaged loading permits (bundles of constraint 
rights) while banks trade constraint rights separately. We use a common index for all 
market constraints including the receptor capacity constraints and provide a compact, 
general LP model which can be used to clear a market in which the farms and the 
banks trade loading permits and constraint rights simultaneously. A set of new 
indices, parameters, and variables are used in model ORAM with those which were 
defined before. 
Indices:  
b = bank: 1,…, B. 
l = bank bid tranche: 1,…, L. 
ĩ = market constraint: 1, …, Ĩ (Ĩ = R×T + I + J). Since each constraint ĩ corresponds to 
a commodity traded in the market, in this section, we use the word ―constraint‖ rather 
than the term ―constraint right,‖ to refer to a commodity.   
Parameters: 
UBankbĩl = quantity specified in bid tranche l submitted by bank b for constraint ĩ (kg or 
mg/l). 
PBankbĩl= bid price specified in bid tranche l submitted by bank b for constraint ĩ ($/kg 
or $/mg/l). 
Cĩ = tradable capacity of constraint ĩ (kg or mg/l).  
Ãĩns= constraint coefficient associated with node n and year s.   
Decision variables: 
                                               
39
 The regulator who participates in the market as a resource bank will have to bid for capacity rights based 
on the discounted present values over a long planning horizon. In chapter 9, we discuss the major issues 
arise in valuating future capacity.  
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xbankbĩl = quantity accepted from bid tranche l submitted by bank b for constraint ĩ (kg 
or mg/l). 
qbankbĩ = aggregate final position of constraint ĩ for bank b; this is the capacity of 
constraint ĩ held by bank b after trade (kg or mg/l).  
Model: ORAM 
Maximize ∑f∑s∑k Pfskxfsk, + ∑b∑ĩ∑lP
Bank
bĩlx
bank
bĩl, subject to: 
Upper and lower bounds on bid tranches  
xfsk ≤ Ufsk for all f, s, and k.     (P-1)  θ
+
fsk  
−xfsk ≤ 0 for all f, s, and k.     (P-2) θ
−
fsk  
xbankbĩl ≤ U
Bank
bĩl   for all b, ĩ, and l.    (P-11) α
+
bĩl  
− xbankbĩl ≤ 0 for all b, ĩ, and l.     (P-12) α
−
bĩl  
Calculation of final permit positions 
∑kxfsk − qfs = 0  for all f and s     (P-3) μfs 
∑l x
bank
bĩl − q
bank
bĩ = 0  for all b and ĩ.     (P-13) νbĩ  
∑f∈zqfs – q
nodal
ns = 0  for all n and s.    (P-5) βzs 
Market constraints 
∑n∑sÃnsĩ q
nodal
ns + ∑bq
bank
bĩ  =  Cĩ  for all ĩ.    (P-14) λĩ 
Private and side constraints 
∑f∑sEfsgqfs ≤ Zg for all g.     (P-7)  ζg 
The ORAM objective function maximises the joint total benefit from trade to both the 
farms and the banks. The market constraints are modelled as equalities because the 
tradable capacity of each constraint ĩ is fully distributed among the market 
participants, ex-post and ex-ante. The set of market constraints includes receptor 
capacity constraints (ĩ = rt), source constraints (ĩ = i), and multi receptor/period 
constraints (ĩ = j). The three types of market constraints can be separated as follows. 
0
),min(
),1max( )(
    rtnsf
St
Tts stnr
yqH  for all r and t.    (P-8) γrt 
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yrt + ∑bq
bank
brt =  Crt    for all r and t.    (P-15) λi  
∑f∑sAnsiq
nodal
ns + ∑bq
bank
bi = Vi for all i.    (P-16)  πi 
∑r∑tBrtjyrt + ∑bq
bank
bj= Wj   for all j.    (P-17) δj 
The model does not include any private or side constraints that affects the banks, but 
they can be included if required. The dual formulation of the ORAM is given below.  
Minimise ∑f∑s∑kUfskθ
+
fsk + ∑b∑ĩ∑lU
Bank
bĩlα
+
bĩl + ∑ĩCĩλĩ + ∑gZgζg, subject to: 
θ+fsk − θ
−
fsk + μfs = Pfsk for all f, s, and k.    (D-1) xfsk 
α+bĩl − α
−
bĩl  + νbĩ  =  P
Bank
bĩl for all b, ĩ, l.       (D-6) x
bank
bĩl 
−μfs + βns + ∑gEfsgζg = 0 for all f and s.     (D-3) qfs 
− νbĩ + λĩ = 0   for all b and ĩ.       (D-7) q
bank
bĩ  
−βns + ∑ĩAnsĩ λĩ = 0 for all n and s.     (D-5) q
nodal
ns 
θ+fsk and θ
−
fsk ≥ 0 for all f, s, and k. 
α +bĩl and α
 −
bĩl ≥ 0 for all b, i, and l. 
μfs free for all f and s. 
νbĩ free for all b and ĩ. 
βns free for all n and s. 
ζg ≥ 0 for all g. 
λĩ ≥ 0 for all ĩ. 
As mentioned above, the model allows the banks to buy and sell constraint capacity. 
But in the succeeding discussions, we assume that the banks are capacity sellers rather 
than buyers, especially to highlight the effects of the regulator‘s participation in the 
market as a capacity owner who offers to sell constraint capacity.  
The shadow price λĩ of the market constraint ĩ (P-14) indicates the marginal value of 
constraint capacity. This is a price which matches the market demand and supply for 
constraint capacity and hence the market price of constraint capacity (constraint 
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price). The farms and the banks should be charged (paid) at λĩ per each unit of 
constraint capacity bought (sold).  
The shadow price νbĩ of the constraint (P-13) which calculates the final capacity 
position of each bank, indicates how much the objective function would increase if 
bank b were given another unit of constraint ĩ. Similar to the farm participant price μfs, 
this is also a participant price, indexed to a particular bank and it describes the 
economic characteristics of the bank.  
If bank b is the regulator who offers to sell constraint capacity based on the 
opportunity cost, ecological cost, and water user‘s cost of having nitrate in water, the 
shadow price α+bĩl of the bid upper bound constraint (P-11) indicates the cost saving 
from the last unsold (accepted) capacity unit from that bid. Hence if a regulator offer 
is rejected, α+bĩl ≥ 0 (in this gross pool formulation, a bid being accepted is equivalent 
to an offer being rejected). The shadow price α −bĩl of bid lower bound constraint (P-
12) indicates how much the society would lose if one unit was accepted from that bid, 
i.e., how much it would cost the society if the regulator was forced to withhold one 
unit from that bid. Hence, if a regulator‘s offer is accepted, α −bĩl > 0. If a bid l 
corresponds to a bank‘s buy bid, the associated shadow prices of α+bĩl and α
 –
bĩl can be 
interpreted as similar to θ+fsk and θ
−
fsk discussed in section 7.2 of Chapter 7. 
The dual constraints associated with primal variables xbankbŕl and q
bank
bŕ produce the 
price relationship λrt  =  νbŕt  =  P
Bank
bŕl  + α
−
bŕl  − α
+
bŕl. As discussed in section 7.2.4, 
from duality and complementary slackness we can show that if a bank offer is fully 
accepted, λrt  ≥  P
Bank
bŕl; if an offer is not accepted, λrt  ≤ P
Bank
bŕl; and if an offer is 
partially accepted, λrt = P
Bank
bŕl. Hence, a bank can be the marginal trader who 
determines the market price (λrt = P
Bank
bŕl). The market price of constraint capacity 
cannot be zero unless the banks all bid at price zero, or not enough bid for the 
constraint. The market allows the regulator, who offers to sell constraint capacity, to 
act as a bank, effectively refusing to sell unless the market price is above its bid 
(reservation) price. Hence, the farms have to bid for loading permits to set the 
constraint prices above the regulator‘s reservation price (ÃnsĩPfsk ≥ λi ≥ P
Bank
bĩl), 
otherwise the farms cannot buy constraint capacity (i.e., the farms who affect the 
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particular constraint cannot buy loading permits). To buy the total capacity, the farms 
have to out-bid the highest bank bid. Even if only one farm‘s year-1 to year-S permits 
affect some year t, the farm‘s ability to affect the price is limited because it has to 
compete with the banks. 
If ĩ corresponds to a receptor capacity constraint (receptor r in period t), ĩ = rt, and the 
farms cannot buy the capacity of receptor r in period t unless they bid so that, 
  Hnr(t−s)Pfsk ≥ λi  ≥  P
Bank
brtl. 
8.4 Benefits of Having Resource Banks in the Market      
The ability to charge the polluters appropriately and to balance resource consumption 
over time is just a few of the benefits of allowing resource banks (mainly, the 
regulator) to participate in the market and trade constraint rights. Apart from that, the 
resource banks can improve the performance of the market. 
Markets in diffuse nitrate discharge permits generally provide limited opportunities 
for trade in loading permits because the loading permits are not comparable between 
farms40. As discussed above, loading permits are different compositions of constraint 
rights (commodities). The ability and willingness of the farms to trade each 
commodity in the market are limited by the farm‘s location and the effects on each 
constraint, which determine the composition of each farm‘s loading permit. If the 
farms are hydro-geologically isolated, having effects on unique combinations of 
constraints, they have limited opportunities to trade with each other. Therefore, when 
the farms alone cannot create an active market, the resource banks can make a market 
work. Even if the farms cannot trade with each other, every farm can trade with the 
banks (multilaterally). Therefore, the resource banks can improve both the market 
competitiveness and liquidity by acting as ―market makers.‖ 
 For a trading system to be useful in any catchment, the non-tradable sources, mainly 
the state of the aquifer, should not be bad enough to violate the market 
                                               
40
 Chapter 12 includes a section on market competitiveness, which discusses the extent to which nonpoint 
sources can trade with each other. 
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(environmental) constraints. For example, if the expected nitrate flux into a surface 
water body via groundwater is above the maximum acceptable level, no capacity is 
left for trading in the years to come unless the receptors and/or the groundwater 
aquifer can be cleaned.  
If someone can clean nitrates from a receptor, the tradable capacity of the receptor can 
be augmented. Similarly if someone can remove nitrates flowing from some region, 
the regional loading cap can be relaxed. Hence the constraint capacity of the market 
constraints are not always fixed but can be augmented. Those who have the ability to 
augment constraint capacity can participate in the market as resource banks and sell 
augmented capacity. Hence, the proposed market model incentivises active cleanup 
technologies and methods. 
Assume a resource bank b that can remove nitrates from a receptor r in year t, up to a 
maximum of CArt (kg or mg/l) at a marginal cost of P
Bank
rt, submits a single bid tranche 
of CArt at P
Bank
rt. Then the capacity constraint for receptor r in period t can be re-
written as follows to facilitate offering additional capacity to the market. 
yrt + ∑bq
bank
brt =  Crt + C
A
rt       (P-18) λi  
Since the cost of remediation is relatively high, the farms would not buy augmented 
capacity unless the currently available capacity (capacity offered to the market by the 
regulator) is insufficient and the incremental profit from more nitrate intensive 
farming options justifies paying for polluting the receptors beyond the natural 
capacity, and paying the cost of cleaning. If the banks try to monopolise the market, 
the farms will find it more economical to implement on-site nutrient management 
practices to reduce nitrate losses rather than buying more permits. Then the banks will 
not be able to recover the cost of building and maintaining the treatment plants.     
How a bank optimizes the bids, and the potential for price manipulation by the banks, 
is beyond the scope of this work. We expect that the regulator will set the bids to price 
out over-consumption, not to price out the farms entirely and monopolize the market.  
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8.5 Charging a Penalty on Resource Consumption 
In a catchment dominated by agriculture, the farms may oppose the intervention of 
any third party (bank) in the market because such third parties can affect the prices. 
On the other hand, the farms may claim that they own permanent rights to discharge 
nitrates, and oppose the regulator‘s participation in the market as a capacity owner. In 
the absence of resource banks, a penalty may be imposed to discourage full 
consumption of future capacity and to encourage saving for the future. Just like the 
stepped bank bid functions, stepped penalty functions may be set to price out over-
consumption of resources by low value uses. Including the penalties would change the 
constraint structure of the Generalized OLM and thus the resulting price structures. 
The constraint structure for a simple penalty function with two steps is given below, 
assuming no market constraints other than the receptor capacity constraints.   
Assume a penalty of zero on the first CFreert (<Crt) units of receptor capacity allocated 
(kg or mg/l), and a penalty of PPenaltyrt ($) on each unit of capacity allocated above 
CFreert. Two receptor end variables for the total allocation of receptor capacity, one 
without penalty (yfreert) and one with penalty (y
penalty
rt) can be used to model the 
constraints. The following additional constraints are required to accommodate the 
penalties.  
yrt  − y
free
rt− y
penalty
rt  =  0   for all r and t.  (P-19) λrt 
yfreert ≤ C
Free
rt  for all r and t.   (P-20) ψ
+
rt  
ypenaltyrt ≤ Crt− C
Free
rt for all r and t.   (P-21) ρ
+
rt 
−yfreert ≤ 0  for all r and t.   (P-22) ψ
−
rt  
−ypenaltyrt ≤ 0   for all r and t.   (P-23) ρ
−
rt 
The following dual price relationships are derived from the dual constrains associated 
with primal variables, yfreert and y
penalty
rt. 
λrt= ψ
 +
rt− ψ
 −
rt = ρ
 +
rt − ρ
 −
rt + Vrt. 
If the market clears with surplus penalty-free capacity, i.e., if 0 < yfreert< C
Free
rt, then 
ψ+rt= 0, ρ
+
rt=0, ψ
−
rt= 0, and ρ
−
rt> 0. Hence λrt= 0. 
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If the market clears at the penalty margin, i.e., if 0 < yfreert= C
Free
rt, then 
ψ+rt> 0, ρ
+
rt=0, ψ
−
rt = 0, and ρ
−
rt> 0. Hence λrt= ψ
 +
rt  = Vrt − ρ
−
rt. 
If the market clears above the penalty margin but with surplus capacity, i.e., if 0 < 
ypenaltyrt< Crt− C
Free
rt, then 
ψ+rt > 0, ρ
+
rt =0, ψ
−
rt = 0, and ρ
−
rt= 0. Hence λrt = ψ
 +
rt  = Vrt.  
If the market clears with full capacity allocation, i.e., if 0 < ypenaltyrt= Crt− C
Free
rt, then 
ψ+rt> 0, ρ
+
rt > 0, ψ
−
rt= 0, and ρ
−
rt = 0. Hence λrt= ψ
 +
rt = Vrt+ ρ
 +
rt.  
If the market clears above the penalty margin, the farms have to pay at least the 
penalty PPenaltyrt. If the farms collectively buy the total capacity, they have to pay the 
penalty plus the price they would have been charged if no penalty were imposed. 
Again, the penalty should be set to price out over-consumption, not to price out the 
farms entirely. The environmental authority‘s problem of optimising the penalty 
margin and the rate is beyond the scope of this work. 
8.6 A Conceptual Market Model for a Typical Lake Catchment 
The ORAM presented above is an abstract, generally applicable LP model for a 
double-sided market which allows the farms to buy (and sell) loading permits and the 
banks to sell (and buy) constraint capacities. However, the structure may vary 
depending on the catchment hydro-geology, surface water flow system, and long term 
goals of the community. This section presents a market model for a hypothetical lake 
catchment inspired by the nitrate pollution problem in the Lake Taupo catchment41. 
                                               
41 Lake Taupo is the largest lake in New Zealand. More than 30 rivers and streams flow into the lake, but it 
has only one outlet, the Waikato River. Since the mid 1970s, increased nitrate levels have been observed in 
the lake due to intensive farming and urbanization in the catchment. Catchment hydro-geology is complex 
with groundwater nitrate residence times ranging from 20 to 180 years and varying levels of attenuation in 
the aquifer. The lake waters move slowly (water, once in Lake Taupo, can take 11 years to move through 
the lake to the Waikato River). Even without further intensification of land use, the total nitrogen load into 
the lake is expected to increase in the future, because the catchment groundwater quality has not yet reached 
equilibrium with the current land use distribution (Morgenstern 2008). To maintain current water quality, 
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The main purpose is to show how the complex market interactions in a large 
catchment can be modelled as an LP, sufficiently addressing the underlying physical 
transport systems while maintaining the simplicity of the model. We do not present a 
numerical simulation of the model (numerical results for another case study are 
discussed in the next chapter), but we discuss how the price structure is driven by the 
constraint structure and the ability of the model to generate theoretically efficient 
prices. The model does not correspond to any particular catchment, but a general 
representation of a lake catchment. 
We consider a slow-moving lake which has many rivers flowing in and one outlet 
(Figure 8.1).To develop a conceptual market model, we have to make some 
assumptions on the underlying hydro-geological systems and the regulatory systems 
governing permit trades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 bnbmnb 
Lake 
Streams 
Farms 
Nitrate flow  
Outlet - River 
 
Figure 8.1: Hypothetical Lake Catchment 
                                                                                                                                            
the nitrogen load into the lake has to be reduced by at least 20% (Petch et al. 2003). Tradable nitrogen 
discharge permits have been proposed as a means of achieving the target.  
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8.6.1 Physical Water Transport System: Assumptions 
Nitrate loading permits are traded, assuming that nitrogen loss from farms in the 
catchment occurs as nitrate leaching (runoff losses are negligible). Nitrate loaded by 
the farms may be carried down to the lake via streams or direct groundwater seepage. 
Therefore, the streams and the lake are considered as receptors where the mass of 
nitrate discharge into each receptor is to be controlled. We assume that in-stream 
nitrate residence time is less than a year, and the proportions of in-stream nitrate 
attenuation (loss before reaching the lake) are known. We assume a simple (rough) 
nitrate mass balance model for the lake. The mass balance model assumes that any 
nitrate ion in the lake at any time has known probabilities of being lost (by de-
nitrification or other processes) and of being drained to the outlet. The hypothetical 
model is given in Section 8.6.3. 
8.6.2 Market Rules: Assumptions 
All the farms in the catchment are assumed to be participating in the trading program 
as discussed in section 6.7.1 of Chapter 6. An independent entity called the ―market 
operator‖ operates the market. A regional environmental authority called the 
―regulator‖ participates in the market as a resource bank which buys and sells 
constraint permits. Trading takes place once every year. 
At the beginning of every trading year, the market operator calculates the available 
receptor capacities, taking into account all non-tradable sources, including the 
previous year‘s discharges. We assume no previously allocated permanent discharge 
rights, and only pre-purchased permits are considered as initial holdings. All initially 
free (unallocated) constraint capacity is considered to be owned by the regulator.  
8.6.3 Market Modelling 
Based on the assumptions, a market model for the catchment requires two types of 
environmental constraints specifying the ability of the receptors to accept nitrates 
(restrictions on total nitrate discharge into the receptors in each year) and the ability of 
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the lake to store nitrates (restrictions on annual nitrate storage in the lake) while 
maintaining its health42. The trading program would be simpler if tradable constraint 
rights are defined only relative to the constraints on annual discharge limits43. Hence, 
we assume that only discharge rights are traded, and the surpluses generated by 
storage constraints are paid to the regulator. A cap on loading rate per hectare may be 
imposed (outside the market) to secure local groundwater quality. 
For the market constraints, a common index ĩ was used in model ORAM because 
tradable constraint rights were assumed for all market constraints. But in this case, 
tradable rights are assumed only for the receptor capacity constraints, not for the 
storage constraints (these are receptor end multi-period constraints). Hence for this 
model, we do not use the common index ĩ. Apart from having a single bank 
participating in the market, the model structure, except the set of market constraints, 
would be the same as in model ORAM. Hence we present only the set of market 
constraints.   
Additional indices, parameters, and variables: 
Receptor r = 1 is the lake, and r = 2, 3, …, R are the streams. 
ylaket = total mass nitrate discharge into the lake during year t = ∑r Eryrt where 1−Er = 
proportion of in-stream nitrate attenuation. E1 = 1.   
ystoret = mass nitrate storage in the lake at the end of year t. 
GW= proportion of mass nitrate in the lake that flows away from the outlet (river) 
annually. 
GL = proportion of annual nitrate attenuation in the lake. 
                                               
42
 If the nitrate fate and transport in the lake are well understood with certainty, either type of constraints 
alone may be sufficient to maintain lake water quality. However, under a high level of uncertainty, having 
both types of constraints is safer.  
43
 Another option is having only the discharge based constraints in early years and only the storage based 
constraints in later years of the planning horizon. 
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ystoret = G (y
store 
t−1+ y
lake
t) where G = (1−G
W−GL). This is the lake nitrate balance 
equation assumed. 
C0 = maximum acceptable mass nitrate storage in the lake. 
Model: LakeModel (Market constraints) 
Maximum annual nitrate load into the streams  
yrt + q
bank
rt = Crt  for all r and t.     (P`-2)  λrt 
Maximum annual nitrate load into the lake 
∑r Eryrt − y
lake
t  = 0 for all t.     (P`-3) εt 
ylaket  + q
bank
1t  = C1t  for all t.     (P`-4) λ1t  
Maximum in-lake nitrate storage 
Gylaket + Gy
store
t−1 − y
store
t  = 0 for all t.   (P`-5)  δt 
Ystoret ≤ S0 for all t.      (P`-6) λ
0
t 
8.6.4 Price structures and Relationships 
All the market constraints in this model are receptor based. Since the model contains 
both multi-period and multi-receptor constraints, prices should be spatially and 
temporally dependent. The constraint structure of the model provides the following 
price relationships.  
νrt  = λrt  for all r and t. 
γrt  =  Erεt + λrt  for r = 2,3, …, R and all t. 
γ1t  =  εt   for all t. 
εt  = λ1t + Gδt  for all t. 
δt  = Gδt+1 + λ
0
t for all t. 
Price λrt for some r∈[2,3, …, R] is the market price per unit nitrate discharge into 
stream r in year t. The market price per unit nitrate discharge into the lake in year t is 
λ1t. The regulator which participates in the market as a bank (possibly as a resource 
owner) will be selling at λrt. However, the prices charged to the farms, γrt may be 
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higher than λrt because discharges into the streams have effects on the lake also. For 
the farms, the stream price equals the stream‘s market price plus the lake price 
adjusted by the proportion of in-stream nitrate carried down to the lake (γrt =  Erεt + 
λrt). Thus, even if the farms in a sub-catchment perform well below the maximum 
nitrate intake capacity of the local streams, they may face a high price because a 
relatively large proportion of their discharges flow down to the lake. The farms may 
face an even higher price if the local constraints also bind.   
The storage cost (cost of carrying a kg of in-lake nitrate into the next year) is δt. For 
discharging nitrate into the lake, the farms should pay the expected cost of carrying 
forward in addition to the market price (εt  = λ1t + Gδt). The storage cost of each year is 
determined by current and future storage capacity constraints (δt = Gδt+1 + λ
0
t). Even if 
the total discharge into the lake in some year t is well below the maximum acceptable 
level, the price of discharge in year t may be increased by the capacity shortages 
expected in the future. In large agricultural catchments, due to unmanaged nitrate 
discharges in the recent past, capacity shortages are more likely to occur in the future 
than in the present. For example, in the Lake Taupo catchment, a large amount of 
nitrate leached from current and previous land use is currently flowing towards the 
lake via groundwater, and nitrate discharge into the lake from this non-tradable source 
is likely to increase in the future (Morgenstern 2008). The above price structure has 
the capability of pricing the current discharges to reflect the value of future capacity. 
8.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
In the two preceding chapters (7 and 8), we presented alternative linear programming 
models to price diffuse nitrate discharge permits. The simplest model simulates a 
market in loading permits where the diffuse dischargers, mainly agricultural 
dischargers, trade rights to load nitrates into groundwater aquifers. Environmental 
constraints are imposed on maximum acceptable nitrate level in groundwater and 
groundwater fed surface water bodies. The model generates self-explanatory and 
consistent resource (commodity) prices from which the permit prices can be derived. 
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In addition to the essential capacity constraints, catchments can have different types of 
receptor-based or source-based constraints, and these constraints differentiate nitrate 
permit markets from other general permit markets. Most importantly, additional 
receptor based constraints may be required to describe nitrate residence and transport 
in surface water bodies. Including such constraints in the market clearing LP models 
has significant effects on market prices. One major consequence of such constraints is 
settlement surpluses, and hence the market design should include mechanisms to deal 
with the prices associated with these constraints. 
Ultimately, what prices should be charged is a matter of which environmental 
resources and services are traded in the market. Once all demand and supply 
constraints on all resources and services are included in the market clearing LP, the 
proposed generalized market models may be implemented as a combined market for 
any number of inter-dependent and inter-related commodities.  
We showed that a single sided buyers‘ market in loading permits can lead to 
premature consumption and under pricing of resources. On the other hand, loading 
permits are not comparable between farms and hence they provide limited 
opportunities for trade. Therefore, we proposed an expanded market model which 
allows the polluters to buy loading permits and environmental (or public) agents to 
sell (or lease out) the ability of the natural water systems to accept and dilute nitrates 
(as constraint rights). Market participation of such third parties, mainly the 
environmental authorities who represent the public interest, can balance resource 
consumption over time, increase market competitiveness and aid liquidity. In case 
third parties cannot participate in the market, other mechanisms such as penalties on 
over-consumption could be applied to balance resource consumption over time and to 
discourage over-consumption of receptor capacities by low value uses. 
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Chapter 9 
9 PARTICIPANT DECISIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides guidance for the market participants on how they can use the 
available information to optimise their behaviour in the market. We do not present any 
participant-side optimisation models, but discuss the important considerations.  
We first present the factors that affect the decisions of agricultural nonpoint sources. 
We discuss the models and information that would be useful to the farms in 
optimising their bids. We specifically highlight the relationship between the 
profitability of different land use options and the value of loading permits. We then 
discuss the factors that affect the regulator‘s behaviour in the market, assuming that 
the regulator is a public agent, rather than a profit seeking business agent. We discuss 
the issues that arise in determining the present value of future capacity. We show how 
the available receptor capacities would restrict the regulator‘s decision space.  
9.2 Information Required by Agricultural Nonpoint Sources 
Since this work is mainly focused on agricultural pollution, the major players in the 
market would be the commercial farmers in the catchment. The size of the nitrate 
loading permit held by a farm in any year determines the maximum allowed nitrate 
loading into the groundwater system from that farm. However, the farms cannot 
directly control nitrate loading. The amount of nitrate loading depends on the land use, 
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weather, and geography. What the farms can control is the land use. Therefore, the 
size of the nitrate loading permit held by any farm in any year determines the type of 
―land use‖ the farm can adopt in that year.  
A ―land use option‖ is a combination of factors such as the type of crop grown, type 
of stock, fertilizer application rate, stocking density (for example, cows per hectare), 
irrigation method, effluent discharge system, drain layout, and other farming and land 
management practices. The size of the permit required to adopt some land use option 
(for example, to farm a dairy with a stocking rate of 2.8 cows per hectare, and with a 
recommended effluent discharge system), is the estimated nitrate leaching from that 
land use option.  
The options available for the farms are limited. The major factors that affect the 
nitrate leaching rate, such as fertilizer application rate and stocking rate, are also the 
major factors that affect profitability. Hence a rational farm would bid for loading 
permits based on the potential nitrate leaching and profitability of alternative land use 
options. To optimize the bids, the farms need to know both the economic and 
environmental effects (profits and nitrate loading) of each land use option.  
9.2.1 Soil Nitrogen Models  
The farms can use soil nitrogen models to estimate the potential nitrate leaching from 
alternative land uses. Standard computer-based soil models such as SWAT and 
GLEAMS and regionalized nutrient budget models such as OVERSEER can simulate 
soil nitrogen dynamics and estimate nitrate leaching from different land use scenarios, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.   
The computer models usually estimate the potential nitrate loading as a rate in kg per 
unit area per year (kg/ha/year). Then the land users have to multiply the loading rate 
by the farm size to obtain the size of the permit required. This calculation is based on 
the assumption that nitrate loading occurs uniformly over the whole area of each farm. 
If the farms can prove to the authorities that loading occurs only in a part of the farm 
area, the size of the permit required may be adjusted accordingly. 
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The models used to estimate leaching could be authorized by the market authorities.  
If the farms do not have access to such models, the market authorities could provide 
information about leaching from alternative land use options and their permit 
requirements. In any case, accountability and liability issues will be raised, if the 
models and/or information were subsequently revised.  Different authorities might 
take a different view as to whether the participants should then be deemed to have 
purchased permits for the agreed discharge rate, or for the activity level that, 
according to the model, was expected to produce that discharge rate. Who is liable for 
the consequences of wrong estimates, is an issue to be resolved before a trading 
system is implemented. 
9.2.2 Farm Economic Models 
Farms also need to know the potential profit from alternative land uses. Farm 
economic models, for example, WFM (Beukes et al., 2005), estimates the potential 
profits from different land use and management options. In New Zealand, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) publishes annual reports on the production and 
financial outcomes of the farms in different agricultural sectors (dairy, sheep/beef, 
horticulture, and etc.) and regions throughout New Zealand. Such information and 
models can also be used to estimate the profitability of different land use options.  
Rather than independent agro-ecological and agro-economic models, integrated agro-
ecological and agro-economic models which can predict both the nitrate losses and 
potential profits from alternative land uses would better help the farms in optimizing 
their bids. Such integrated models are rare but do exist, for example, the models 
proposed in Johnson, Adams and Perry (1991) and Mohamed, Sharifil and Keulenz 
(2000).  
9.2.3 Best Management Practices 
Nitrate loading may be negligible from those land uses which employ best nutrient 
management practices. Recommended management practices include nutrient budgets 
to minimise nitrogen losses, and feed pads and herd homes to capture livestock 
effluents and urine (Thiagarajah Ramilan, 2008). Farms holding small permits (or no 
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permits) can adopt those best management practices to minimise nitrate loading. The 
responsibility of identifying the best management practices, based on the regional soil 
geography and climate, will remain with the government or the regional 
environmental authorities. These authorities may specify the minimum levels of 
management practices required to operate without a nitrate permit.  
9.3 How Do Farms Determine the Optimal Bids? 
Using the above discussed agro-economic and agro-ecological models, the farms can 
calculate the profitability of each land use option and the size of the loading permit 
required for each land use option. Usually, if nitrate loading comes free, more nitrate 
intensive farming options such as dairying are more profitable. Once the farms know 
the profitabilities and permit requirements of alternative land uses, they can decide 
how much each additional 1 kg or each additional block (x kg) of nitrate loading is 
worth, and hence how much they are willing to pay for each additional unit or block 
of nitrate loading.  
For example, assume a crop farm X has three land use options, crop A, crop B, and 
crop C, with expected annual profits of $500, $800, and $1000 respectively. The 
potential annual nitrate leaching from A, B, and C are 10 kg, 20 kg, and 40 kg 
respectively. Assume that the farm cannot affect the market prices, but can buy 10 kg, 
20 kg, 40 kg or none.  
Given all costs of farming other than the cost of nitrate permits are accounted for in 
calculating the above profit figures, the value of the first 10 kg of nitrate loading is 
$500 for farm X. If the farm is required to pay for nitrate loading, the maximum 
amount of money it would like to pay for the first 10 kg is $500. The value of each 1 
kg is $50, assuming profit from a given land use is proportional to loading.  
If the farm could buy another 10 kg, it could make an additional profit of $300 by 
shifting to land use option B. Hence, the next 10 kg of nitrate loading is worth $300 to 
farm X. The farm would pay a maximum $30 each for the next 10 kg. Similarly, farm 
X would pay a maximum of $10 each for the next 20 kg of nitrate loading. The results 
may be given as a stepped marginal profit (value) function, as in Figure 9.1 below. 
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Therefore, for the above simple example, the optimal bids are 10 kg at $50, 10 kg at 
$30, and 20 kg at $10. They indicate the maximum price the farm would like to pay 
for each block, or the minimum price at which the farm would sell each block. The 
blocks may correspond to different crops, different stocking rates, different fertilizer 
application rates, or different combinations of those. Hence, a step in the marginal 
profit function would possibly correspond to a type of land use.  
$0.00
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0 10 20 30 40 50
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Figure 9.1: Stepped marginal profit function of Farm X, for nitrate loading. 
The example discussed above is just a simplification of the economic theory related to 
marginal economic gains. A farm‘s true marginal profit function of nitrate loading 
may not be a stepped piece-wise linear function as above. In reality, the first few units 
may be worth nothing because commercial farming may not be profitable below a 
certain scale. For example, growing some crop may not be profitable without applying 
sufficient amounts of fertilizer, and having a dairy farm may not be profitable without 
a minimum stocking rate. On the other hand, the profit from any kind of farming may 
be neither proportional nor linearly related to nitrate loading. A farm‘s marginal 
profits function would generally look like the one given in Figure 9.2.  
The stepped bid function we considered above is a stepped piece-wise linearization of 
a part of the marginal profit function which lies between q1 and q3. We effectively 
assume that unless the farms are allowed to specify a minimum permit level, they will 
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set the bids so that they will be able to deal with the situation if the LP solution allows 
them to buy less than q1. The way the farms determine the stepped bid tranches 
(piece-wise linearization of the function) depends on many private factors. The price 
they offer for each tranche depends on their risk perceptions and the market 
regulations such as the maximum number of bids allowed, and whether the conditions 
like minimum permit levels are accepted by the market.  
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Figure 9.2: Marginal profit of nitrate loading.  
Apart from the marginal profit functions, the farm behaviour in a real-time nitrate 
permit market will be affected by other factors such as market power and strategic 
intents. Lack of real data collected from the history of a market compels us to assume 
that the farms would bid based on the marginal profit functions. Still, generally 
applicable farm profit functions are hard to obtain.  
For this work, we assume three bid functions for three types of land uses (dairy, 
sheep/beef, and crop) as given in Table 9.1. A marginal profit function and a 
corresponding bid function for each land use type were developed (roughly) based on 
the ―gross $:N relationships‖, presented by Woods et al. (2004) (Table 9.2). Those 
relationships have been estimated specifically, considering the farms in the Waikato 
region of New Zealand, and therefore they may not be generally applicable.  
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  Dairy       Sheep/beef  Crop  
Bid Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price 
1 13 kg $41.00 9 kg $70.00 110 kg $28.45 
2 8 kg $33.00 3 kg $48.00   
3 20 kg $25.00 3 kg $30.00   
4 19 kg $21.00 8 kg $18.00   
5 30 kg $18.00 19 kg $6.00   
Table 9.1: Bid functions for different land use types. Dairy, sheep/beef, and crop bids 
were calculated based on the gross $:N relationships (Table 9.2) for dairy, intensive 
sheep and beef, and process vegetables, respectively.   
Land use type Nitrate leaching (kg/ha/year) CFS44 ($/ha/year) 
Dairy 7.6×cows1.785  729×cows – 235 
Intensive sheep and beef 1.53× e(0.2057×su)  1114×Ln(su) – 1347 
Process vegetables 110 3130 
Table 9.2: Gross $:N relationships for Waikato farms, Source: Woods et al. (2004). 
cows = cows per hectare and su = stock units per hectare.   
In Chapter 10, we use the bid functions in Table 9.1 to demonstrate the outcomes of 
the proposed LP models (prices and allocations), assuming that the proposed market 
mechanism was applied to allocate nitrate permits in a small catchment area (not in 
the Waikato Region).   
The calculations performed to draw the marginal profit functions are described in 
Appendix C (only for dairy farms). The tranches were arbitrarily selected to fit the 
                                               
44
 Cash Farm Surplus (CFS) is the remainder after farm working expenses, but before interest, leases, wages 
of management, and capital expenditure. Hence, CFS is the operating profit taking into account variable 
cost, but not the fixed cost.  
178 
 
 
 
marginal profit functions. Bid prices were set assuming that the land users are risk 
averse. The appendix provides an overall view of how to use the available information 
to estimate the bids. 
9.4 How Does the Regulator Set Offers? 
If the regulator owns the currently available receptor capacities on behalf of the 
public, it has to set an offer curve for the receptor capacities, indicating how much 
each unit (or block) of capacity is worth to the public. Then the regulator‘s valuation 
of receptor capacity would be determined by the cost of forgone future opportunities 
(opportunity cost of being unable to discharge nitrates in the future), the ecological 
and water users‘ cost of having nitrate in water, and the cost of any required 
remediation and treatment.  
The problem of estimating the present value of future capacities over a long planning 
horizon (possibly several decades) is complicated by economic, political, and 
environmental uncertainties. Risks associated with climate change, interest rates, 
technological changes, and government policies may affect the present value of future 
environmental health. Estimation of the social marginal value curves for future 
capacity is strictly beyond the scope of this thesis. We assume that the regulator would 
set the offers based on an expected allocation plan which reflects the above costs.  
For example, if the capacity of a lake is 1000 kg and 600 kg of nitrate already in 
groundwater is expected to reach the lake in year 2015, then 400 kg of the lake 
capacity of 2015 is currently available (assuming no previously allocated loading 
rights). Out of the 400 kg, the regulator may wish to allocate only 80 kg in each of the 
trading years from 2011 to 2015, unless the demand is extremely high. Then the 
regulator can offer the first block of 80 kg at a lower price ($0.5) so that it is allocated 
any way, the next block at a relatively higher price ($40) so that it is allocated only if 
the demand is relatively higher, and an extremely high price ($200) on the next block 
so that it is not allocated unless the demand is extremely high, and like-wise.  
For our demonstration in the next chapter, we assume that the regulator sets a single 
reservation price for the capacity of each receptor and each year (or for the capacity of 
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each constraint), based on the capacity expected to be allocated and the forecasted 
demand. Since the market allows some trial rounds, the regulator can iteratively adjust 
the reservation price until the total allocation is acceptable. 
Even though we do not present a specific model for the optimisation of the regulator‘s 
bid function, we next discuss the possible scenarios of available capacity which is the 
critical factor that determines the regulator‘s capacity positions and thus the 
regulator‘s behaviour in the market.   
9.5 Available Capacity and Tradable Capacity 
If the natural hydrological systems do not significantly change over time45, the major 
factor which causes temporal variations in capacity availability is the current status of 
the groundwater aquifer. The current distribution of nitrate concentration in 
groundwater is mainly a consequence of current and previous land uses in the 
catchment. As we discussed earlier, nitrate currently in groundwater may flow through 
a groundwater well or may reach a surface water body decades later. Hence, even if 
no more nitrate discharges were allowed in the catchment, either from point or 
nonpoint sources, nitrate level at the receptors may still increase. Therefore, both the 
feasibility of a market, and the capacity available to a market, are determined by the 
current state of the aquifers.  
Currently available capacity of some receptor r in some future period t (C0rt) may be 
calculated as follows.  
CSDr = sustainable receptor capacity or load standard (kg or mg/l). C
SD
r indicates the 
amount of nitrate that a receptor can sustainably accept and dilute in any period. 
CGWrt = capacity already committed for groundwater nitrates (kg or mg/l). C
GW
rt 
indicates how much the mass nitrate load into a surface water receptor or the nitrate 
                                               
45
 The ability of a water body to accept nitrates may vary over time due to the variations in temperature, 
rainfall, and water use. Despite these possibilities, nitrate load standards have been developed for large 
water bodies such as rivers and lakes (ignoring the effects of climate change), for example TMDLs in the 
US, and the Lake Rotorua nutrient targets.  
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concentration in a groundwater receptor would increase in each period, even if there 
were no more nitrate discharges in the catchment from any natural or non-natural 
source.  
CNr = capacity allocations for unmanageable sources other than groundwater (kg or 
mg/l). CNr indicates how much the nitrate level at receptor r is expected to increase in 
any period t due to minor unmanageable sources such as rain water and natural 
habitat. If the length of each period t is sufficiently long to cover a whole hydrological 
cycle (at least a year) or many cycles, CNr can be considered as fixed over t, therefore 
CNr is not indexed over t. 
C0rt = currently available receptor capacity (kg or mg/l), how much more nitrate the 
receptor can take from the manageable (tradable) sources. 
C0rt = (C
SD
r − C
N
r) − C
GW
rt. 
If there are no previously purchased permits (if S = 1 or if the farms have not 
purchased future permits from the previous auctions), at the beginning of any trading 
year (t=1), the regulator‘s capacity positions are described by C0rt. Unless the receptor 
capacities are augmented, the tradable capacity cannot be more than C0rt. Possible 
scenarios for CGWrt and C
0
rt relative to the sustainable receptor capacity C
SD
r are shown 
in Figure 9.3. Actual shapes of the graphs may be different; the sketches are 
illustrative. 
In an agricultural catchment, if the same land use distribution has continued for a long 
time (close to the maximum nitrate residence time in the catchment), and thus nitrate 
leaching has occurred at the same rate, groundwater nitrate concentration, and hence 
the mass nitrate flux from the catchment, would be in equilibrium with the current 
land use. In this case, the committed capacity of the receptors may decrease over time 
as described by scenarios A1 and A2. If the system has not yet reached equilibrium 
(for example, if the upper catchment land use has recently intensified), the committed 
capacity may keep on increasing for some time as described by scenarios B1 or B2. 
The possible distribution of available capacity under each of the committed capacity 
scenario is shown in Figure 9.4.  
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Figure 9.3: Capacity committed for nitrate already in groundwater.   
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Figure 9.4: Possible scenarios for available receptor capacity.  
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Under scenarios A2 and B2, some amount of each year‘s receptor capacity is currently 
available. The regulator could release the total available capacity to the market 
(Crt=C
0
rt) as a stepped offer function, setting the reservation prices based on the 
associated costs and the expected allocation schedules.  
If the receptor capacity were already over-utilized as in scenarios A1 and B1, no 
receptor capacity would be available in some years. If the tradable capacities of those 
years were set to zero, some of the farms might not be able to buy any permits, and 
might have to shut down their operations for some time. However, if the situation 
were not that bad, the water system was still in good condition, and the over-loading 
had taken place only for a few years, the regulator may temporarily relax the 
sustainable limits based on a timeline to achieve the standards. In this case, the 
regulator can set reservation prices to cover the cost of treatment and remediation. 
Otherwise, the regulator can allow third parties to artificially increase the available 
capacity via treatment and remediation, and participate in the market directly to sell 
augmented capacity. Then such third parties would play an important role in the 
market to determine the market prices. In Chapter 10, we demonstrate the market for 
two available capacity scenarios similar to A1 and A2.      
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Chapter 10 
10 OUTCOMES OF TRADE: PRICES AND 
ALLOCATIONS
46
 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the outcomes (prices and allocations) produced by the LP 
models proposed in Chapters 7 and 8, assuming that the market mechanism proposed 
in Chapter 6 is applied to allocate nitrate loading permits among a set of hypothetical 
farms in part of the Mataura River catchment in the Southland region of New Zealand. 
For this purpose, we use a nitrate transport simulation model of the Edendale aquifer 
which underlies the catchment area47. The simulation model has been developed 
previously by AquaFirma Ltd, for the Southland Regional Council (Rekker, 1998).  
The model simulates nitrate-N loading from agricultural properties in the region and 
the resulting nitrate-N levels in the receiving water bodies; hence, we present our 
                                               
46
 The results discussed in this chapter are based on the catchment example discussed in Appendix D. 
Similar analysis was carried out in Prabodanie and Raffensperger (2007), Prabodanie et al. (2009) and 
Prabodanie et al. (2010) using hypothetical catchment examples.     
47
 The proposed trading program works best for a whole catchment rather than for a part of a river 
catchment. However, since the available nitrate transport model covers only a part of the Mataura River 
catchment, we demonstrate the results assuming that only the (hypothetical) agricultural sources in the 
particular area are included in the trading program.   
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results also in terms of nitrate-N48. Information about the original model, and the 
assumptions and modifications we made to use the model for our purpose, are 
discussed in Appendix D. Apart from the physical model, all the information used in 
the demonstrations, and thus the results, are hypothetical and not related to any farm 
or institution in the region. 
We discuss the results of trading under a set of scenarios differentiated from capacity 
availability over time, constraints applicable, bidding behaviours, types of 
participants, and trading rules (for example, the number of years for which permits are 
traded). We demonstrate the resulting prices, allocations, and financial flows, 
assuming no previously allocated long term (or permanent) loading rights.  
Later in this chapter, we consider the presence of permanent loading rights and 
discuss the importance of making some free initial allocation among the farms based 
on permanent loading rights or some other criteria. After demonstrating the outcomes 
of trade in the presence of initial allocations made based on prior land use (permanent 
loading rights), we discuss the issues related to setting the initial positions and present 
ideas for further investigation.     
10.2 OLM Results 
Trading Scenario 1: To demonstrate the results generated from the OLM, this scenario 
considers the tradable capacities in the 4th column of Table D.4 calculated based on 
the sustainable land use scenario discussed in Appendix D. Trading takes place at the 
beginning of year 2011, for the first time. Farms are allowed to bid for loading permits 
for the next five years (S = 5). All dairy farms submit the same set of ―Dairy bids‖, all 
sheep and sheep/cattle farms submit the same set of ‗Sheep bids‖ and all other farms 
submit the same set of ―Crop bids‖ given in Table 9.1 of Chapter 9. Each farm 
submits the same set of bids for each year from 2011 to 2015, ignoring the effects of 
discounting.  
                                               
48
 Nitrate-N (NO3-N) mass × 4.43 = Nitrate (NO3) mass. Hence the results for nitrate-N can be converted to 
nitrate by multiplying by 4.43.   
185 
 
 
 
No permanent (or long term) loading rights are present. Receptor capacity is fully 
owned by the regulator. Since this is the first time trading takes place, farms have no 
initial permit holdings. Only receptor capacity constraints are present, no multi-
receptor/period constraints, no source constraints, and no private or side constraints 
are present. An AMPL formulation of the OLM is given in section E.1.1 of Appendix 
E. Since the farms all submit bids in kg/ha/year, the program immediately converts 
them to kg/year, but displays the resulting allocations in kg/ha/year and the prices per 
kg, so that the prices and allocations are comparable between farms.  
The results for the set of bids are given in Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3. The capacity 
constraints are binding for years 2012 to 2016, 2018, and 2019 (Table E.3). Upstream 
farms with relatively longer delay times (for example, farms 1, 2, 3, 9, 11 and 12) get 
all they bid for at price zero, because their (2011 to 2015) permits do not affect the 
binding constraints (Tables E.1 and E.2). Permits are allocated only until 2015 but the 
allocation binds the capacity constraints of later years: 2016, 2018 and 2019. As a 
consequence, unless the farms which bought permits from the 2011 auction offer to 
sell back in the consequent auctions, in 2016, the farms having Hf10>0, Hf12>0, or 
Hf13>0 (44 farms out of 62) will not be able continue any land use which requires 
nitrate loading permits. This demonstrates the two major issues in the OLM discussed 
in Chapter 7. Hence we next move onto the ORAM.  
10.3 ORAM Results 
We discuss ORAM outputs for different sets of regulator offers and farm bids, 
different sets of constraints, different available capacity situations, and different 
market rules.   
Trading Scenario 2: The regulator, who owns the total available capacity, participates 
in the market as a bank. The available capacities are as given the 4th column of Table 
D.4 based on the sustainable land use. The regulator offers the total available capacity 
of each year to the market with a single reservation price on each year‘s capacity, a 
relatively lower price for the first S years to fully allocate the available capacities ($1 
on each kg of the years 2011 to 2015 capacities), and a relatively high price on the 
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later years to partially allocate the available capacities ($25 on each kg of the years 
2016 to 2064 capacities). The farms submit the same set of bids as considered for 
scenario 1. An AMPL formulation of the ORAM is given in section E.2.1 of 
Appendix E. The resulting prices and final allocations are given in Tables E.4, E.5, 
and E.6.     
The results indicate that the final allocations to most of the farms are less, and the 
nodal prices are higher, but the price distribution is smoother (differences are smaller) 
compared to the OLM results. No farm can buy at price zero. The receptor capacity 
prices (Table E.6) for all years other than for years 2012 to 2016 are determined by 
the regulator‘s reservation price. Farm demands for the capacity of years 2012 to 2016 
are higher and they set the associated prices above the regulator‘s reservation price to 
buy the total capacity. The full allocation of the capacity of the first five years may not 
be a problem because the farms buy permits for the first five years, but the full 
allocation of 2016 capacity has the consequences discussed under the OLM results. 
Hence (if this were a trial market) the regulator may raise the reservation price for 
2016 capacity to avoid full allocation.  
Trading scenario 3: This scenario assumes that the regulator raises the reservation 
price of the 2016 capacity to $40. This is the only difference from scenario 2. The 
regulator‘s reservation price for the capacity of years 2011 to 2015 is still $1, and for 
the years 2017 to 2064 is still $25. The farms submit the same set of bids considered 
for scenario 1. The resulting prices and allocations are given in Tables E.7, E.8, and 
E.9. This scenario allocates only 58,547 kg of the available capacity (61,830 kg) of 
year 2016 to the farms. The payments due from the farms for buying loading permits, 
and the payments due to the regulator for selling receptor capacities, are calculated in 
Table E.9. The total payment made by the farms for loading permits approximately 
equals the total payment due to the regulator for selling receptor capacity rights. Total 
benefit from trade is $152,709,597. 
Nitrate loading from each farm until 2010 (before the trading program begins) is listed 
in Table E.7 to the left of the final allocations for years 2011 to 2015. A comparison 
of the loading permit allocations via trading and pre-trade loading positions indicates 
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that some farms will have to change their land use type significantly as a result of the 
trading program (for example, farms 3, 58 and 52). The farms may face difficulties in 
making such dramatic changes immediately. 
Trading scenario 4: To avoid or reduce the burden of immediate land use changes, 
some side constraints may be imposed on allocation so that the farms get at least 80% 
of the initial (until 2010) permit position in 2011, at least 60 % in the next year, …, 
and at least 10% in 2015 to allow the farms to gradually change the land uses. Such 
constraints cannot cause infeasibility because the sustainable receptor capacities and 
the available capacities were calculated based on the pre-1998 land use distribution 
which was assumed to have been continued until 2010. This scenario considers the 
above set of side constraints (together with the receptor capacity constraints) and the 
same set of bids and offers considered for scenario 3. The resulting allocations after 
imposing those side constraints are given in Table E.10. The set of side constraints 
cause a minor (0.06%) reduction in the total benefit from trade (the total benefit from 
trade is $152,622,123 for this scenario compared to $152,709,597 for scenario 3). 
Under all the above trading scenarios, the receptor capacities of the early years are 
fully allocated among the farms. Only a small amount of the receptor capacities of the 
tail years are allocated among the farms (Table E.9). The next scenario is designed to 
study what happens if the demand for the capacity of tail years were increased 
significantly.  
Trading scenario 5: This scenario assumes that the bid prices of all the farms having 
tail effects (Hfr(t−s) > 0 towards the tail of the planning horizon) were increased 
significantly. The bid prices of the farms having Hfrd >0 for d ≥ 22 were increased to 
$1000. These are the farms whose 2011 to 2015 permits affect the years after 2037 
(farms 1 to 14, 17 to 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, and 42). The regulator submits the same set of 
offers considered for scenario 3. The resulting prices and allocations for the changed 
set of farm bids (without any side constraints) are given in Tables E.11 and E.12. 
The results indicate that even if the bid prices of all the farms that affect the receptor 
in the years after 2037 were drastically increased, the farms cannot buy the total 
capacity of those years (after 2037). The top bidders of course buy all they bid for, but 
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neither the capacity prices nor the allocations increase significantly compared to 
scenario 3 results in Table E.9. Hence, if the capacity constraints of the earlier years 
are tighter than those for the later years as in available capacity scenarios A1 and A2 
discussed in Chapter 10, the prices and allocations are driven mostly by the capacity 
constraints of the earlier years, and hence the tail constraints may be redundant. The 
long skewed tails of the nitrate transport profiles (as shown in Figure 5.3) also suggest 
that the effects on the tail of the planning horizon can be ignored. Hence, the length of 
the planning horizon may be reduced significantly, because the farms cannot buy the 
capacity of the tail years unless they buy the capacity of the earlier years.   
10.4 Model ORAM Results with Multiple Resource Banks   
The results discussed above were based on the available capacities calculated 
assuming sustainable land use until 2010 (until the trading program begins). However 
if the prior land use was too intensive, the available capacities will be lower or may be 
zero for some years. For the next trading scenario, we consider the available capacities 
calculated based on an intensive land use scenario (column 5 of Table D.4).   
Trading scenario 6: The regulator who owns all the available capacity participates in 
the market. However, for the first four years (2011 to 2014), the regulator has no 
capacity to sell. Another third party called the ―supplier‖ participates in the market as 
a bank. The supplier has the capability to remove nitrates in the receptor (river) up to a 
limit of 75,000 kg in each of years from 2011 to 2015 at a marginal cost of $30 per kg, 
and offers to sell capacity at this marginal cost. The regulator does not submit any 
offers for the first four years. It offers to sell the total capacity of the fifth year (2015) 
at $1 and the capacity of all the other years at a price of $25.  
An AMPL formulation of the ORAM with multiple banks offering to sell at a single 
reservation price is given in section E.3.1 of Appendix E. The prices and allocations 
produced by the model are given in Tables E.13 and E.14. The receptor capacity 
prices of the early years are determined by the marginal cost of remediation (Table 
E.14). As discussed above, the demand for the capacity of year 2016 is so high that 
the farms buy the total available capacity from the regulator.  
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Compared to the previous results, the final allocations to the farms (Table E.13) are 
lower, which is reasonable because the available capacities are lower. The farms 
which have immediate effects on the river, mainly those with peak effects in the tight 
years (for example, farms 61, 57, and 58), cannot buy any permits for the next few 
years. To enable them to buy permits, the capacity constraints may be relaxed to some 
extent, based on a time line by which the accepted quality levels have to be achieved. 
For example, the capacity constraints of the next 10 years may be relaxed (2016 
capacity by 50%, 2017 capacity by 40%, …, and 2020 capacity by 10%) to gradually 
reduce pollution and achieve the acceptable level over the next 10 years. Still, some 
farms may not be able to buy permits for some years. 
All the above scenarios considered trading permits for five upcoming years. The 
outcomes of trade would be different if permits are traded for more or fewer years. 
Due to the capacity shortage in the earlier years (under scenario 6), loading permits 
can be allocated via trading only for the upcoming year 2011 (S=1), at least until some 
improvement is achieved. 
Trading scenario 7: This trading scenario assumes that permits are traded only for one 
year (2011). The farms submit the same set of bids assumed in scenario 1 (only for 
2011). The regulator sets the reservation price of 2011 capacity to $1, and the 
reservation price for the capacity of all other years to $25. The supplier submits the 
same set of offers considered for scenario 6. The results for this scenario are given in 
Tables E.15 and E.16. Some farms, which would have been unable to buy 2011 
permits if permits for five years were traded, can now buy some permits49, for 
example farms 57 and 47 (Tabled E.13 and E.15). The future capacities, mainly the 
augmented qunantities offered by the supplier, are not fully allocated (Table E.16), so 
the farms will be able to buy permits in the next years.  
                                               
49
 In scenarios 1 to 6, we considered the same set for bids for the next five years ignoring the effects of 
interest rates. Hence the results for a five year trading period and a one year trading period are not perfectly 
comparable.  
190 
 
 
 
10.5 Permanent (or Long Term) Loading Rights and Initial Holdings   
So far in this work we assumed that the farms hold no initial nitrate loading rights at 
the time the trading program is launched (or the available rights are invalidated and 
the farms are expected to buy from the market). As the trading program allows the 
farms to buy permits for future years, in the consecutive auctions, the farms will 
possess previously purchased loading permits. We have assumed that the environment 
and thus the ability of the environment to accept pollution (the receptor capacities) are 
fully publicly owned. The regulator, acting as a property agent for the public, leases 
out the receptor capacities to the polluters. Our demonstrations above indicate that the 
regulator makes a large revenue from sales (results of trading scenarios 3, Table E.9), 
under the assumption of public property ownership. Even if the reservation prices 
were reduced, the prices associated with the capacity of early years are set high by 
farm competition, and the regulator can still make a large revenue.       
In most agricultural catchments, the farms have had infinite or long term rights to 
continue land uses that discharge nitrates. Hence, they implicitly own the dilution 
capacity of receiving water bodies. For example, most farmers in the United States 
may be assumed to have infinite rights to discharge the amounts of nitrate they 
currently discharge, because agricultural discharges are not always regulated (King & 
Kuch, 2003). In New Zealand, the farmers usually have to obtain consents to release 
pollutants from the regional environmental authorities. But since the valid period of 
the consents may be up to 35 years, and can be extended, these consents can also be 
considered as long term discharge rights. Even though these natural resources are not 
explicitly privatised on paper, they are implicitly privatised as the individual farms 
have firm rights to discharge the amount of nitrates they currently do (or sometimes 
up to a regulated limit). In this case, the receptor capacities are (fully or partially) 
privately owned. The property owners who lease out receptor capacities are not only 
the regulators, but also the farms themselves, and hence at least a portion of the 
revenue from sales should be distributed among the farms, based on their permanent 
or long- term permit holdings (apart from the payments due for selling previously 
purchased permits).  
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Even if the farms are not considered as possessing permanent loading rights, or as 
sharing ownership of the environment, some initial allocation of permits is required to 
provide sufficient security to the commercial land users, because the market itself 
allows them to buy permits up to a fixed number of upcoming years, and there is no 
guarantee that the farms will be able to buy from the market for the later years. As we 
mentioned earlier, the proposed market mechanism is not for allocating permanent 
pollution rights, but for allocating short term leases (Chapter 6). The underlying 
spatial and temporal complexities and uncertainties involved in nitrate pollution 
justify such a rental market.  
The successful sulphur dioxide trading program in the US can also be considered as a 
market in property rentals, because the traded sulphur allowances are defined for a 
single year. But the commercial discharges have some security, because a free initial 
allocation is made every year based on a formula. Therefore, rather than assuming that 
the regulator initially possesses all the capacity (constraint) rights traded, some initial 
distribution of loading rights among the farms would definitely improve the 
attractiveness of the trading program. Under perfect competition, the initial 
distribution of permits does not affect the market equilibrium, and thus the final 
distribution of permits (Coase, 1960; Montgomery, 1972), but it would affect the 
revenue distribution.        
10.5.1 Initial Distribution Based on Prior Land Use  
Trading scenario 8: To demonstrate the settlement process under an initial distribution 
of loading permits, we assume that the 62 hypothetical farms in our demonstration 
example have permanent loading rights equal to their pre-1998 land use nitrate 
loading, which has been continued until 2010. So this scenario implicitly considers the 
available capacities calculated based on sustainable land use (column 4 of Table D.4). 
Trading takes place for the first time in 2011, and hence the farms do not possess any 
previously purchased permits. The initial positions will then be determined by the 
permanent loading rights. For example, if a farm‘s pre-1998 nitrate loading was 11.9 
kg/ha/year, the farm‘s initial permit position for each of the next five years (S=5) is 
11.9 kg/ha/year. The farms can buy or sell, but since the market operates as a gross 
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pool, the offers have to be converted to equivalent bids as discussed in Chapter 6. The 
farms submit the same set of bids considered for trading scenarios 1 and 3 (assuming 
that the bids are not affected by the initial positions). This initial distribution does not 
over-allocate any capacity constraint because both the sustainable receptor capacities 
and available capacities were calculated based on the same pre-1998 land use 
distribution; hence the initial distribution should be feasible50. We assume that the 
regulator still owns the unallocated receptor capacities, and offers to sell at the same 
set of prices considered for scenario 3. No other third parties participate in the market.  
Since all the market participants submit the same set of bids considered for scenario 3 
and the total available capacities are also the same as for scenario 3, this scenario is 
equivalent to scenario 3; the only difference is the initial distribution of the receptor 
capacity rights which does not affect the market equilibrium in capacity rights. Hence 
the resulting receptor capacity prices, nodal prices, and final permit positions for this 
scenario are the same as the results produced by scenario 3 (Tables E.7 and E.8, and 
the first two columns of Table E.9).     
The calculated net payments due from (to) the farms are given in Table E.17 (a 
negative value indicates that the farm makes a net revenue from the market by selling 
permits). The regulator‘s (updated) starting capacity positions, final capacity 
positions, and the payments due to the regulator for selling each year‘s capacity are 
also given in Table E.17. Effectively, some farms are selling and some are buying. 
Hence the regulator gets only 25% of the revenue it would have gained under full 
capacity ownership ($5,452 thousand, compared to $21,877 thousand under full 
capacity ownership). The prior land use based initial allocation of permits results in 
75% of the total revenue being distributed among the farms. 
                                               
50
 However, we had to set the initial positions to 97% of the simulated pre-1998 land use nitrate loading 
because setting the initial positions exactly equal to pre-1998 loading created a few violations in the 
capacity constraints. This problem was caused by rounding errors and unit conversion errors in the response 
coefficients and available capacities obtained from physical simulations (for example, the response 
coefficients of some farms add up to 1.01).  
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10.5.2 Problem of Setting Initial Positions  
Initial distribution based on prior land use (regardless of whether the farms are 
considered as the owners of the receptor capacity or not) is not always feasible. In this 
case, the market authorities have to derive some mechanism to reduce the initial 
rights. As discussed earlier, any initial distribution of loading rights may not bind all 
the capacity constraints, and the regulator may still make money from the market. On 
the other hand, when the market participants know that they will be deemed to have 
some initial position based on current or previous land use nitrate loading, they could 
be motivated to behave strategically. Literature on market power and strategic 
behaviours in permit markets suggest that the initial distribution of permits is the 
major factor which determines the market power in permit markets (Egteren & Weber, 
1999).  
One way to solve the problem of initial distribution is creating another independent 
market in long term or permanent pollution rights. This method has been successfully 
adopted by the Hunter River Salinity Trading Schema. Under this system, point 
sources trade salt discharge rights on a daily basis, relative to long-term (10 year) salt 
discharge rights purchased from another independent auction. The discharge rights are 
defined proportionally (rather than quantitatively) as a share of the total allowed salt 
load into the river. Similarly, under tradable fishing quota systems, markets in quota 
leases exist together with markets in permanent fishing rights or quotas (Newell, et al., 
2005; Newell, et al., 2002).   
However, when the nonpoint sources and the dispersed and delayed nature of nitrate 
pollution are concerned, defining permanent pollution rights is difficult. In both of the 
above examples, the permanent and thus the lease rights are defined proportionally as 
quotas so that they are adjustable according to availability. Hence, permanent rights 
may be defined as shares of receptor capacity or shares of receptor capacity in each 
year (as a perishable commodity). Another market-based approach for setting the 
initial positions is to create an independent market in ―hedge contracts‖ similar to the 
hedge contracts exercised outside centralized power markets to protect against price 
volatility (Ring 1995).  
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The purpose of the preceding discussion was to highlight the importance of having 
initial allocations, and to provide some ideas about setting the initial positions. 
However, there is no globally optimum allocation of initial rights, the best criterion 
for a given catchment will depend on ―what the community think is fair and what will 
be politically feasible‖ (Kerr & Lock, 2009). 
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Chapter 11 
11 POINT AND NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING  
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter blends two important considerations for a market-based mechanism 
designed to control water pollution from nitrates. First, we present a way to extend the 
scope of the market to include point sources. We discuss the extent to which the point 
and nonpoint sources can interact in the market, and the factors that restrict their 
interaction.  
Second, we study the extent to which the nonpoint sources themselves can interact in 
the market. We show how the competitiveness in permit markets can be naturally 
restricted by the catchment hydro-geology. We derive some measures that describe 
the ability of the nonpoint sources to trade with each other. The major purpose is to 
identify the essential and desirable conditions for proper functioning of a market in 
nitrate loading permits. We also study what the market designers could do to increase 
the opportunities of the sources to actively participate in the market. 
11.2 Including Point Sources51 
Since nitrates enter waterways from both point and nonpoint sources, including the 
point sources in the trading program is important. The trading system we have 
                                               
51
 This section is based on Prabodanie et al. (2009). 
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discussed so far is implicitly capable of including the point sources. The only 
difference is that while the nonpoint sources trade loading permits the point sources 
trade ―emission‖ permits. Emission permits specify the maximum allowed nitrate 
emission into a receptor (possibly into a river or a lake) during a specified time period 
(year), while the loading permits specify the maximum allowed nitrate loading into 
the groundwater system underlying a farm.  
Since point source emissions are immediately received by some receptor r0, 1 kg 
nitrate emission from any point source i in any year would increase the nitrate mass in 
receptor r0 by 1 kg in the same year. Hence, the response coefficient Hird = 1 for r = r
0 
and d = 0, and Hird = 0 for all other r and d.   
The response coefficients used in this work are not intended to describe nitrate 
transport in surface water, but in groundwater. Hence even if nitrate could reside in 
receptor r0 for more than a year, or could flow down to another connected receptor, we 
still assign Hird = 0 for all r ≠ r
0 and d ≠ 0, to produce emission permit prices and 
allocations which are comparable with loading permit prices and allocations. 
However, the inter-receptoral or inter-temporal relationships caused by nitrate 
residence and transport in surface water are described by the multi-receptor and multi-
period constraints discussed in Chapter 7. 
The trading system proposed in Chapter 6 does not require any major extension to 
include point sources. Point sources can decide on the size of the permit required for 
each year in kg/year from the quantity and nitrate concentration of the effluents they 
wish to discharge into their receptors during the year. They can submit a set of bids 
for each permit year as the farms do.  
In a competitive market, point sources would bid based on the cost of reducing nitrate 
emissions (marginal abatement costs). Since point sources have the option of in-plant 
or outside treatment of effluents to reduce nitrate, the abatement costs will be affected 
by the treatment costs as well as the cost of downscaling operations. A rational 
municipal or industrial point source, given that she cannot affect the price charged for 
nitrate emission, would choose either to buy a permit or to treat effluents (assuming 
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treatment is more economical than downscaling), whichever is cheaper, and hence bid 
to buy permits based on her marginal cost of treatment.     
The same Optimal Resource Allocation Model (ORAM) presented in Chapter 8 can 
facilitate simultaneous trade in loading and emission permits, redefining f as a (point 
or nonpoint) source rather than a farm, and having all point sources located on each 
single receptor grouped into a single distinct node. 
The nodal price, βns =  

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Since point sources do not affect the constraints on loading, if node n represents point 
sources then βns =  

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If node n represents the point sources discharging into receptor r0: 
jj sjrsrsrns
B   000 . 
In the absence of any multi-receptor/period constraints, the point source (emission) 
price equals the capacity price of the receiving water body. In this case, the point 
source price for any year is independent of the prices associated with other years as 
well as other receptors. If the receptors are connected and/or nitrate resides in a 
receptor for more than a year, the second component of the point source price can be 
non-zero, and hence the effects of nitrate residence and transport in surface water are 
reflected by the point source prices.  
For example, in the hypothetical catchment example presented in Chapter 8, the point 
sources that discharge into the lake directly will have to pay εs = λ1s + Gδs per kg 
nitrate emission into the lake in year s. Effectively, for discharging nitrate into the 
lake in any year, the point sources have to pay the associated receptor capacity price 
(λ1t) plus the expected cost of carrying forward (Gδt) to the next year. Those who 
discharge nitrate directly into a stream will have to pay the associated capacity price 
of the stream plus the lake price adjusted by the proportion of in-stream nitrate carried 
down to the lake (γrt =  Erεt + λrt). Thus the upstream emission prices reflect the effects 
of the upstream receptors on the downstream receptors.     
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11.2.1 Point-Nonpoint Source Trading Demonstration 
To demonstrate the effects of having point sources based on our demonstration 
example (Appendix D), we consider a hypothetical point source located beside the 
river which is the only receptor considered. Since we have only one receptor, and the 
point sources located on the same receptor are considered as hydro-geologically 
identical (having similar effects on the market constraints which determine the prices), 
we consider only one point source (which may be a group of point sources). Since the 
model includes only receptor capacity constraints, and no other market constraints, the 
point source emission price for any year is equal to the receptor capacity price of that 
year (λ1s).    
Trading scenario 9: This scenario assumes that the point source (PS) submits five bids 
as given in Table 11.1 for each of the five years from 2011 to 2015 (S = 5) ignoring 
the effects of discounting.  
Bid Quantity(kg/year) Price ($/kg) for scenario 9 Price ($/kg)   for scenario 10 
1 5000 $5.00 $50.00 
2 5000 $4.00 $40.00 
3 5000 $3.00 $30.00 
4 5000 $2.00 $20.00 
5 5000 $1.00 $10.00 
Table 11.1: Point source (PS) bids. 
 
Available receptor capacities are based on sustainable land use (column 4 of Table 
D.4).  The farms and the regulator submit the same sets of bids and offers considered 
for trading scenario 3.   
The results produced by the ORAM for this scenario are given in Tables E.18 and 
E.19 of Appendix E. The resulting allocations to point and nonpoint sources (Table 
E.18) clearly indicate that the nonpoint sources dominate the market. The farms get 
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the same allocations as per scenario 3 (Table E.7) which did not include the point 
source. The PS buys only the remaining 2011 capacity after allocation to the farms, 
and does not affect the farms at all. The PS cannot buy any permits for the years 2012 
to 2015. The reason is that the PS price per kg nitrate emission into the river in any 
year is equal to the associated receptor capacity price (Table E.19) which is well 
above the PS‘s highest bid of $5.  
However, when a farm loads a kg of nitrate into the aquifer, only a small fraction goes 
into the stream in any one year. Hence they are able to buy receptor capacity even 
though the capacity price is higher relative to their bids. For example, the highest 
response coefficient for d = 0 is 0.404, and only 12 farms out of 62 have Hfrd > 0.01 
for d = 0, which means that all other farms have to pay less than 1% of the capacity 
price per each kg of permit purchased, while the PS has to pay 100% of the capacity 
price for each kg purchased. Hence, the point sources will not be able to buy unless 
they are prepared to pay the price for instant effects.  
The point and nonpoint source abatement costs, or more closely, the cost of reducing 
land use nitrate loading and the cost of point source effluent treatment are the major 
factors which determine the competition between the two types of sources and the 
extent to which they interact in the market. Since we do not have accurate information 
about either point source abatement costs or farm profit functions, we do not study the 
issue any further. To study how the underlying physical systems affect the interaction 
between point and nonpoint sources, we assume that the PS is prepared to pay a 
higher price for permits, possibly because the abatement cost is high.  
Trading scenario 10: This scenario assumes that the PS increases all bid prices tenfold 
(3rd column of Table 11.1), so that her bids lie in a competitive range compared to the 
receptor capacity prices produced by scenario 9 (Table E.19). This is the only 
difference between scenarios 9 and 10. For this scenario, the outcomes of trade, the 
prices and allocations, are given in Tables E.20 and E.21. The PS can now buy a 
relatively large permit for each year, and the PS purchases affect many nonpoint 
sources. In Table E.20, the reduced nonpoint source allocations (compared to the 
results for scenarios 3 and 9) are highlighted. The farms (15, 16, 23, 27, 33, 37, 40, 
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41, 45, 47 to 49, and 51 to 62) whose final permit positions were reduced to meet the 
point source demand, are those which have shorter delay times. By paying more, the 
PS can purchase permits which would otherwise have been purchased by the nonpoint 
sources. The receptor capacity prices associated with the first five years are pushed up 
by the competition between the point and nonpoint sources (Table 21). These results 
provide evidence that there is significant trading interaction in year-1 to year-5 
permits between point and nonpoint sources.  
Trading Scenario 11: To study how the interaction between the point and nonpoint 
sources is affected by the number of trading periods, this scenario assumes that the 
number of trading years S was reduced to one (S=1) and permits are traded for the 
upcoming year only. The regulator submits the same set of bids considered for 
scenario 3. The farms also submit the same set of bids considered for scenario 3 (for 
year 2011 only). The resulting final allocations for this scenario, without and with the 
PS participating in the market (submitting the set of bids in the 3rd column of Table 
11.1), are given in Table E.22. The results indicate that nonpoint source allocations 
are not much affected by the PS participation in the market. The final permit positions 
of only a few farms (16, 41, 61, and 62) are reduced by a small amount (in terms of 
kg/ha/year). These results provide evidence that there is some trading in year-1 
permits between point and nonpoint sources, but not much. 
Scenario 12: This scenario considers permit trading for 10 years (S=10). It also 
assumes that the regulator submits the same set of bids considered for scenario 3, and 
the farms also submit the same set of bids considered for scenario 3 (for 10 years) 
ignoring the effects of discounting. Based on this scenario, we compared the resulting 
final allocations without and with the PS participating in the market (submitting the 
same set of bids in the 3rd column of Table 11.1 for each year). The results indicate 
that the allocations to even more farms are reduced by the PS participation in the 
market (farms 14, 26, 31, 35, 38, and 43; and the 24 farms affected under scenario 
10).         
When the point sources bid to buy future permits, nonpoint sources are burdened with 
their bids for recent permits (for example, year-1 permits) competing with the point 
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source bids for future permits (for example, year 5-permits) because recent nonpoint 
source permits and future point source permits affect the same constraints. Hence, the 
interaction between point and nonpoint sources generally increases when the number 
of trading periods (S) is increased. However, beyond a certain point, increasing the 
trading period S further does not significantly increase the interaction (when S = 1, 
only four farms were affected by PS participation in the market; when S = 5, another 
twenty farms were affected, but when S =10, only six other farms were affected).    
11.2.2 Discussion: Point Nonpoint Source Trading 
The trading interaction between point and nonpoint sources, and thus the usefulness of 
point and nonpoint source trading, is mainly determined by the abatement costs of the 
two types of sources, more specifically, the cost of shifting to less nitrate intensive 
farming, and the cost of effluent treatment (assuming that that the participants bid 
based on their true economic values). Generally, point source bids for any particular 
year will compete with the nonpoint source bids for several years adjusted by the 
relevant response coefficients (due to the dispersed and protracted effects of nonpoint 
sources). Hence, the point sources may have to pay more to out-compete the nonpoint 
sources. Without reliable information on the cost functions, we cannot predict how far 
the two types of sources can interact in the market.     
To study the physical limitations for trade between the two types of sources, we 
assumed that the abatement costs of point and nonpoint sources are such that their 
bids lie in a competitive range.  According to our results, the extent to which trade 
occurs among the two types of sources depends on the properties of nonpoint sources, 
mainly the time lags associated with nonpoint sources. The faster the diffuse loads 
reach their destination, the greater the opportunities for trade between point and 
nonpoint sources. However, a market which trades permits for a single upcoming year 
provides fewer opportunities for trade between point and nonpoint sources, because 
NPS permits have effects on many future years while PS permits have effects on a 
single immediate year. Hence, two markets are likely to exist, unless the nonpoint 
sources have significant impacts in the same year of the loading. When permits for 
multiple years are traded simultaneously, nonpoint source bids for recent years will 
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compete with the point source bids for future years, and the market prices are pushed 
up by intensive competition.  
Provided that the abatement costs are competitive, point and nonpoint source nitrate 
trading appears to be most suitable when nitrate transport in groundwater is 
sufficiently fast and/or point sources are willing to buy future permits. The market 
designers can select the optimal number of years for which the permits are traded (S) 
based on the nonpoint source delay times to increase the trading opportunities 
between point and nonpoint sources. Uncertainties in the physical system and existing 
environmental regulations may restrict the ability to increase S, but the ability to buy 
permits for many years will provide more security to the commercial sources. For 
example, if the delay times associated with all the nonpoint sources are greater than 
five years, setting S ≤ 5 would provide no opportunities for point and nonpoint source 
trading; unless S is set higher, two markets would operate independently.          
11.3 Market Competitiveness52 
Market competitiveness usually describes the rivalry among the firms. Research into 
market power and strategic behaviours in general environmental permit markets 
suggests that those issues are mainly related to the initial distribution of pollution 
rights (Egteren & Weber, 1999).  
A market participant who is financially stronger than others can have market power, 
the ability to raise the prices and buy more or to monopolise the market. Auction 
markets can be more susceptible to such gaming behaviours (Stoft, 1999). In 
electricity markets, game theory models have been used to estimate potential 
efficiency losses from a Nash equilibrium due to the strategic behaviours of powerful 
suppliers (Migliavacca, 2007; Saguan, Keseric, Dessante, & Glachant, 2006; Stoft, 
1999). A Nash equilibrium is obtained by solving a competitive market equilibrium 
model, but this requires information on the cost functions of the players (Migliavacca, 
2007; Saguan, et al., 2006). A game theoretical approach is then used to estimate how 
                                               
52
 This section is based on Prabodanie and Raffensperger (2009a).  
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much the social welfare would change if the players game the bids above or below the 
true economic values with strategic intents.  
In the context of nitrate permit markets, if information is available on the profit 
functions of the farms, similar approaches may be used to estimate how far the prices 
can be distorted. However, it is difficult to predict what strategies the market 
participants would play in the real world. Without such information about the players 
or any real data collected from active permit markets, results of game theoretic 
analysis may not provide an accurate picture of the market competitiveness.               
The competiveness in nitrate permit markets may be limited by factors other than 
market power. As discussed earlier, loading permits are different compositions of 
receptor capacities (and other services), they are not directly comparable between 
farms, and non-comparable permits provide fewer opportunities for trade. Even if the 
players were ideal competitors and did not behave strategically or exercise market 
power, the ability and willingness of the farms to trade future capacities in the market 
are limited by the catchment hydro-geology, which determines the composition of 
each farm‘s loading permit. Therefore, the competitiveness in these permit markets is 
determined by two types of factors: (1) participant characteristics (capabilities, 
strategic intents, current permit holdings) and (2) catchment hydro-geology.  
This section looks at the extent of competition determined by the catchment hydro-
geology which is beyond the control of market designers and the players. We ignore 
both the resource banks (including the regulator) and the point sources, to study how 
far the nonpoint sources themselves can trade with each other. We assume only the 
receptor capacity constraints and no other market constraints. In this section, we use 
the term ―market competitiveness‖ to refer to the extent to which the farms can 
participate in the market and trade with each other, given that the only factor which 
restricts their ability to inteact with each other is the catchment hydro-geology, not the 
individual economic characteristics and capabilities. 
In the following discussion, we assume a single receptor situation (r = R =1), but the 
models and measures are applicable to cases where R > 1 with minor changes. We 
consider two cases: (1) farms can trade only year-1 permits (S = 1) and (2) farms can 
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simultaneously trade permits for several years (S > 1). In the former case, if a farm i ∈ 
[1, 2, …, F] has HiRd > 0 for all d ≤ 4, and HiRd = 0 for all d > 4, while all other farms 
have HiRd = 0 for all d ≤ 4, then farm i is hydro-geologically isolated, and cannot trade 
with others, because it does not compete for the same commodities (capacities of the 
same years) as others. However, if the farms can simultaneously trade year-1 to year-3 
permits, farm i will compete with other farms for some constraints (the capacities of 
years 5 and 6). Following this general understanding, we derive numerical indicators 
of competitiveness in the next sections.   
11.3.1  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of buyer/seller concentration 
and an indicator of competition among the buyers/sellers (Liston-Heyes & Pilkington, 
2004). HHI is calculated from the sum of squared market shares of firms purchasing 
(selling) a particular product. Clearly, HHI is expressed relative to a single 
commodity. 
To assemble a unit year-1 loading permit, farm i has to buy HiR(t−1) of the capacity of 
each year t. The farm‘s consumption rate of year-t capacity is given by the response 
coefficient HiR(t−1). Hence, farm competition for year t capacity is determined by the 
distribution of HfR(t−1) over f, in the (t−1)
th row of the response matrix for receptor R. 
We may define a farm‘s relative consumption rate of year-t capacity, RCRiRt, as a 
share of the cumulative consumption rate of all the farms. 
RCRiRt = HiR(t−1) ∑f HfR(t−1)       (C-1) 
Considering the relative consumption rate of each farm as a natural market share, we 
may now define a modified HHI, HHIM for a market in year-t capacity of receptor R (a 
single commodity), as the sum of squared relative consumption rates of the farms. 
HHIMRt = ∑f (RCRiRt)
2.        (C-2) 
Similarly, we can define the HHIMrt for each receptor r and time period t. The 
modified index HHIMrt indicates the extent to which the farms could compete for the 
capacity of year-t of receptor r. For a demonstration, we calculated the values of 
HHIMrt for our demonstration example presented in Appendix D, using the response 
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matrix coefficients of the single receptor and the 62 hypothetical farms given in Table 
D.3. Assuming a market to allocate loading permits for year 2011 (S = 1), the 
estimated values of HHIM1t for the capacity of each year from 2011 to 2050 (for each 
t=2011+d) is given in Table E.23.   
The values of HHIMRt  for t = 2012, . . ., 2035 are below 0.1. An HHI of 0.1 or below is 
usually considered as a competitive market (Ruster & Neumann, 2006). Therefore, the 
results indicate that the market is competitive for the receptor capacity of some years 
(24 years from 2012, . . ., 2035), but for the capacity of some years, (for example 
t=2060 and t=2059), the market is currently dominated by a few players. However, the 
farms cannot buy the capacity of tail years without buying capacity from the other 
competitive markets, because they can trade only loading permits. Hence, even if the 
competition for a few capacity constraints is significant relative to the number of 
farms in the catchment, the combined market would probably function actively.     
The index derived above gives an approximate idea about the buyer concentration for 
each commodity traded in the combined market. However it does not give a clear 
picture of overall market competitiveness. Therefore, we derive a new measure called 
the ―Contiguity Index‖ which measures the contiguity of locational (farm) loading 
permits to provide an overall picture of the extent to which the farms can trade with 
each other, and thus the overall market competitiveness. 
11.3.2 Contiguity Index (CI) 
Assuming S = 1, we first define a contiguity index for a pair of farms i and j, to 
measure the extent to which they can interact in the market.  
Define CI(i,j)= 
jRtiRt HH
jRt
T
t iRt
HH
T


 )(
`
1 `
1
,  
where T` is the number of years for which (at last one of) HiRt > 0 or HjRt > 0. 
If either HiRt = 0 or HjRt = 0 for all t (if the columns corresponding to  i and j in the 
transport coefficient matrix of receptor R are not overlapping) CI(i,j)= 0, and the pair of 
farms cannot trade at all. If HiRt = HjRt for all t (if the columns corresponding to i and j 
in the transport coefficient matrix coincide perfectly), CI(i,j) = 1, the pair of farms can 
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trade perfectly. Since Hfrt ≤ 1 for any combination of f, r, and t, when the difference 
between HiRt and HjRt (|HiRt−HjRt|) increases, CI(i,j) tends to zero. When the difference 
between HiRt and HjRt decreases, CI(i,j) tends to one. CI(i,j) can take a value within the 
range [0,1]. It indicates the extent to which the pair of farms can interact in the 
market, and a greater the value of CI(i,j) is always preferable for a market. 
From F farms in the market, we can extract FC2 = (F−1)F/2 distinct pairs. Therefore, 
the overall catchment contiguity can be given by:  
jRtiRt HH
jRt
jiT
t iRtji
HH
jiTFF
CI
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1
)1(
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. 
Large agricultural catchments can have a large number of farms with widely different 
spatial and temporal effects. Even if the farms cannot interact with everyone else in 
the market, if they can interact with a sufficiently large number of farms, the market 
would still be sufficiently competitive. However, the value of the index CI will be 
smaller if each farm had similar effects with a smaller number of farms compared to 
the total number of farms. For example, if there were 100 farms, each farm having 
relatively higher pair-wise index values with about 10 farms and relatively lower 
index values with others, the overall catchment contiguity index can still be small. 
However, by looking at the distribution of the pair-wise index values, and by 
calculating the overall contiguity indices for close subsets of farms (for example, we 
may calculate the overall index for sets of 10 adjacent farms, rather than for all the 
farms in the catchment), the market designers can understand how far the nonpoint 
sources can interact with each other, and the degree of market segmentation also. The 
proposed index may not be a perfect indicator of the overall opportunities for 
multilateral trading in the catchment, but it provides an idea of the extent to which the 
farms can trade with each other. Further study is required to better interpret the 
proposed index.  
For demonstration, we calculated the pair-wise and overall values of CI considering 
the 62 hypothetical farms in our demonstration example discussed in Appendix D. 
The results are given in Table E.24 of Appendix E (only some of the calculated values 
are given). The farm pairs having nearly coinciding response coefficients, 46 and 50, 
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35 and 53, and 17 and 19 have the highest values 0.99, 0.97, and 0.95 respectively. 
Even though the overall index for the 62 farms is only 0.33, the overall values for sets 
of 10 farms are around 0.5 or higher. Hence, for our example, the market in nonpoint 
source loading permits would be sufficiently competitive, even if permits are traded 
for the upcoming year only (S = 1).   
11.3.3 Multiple Year Permit Markets 
When S>1, farms can trade permits for several years simultaneously. Earlier in this 
chapter, we discussed that multiple year permit markets provide more opportunities 
for trade between point and nonpoint sources compared to single year permit markets. 
Therefore it is interesting to study how the competition among the nonpoint sources 
themselves would be affected when permits for multiple consecutive years are traded 
simultaneously.  
Assuming that the farms would trade the same quantities of year-1 to year-S permits, 
we may define a cumulative transport coefficient, HSfRd, to measure the cumulative 
effect of a unit (1 kg/year), permit continuously valid from year-1 to year-S.  


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We can then calculate HHIMRt for the case of S>1, by replacing HfRd with H
S
iJd in the 
formulation given above. To calculate CI for this case, we have to replace HfRd with 
HSfRd/min(S,d+1) in the formulation of CI to get H
S
fRd in the range of 0 and 1. For our 
example (Appendix D), the calculated contiguity index for S=5 is 0.39. This is higher 
than the value for the year-1 permit market, but for sets of 10 and 20 farms, the index 
values significantly increase when S is increased to five (Table E.24). The extent of 
nonpoint source competition increases when the number of trading periods increases. 
This result is consistent with the previous observations on point and nonpoint source 
competition which also increases with S.  
11.3.4 Discussion  
In agricultural discharge permit markets, the competitiveness driven by individual 
farm characteristics and the structure of the market is manageable. Therefore, the 
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competitiveness driven by hydro-geology is worth studying before a market is 
implemented.  
In this section, we proposed some measures to evaluate the competitiveness of a 
market in nitrate discharge permits. We studied the competitiveness driven by hydro-
geology, which is beyond the control of both the market participants and the 
designers. Our results suggest that the extent to which the farms can participate in the 
market depends on the extent to which their transport coefficient matrices overlap. If 
the farms are hydro-geologically isolated, tradable permits do little favour to the 
farms. However, if the trading system allows them to buy permits for several future 
years, the farms would be able to trade with each other in a competitive market. 
Further research on applying the proposed measures would help market designers 
understand the nature of competition better. 
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Chapter 12 
12 EXTENSIONS, APPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
12.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents possible extensions and applications of the proposed market 
mechanism, and closes the thesis with our conclusions and directions for further 
research.  
We discuss the physical and behavioural aspects of the problem we have not explicitly 
included in the market models, but can be included: nitrate runoff, compliance-related 
penalties and rewards, and integer constraints. We briefly describe how to extend the 
models to include those features. Then we discuss the applicability of the models and 
concepts to other water pollution problems and other environmental problems. 
In conclusion, we summarize the strengths and the limitations of the proposed market 
mechanism. We discuss the factors beyond our control which can lead to market 
failures, mainly the non-convexities and uncertainties in the underlying physical 
system. The chapter closes with some directions for future research.   
12.2 Extensions 
12.2.1 Runoff 
In Chapter 1, we mentioned that nitrate loss from agricultural land occurs mainly due 
to leaching, but runoff losses are also possible depending on the soil topography, and 
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location of the farms. Since the pollutants carried off by surface runoff and soil 
erosion reach a surface water body quickly, and do not usually migrate to 
groundwater, the effects of runoff are similar to the effects of point source emissions. 
Hence, the simplest way to account for the effects of runoff is requiring the nonpoint 
sources (from which nitrate may be lost due to runoff, for example, the farms beside a 
river) to hold an emission permit to match the expected annual runoff, in addition to 
the loading permits.  
12.2.2 Integer Constraints 
As discussed in Chapters 7 and 9, discontinuities in the land use profit functions can 
create non-convexities in permit markets, requiring integer constraints to model the 
non-convexities. Minimum permit requirements and non-divisible quantities (bids) are 
the common causes of such non-convexities. Market clearing models require integer 
variables to model these constraints. A market-based mechanism may not be 
acceptable to commercial land users unless these requirements are met.  
Electricity markets which are based on LP models do also have similar non-
convexities, for example, start-up and shut-down costs of the generators. Several 
different methods have been proposed to find optimal prices under non-convexities 
arising from integer variables. O'Neill, Sotkiewicz, Hobbs, Rothkopf, & Stewart 
(2002) proposed to solve an integer programming problem first, replace the integer 
constraints with equalities that force the integer variables to their optimal values, and 
then solve the resulting LP to find the market clearing prices. A few other methods 
have been proposed in Ring (1995) and Bjørndal & Jörnsten (2008). Any of those 
methods may be used to handle the non-convexities that arise from integer constraints 
such as minimum permit requirements.    
12.2.3 Compliance Related Penalties and Rewards 
Unless the permit users comply with the permitted discharge levels, the main purpose 
of tradable permits, achieving environmental goals at minimum cost, will not be 
achieved. Therefore, continuous monitoring is required to realise the expected 
benefits. Continuous compliance monitoring through automated devices is one of the 
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factors contributing to the success of the SO2 emissions trading program (Schary & 
Fisher-Vanden, 2004). Unlike the effects of releasing gases, the effects of diffuse 
discharges do not appear instantly, and hence the environmental authorities may have 
to carry out compliance monitoring relative to the permitted activities, and take 
actions to prevent irreversible violations. Together with continuous monitoring, 
violation penalties are required to ensure proper behaviour.     
Compliance-related penalties and rewards also improve the attractiveness of permit 
trading programs (David, 2003; Schary & Fisher-Vanden, 2004). The SO2 emissions 
trading system penalises users who violate permitted emission levels by requiring 
them to buy a permit to cover the previous year‘s deficit in the immediate next year 
and to pay an administrative penalty.  Those who perform well below the permitted 
emission level are rewarded by the ability of banking (the ability to carry forward the 
unused allowances).  
A similar mechanism can be incorporated into the proposed trading program for 
nitrate permits to encourage better performance and to discourage violations. Since 
the effect of nitrate loading in one year is different from the effects of loading in 
another year, loading permits cannot be carried forward, or be surrendered to 
compensate for previous violations. We suggest that this problem can be handled by 
including the previous year (year-0) in the market clearing models, and requiring the 
non-compliant farms to buy year-0 permits to match the previous year‘s deficit, and 
allow the over-compliant farms to sell unused year-0 permits. This method allows 
farms to sell unused permits and to pay for over-use in the immediate next year, 
because including many previous years in the market model can create confusion and 
provide space for strategic behaviours.    
If the last year‘s actual loading levels are known (by the farms, the regulator, and the 
market operator) at the time trading takes place (the beginning of every year), the 
available (tradable) capacities can be re-set accordingly (C`rt). In the market-clearing 
LP models, equality constraints can be included to force those who violated the 
permitted loading level to buy a year-0 permit to match the violation (qf0 = violation), 
and to allow those who performed better to sell the unused permit (qf0 = 0). If the 
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violations are high, the available capacity can be negative, meaning that some 
remediation activity is required. In that case, the market requires an offer of 
augmented capacity to cover the violation. If the regulator sets a bid for each capacity 
constraint (assuming that the regulator bids to buy if the available capacity is zero), 
the violators will be buying from either the farms or the regulator, and the better-
performers will be selling to either the farms or the regulator. If the equality 
constraints are binding, the violated farms may have to pay a higher price for year-0 
compared to their bid prices, and the better-performers may have to sell at a price 
below their reservation.    
12.3 Applications 
The problem addressed in this thesis, allocation of nitrate discharge permits among 
different types of sources, is a common pool, multilateral trading problem with 
complex interactions and a large number of interdependent and interrelated 
constraints. The basic idea is modelling the optimal allocation as a mathematical 
program, possibly as an LP, from which the equilibrium prices may be obtained 
straight off. Thus the proposed concepts and the models are generally applicable for 
other environmental pollution problems with complex interactions, where it is difficult 
to define a common standardised commodity capable of achieving environmental 
quality and sustainability requirements, for example, allocation of fishing rights, land 
development rights, and other environmental pollution rights (noise, air pollutants, 
and other water pollutants). If the demand for those rights and the physical 
interactions in the system can be modelled with sufficient accuracy, and the modelled 
constraints form a convex feasible region for allocations, the proposed market 
mechanism can be used to price those environmental resources efficiently relative to 
submitted bids or value functions.   
Since we specifically addressed nonpoint source water pollution, the closest 
applications are other nonpoint source pollutants such as phosphorus and sediment. 
However, unlike nitrogen, phosphorus does not leach but remains in the soil. 
Phosphorus loss from agriculture occurs due to soil erosion and surface and sub-
surface runoff. Sediment also reaches the waterways via surface runoff and soil 
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erosion. The travel times (time to travel from land to water bodies) of those pollutants 
are shorter, because the medium is fast-moving runoff or erosion, but some amount 
can be lost during transport. The proposed market mechanism can be used for 
phosphorus and sediment with shorter planning horizons, but response coefficients 
should be defined and estimated in different ways. The underlying important 
assumption in using the response matrix technique is that the relationship between 
pollutant loss from farms and effects at the receptors is linear, but this assumption is 
less likely to hold for phosphorus and sediment, because the transport medium is 
surface runoff and soil erosion which are not as stable as groundwater flow systems. 
On the other hand, the source-receptor relationships can be affected by the intensity 
rain-fall. Therefore, simplified delivery factors rather than response coefficients (for 
example, proportional attenuation factors for each farm) or ex-post market clearing 
(Ring 1995) based on observed pollutant loads may be considered for these pollutants.   
12.4 Conclusions 
The core of this thesis was a new market-based mechanism for allocating nitrate 
discharge permits among point and nonpoint sources. The proposed market operates 
as a centralized auction. The pollution sources submit a set of bids to the auction, 
indicating the benefit gained from each unit of loading permit allocated. 
Environmental agents submit offers to lease out the capacity of water bodies to accept 
nitrates. The auction operator runs a linear program which maximises the benefits 
from trade (as indicated in the bids and offers), subject to a set of constraints which 
describe the underlying nitrate transport system, the ability of water bodies to accept 
nitrates, and operational constraints of the sources. The LP solution provides the 
optimal prices and allocations which clear the market. The operator then settles the 
market ex-ante by informing the cleared permit positions of each source, collecting 
money from buyers, and paying the sellers. 
12.4.1 Strengths  
Management of diffuse water pollution sources requires an integration of physical and 
economic models. Despite the growing interest towards market-based mechanisms, 
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the research to date has failed to incorporate accurate representations of the physical 
systems into the market designs. The major strength of our approach is the ability to 
incorporate the underlying physical system into the market clearing models, while 
maintaining the simplicity of the program and low transaction costs. Our approach 
allows the diffuse sources to buy a single permit for each year, ensuring that any large 
set of (relevant) environmental and commercial constraints are met over a period of 
any appropriate length.    
The proposed system efficiently handles the common causes of market failures such 
as transaction costs and externalities. First, users buy from and sell to a centralized 
auction once every year, so they do not have to find trading partners and negotiate 
contracts. Second, the users are not required to validate trades or get approvals. Hence 
transaction costs will be negligible. 
All the externalities of trade are internalised into the market, because the market can 
charge the polluters based on prices associated with any number of constraints which 
describe the effects of discharges. The authorities will have the flexibility to adjust the 
maximum allowed levels of pollution, to add more constraints, or to set time horizons 
through which the target quality levels are to be achieved. Users can be given more 
flexibility by letting them specify conditions such as minimum permit requirements. 
Therefore, we argue that, as the US SO2 emission trading program, the proposed 
trading system would provide sufficient security and flexibility to both the 
environmental authorities and commercial polluters.            
We showed that creating a ―free‖ market to trade nitrate permits, especially for 
nonpoint source nitrate loading permits, is almost impossible. The system we 
proposed is not a free market, but it can allocate permits efficiently taking into 
account the underlying pollutant transport system more accurately.     
12.4.2 Limitations      
The proposed trading program would be most suitable when the underlying solute 
transport system is approximately convex and deterministic. Non-convexities and 
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uncertainties in the physical system (as well as economic conditions) can result in 
failures.  
We used the response matrix technique assuming that loading permit allocations 
(mass nitrate loading) and groundwater recharge rates (via water percolation from 
soil) are separable, which they are not. Loading permits and thus the land use intensity 
can affect the recharge rates. For example, groundwater recharge from a dairy farm is 
usually greater than recharge from dry stock, sheep and beef.  
Even if recharge rates increase with land use intensity, and thus nitrate loading, the 
response coefficient for a given delay may increase or decrease with recharge, what 
could be guaranteed is that the response profile (the series of response coefficients 
over time) would change. This is a completely non-convex situation which cannot be 
handled by a piece-wise linearization. 
All the physical parameters used in the models, mainly the response coefficients and 
the available capacities, are estimated values. Therefore, uncertainty cannot be 
avoided. However, since the time horizon can be longer, and values of those 
parameters cannot be estimated with 100% accuracy at any point in time, multi-stage 
stochastic programming approaches may not always help. Given the political, 
economic, and climatic uncertainties, valuation of future capacities cannot be real, and 
therefore, the reluctance to commit present economic benefits for an uncertain future 
may challenge the feasibility of any market mechanism proposed for nitrate.  
If the uncertain parameter values can be estimated with associated probabilities, a 
chance constraint approach may be developed to meet the environmental constraints 
with given probabilities. However, chance constraints can create non-convexities in 
pricing models.   
12.5 Directions for Future Research   
Even with assimilative pollutants, the ability of the water systems to accept pollution 
is limited, and therefore, the assimilative capacity is a scarce resource. Our 
contribution was only for allocating the available capacity efficiently. Research into 
increasing capacity supply through in-situ and ex-situ treatment, wetlands, and other 
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means, as well as decreasing the demand for capacity through best farm management 
practices are of the utmost importance.  
We presented a generally applicable market design and LP models, but a given 
catchment can have unique physical and economic conditions. Therefore, the 
feasibility of a trading system will be determined by capacity availability, differences 
in the physical and economic properties of the sources (response coefficients and 
abatement costs), how frequently the groundwater flow system changes, and how far 
we can rely on the estimated physical parameters. These questions are worth studying 
at the catchment scale. Trading in a given catchment may be simplified and improved 
by finding a best compromise planning horizon T and optimal S (the number of 
periods for which permits are traded).  
Models for evaluation of receptor capacities and participant-side optimisation remain 
to be studied. Further research into other applications discussed above is highly 
recommended.  
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Appendix A 
GROUNDWATER SOLUTE TRANSPORT EQUATION 
This appendix provides a brief description of the general groundwater solute transport 
equation used to model nitrate transport in groundwater. Most groundwater quality 
management models, as well as ours, are based on a black box approach to 
incorporate the underlying physical system, and do not include explicit representations 
of the solute transport equations. The purpose of this appendix is to open the black 
box, providing some insight into what actually happens once nitrate leaches into 
groundwater aquifers.      
According to the principles of contaminant transport modelling53, the transport of 
contaminants as solutes in groundwater occurs due to three main processes: advection, 
dispersion, and chemical reaction. 
A.1 Advection 
Advection refers to the movement of solute particles with groundwater at the same 
velocity of groundwater flow. In many contaminant transport problems, advection is 
the dominant cause of transport. The mass balance equation which governs pure 
advective transport of a contaminant in a porous medium is:  
                                               
53
 Sources: Zheng and Bennett (2002) and Zheng and Wang (1999) 
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where: 
vx, vy, vz = seepage or linear pore velocity, in coordinate directions x, y and z, ms
-1. 
C = dissolved concentration of the contaminant species, gm-3. 
x, y, z = distance along the respective Cartesian coordinate axis, m. 
t = time, s. 
Seepage velocity is related to the specific discharge or Darcy velocity through the 
equations: 
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where:  
qx,  qy,  qz = Darcy velocities, in the directions x, y and z, ms
-1 and 
θ = porosity, dimensionless (porosity is a measure of void spaces in a material). 
By substituting qx, qy and qz in equation 2.1, the advective transport equation becomes: 
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The transport equation is related to the groundwater flow equation through the 
Darcy‘s Law (Rushton, 2003): 
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where h = hydraulic head, m. 
The hydraulic head is calculated by solving the partial differential equation for three-
dimensional, fully saturated groundwater flow (Rushton, 2003):  
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where:  
Kx, Ky, Kz = values of hydraulic conductivity along the directions x, y and z (hydraulic 
conductivity is a property of the porous medium which measures how easy it is for 
water to move through a material), ms-1, and 
Ss = specific storage, volume of water released from storage in a unit volume of 
aquifer per unit decline in head, m-1.  
The general advective transport equation 2.1 or 2.3 is suitable when the concentration 
and velocity vary in three dimensions without any fluid sources or sinks. We have 
assumed that neither water nor the contaminant is added to, or removed from, the 
aquifer. 
A.2 Sources and Sinks 
If there is a contaminant source through which contaminated water is added into the 
system or a sink through which water is withdrawn, the source is included in the 
advective transport equation 2.3 as:  
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 where: 
qs = volumetric flow rate per unit volume of the aquifer due to sources (positive) and 
sinks (negative), s-1, and 
Cs = concentration of the contaminant species in water that is added or removed, gm
-3.  
A.3 Dispersion 
Dispersion is the spreading of the contaminant over a wider region. Rather than 
moving with groundwater, dispersion occurs due to a departure from that movement. 
Dispersion is caused by (1) mechanical dispersion, a consequence of deviation of 
particle velocity from groundwater velocity and (2) molecular diffusion caused by 
concentration gradient. Generally, molecular diffusion is negligible compared to 
mechanical dispersion. Molecular diffusion is important only when groundwater flow 
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velocity is very low. Hydrodynamic dispersion or dispersion refers to the sum of 
mechanical dispersion and molecular diffusion. 
Dispersion is included in the transport equation using a dispersion tensor, Dij. The 
dispersion tensor is calculated from the pore velocity and dispersivity which is a 
property of the porous medium. For the three-dimensional problem, the dispersion 
tensor is defined in the component form as: 
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where: 
Dxx, Dyy, Dzz, Dxy, Dxz, Dyz = components of the dispersion tensor, m
2s-1, 
αL = longitudinal dispersivity, m, 
αT = transverse dispersivity, m, 
D*= effective molecular diffusion coefficient, m2s-1, 
vx, vy, and vz = components of the velocity vector along x, y, and z axes, ms
-1, and 
|v| = (vx
2 + vy
2 + vz
2)½ = magnitude of the velocity vector, ms-1. 
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The dispersion tensor defined by longitudinal and transverse dispersivities is valid 
only for isotropic media. For anisotropic media it requires five independent 
dispersivities. 
By incorporating the dispersion term in equation 2.6, we get the equation which 
describes advective and dispersive solute transport in groundwater: 
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A.4 Chemical Reaction 
There are two types of chemical reactions that affect solute transport in groundwater: 
(1) chemical reactions that are sufficiently fast and reversible so that local equilibrium 
can be assumed and (2) chemical reactions that are insufficiently fast and/or 
irreversible so that local equilibrium assumption cannot be applied. The chemical 
reactions that are commonly included in the transport simulations are equilibrium-
controlled or rate-limited sorption reactions (transfer of mass between the dissolved 
phase and the solid matrix of the porous medium) and kinetic reactions such as first-
order decay.  
The effects of chemical reactions are included in the advection-dispersion equation 
2.14 using a chemical sink/source term, ∑nRn, which represents the rate of change in 
solute mass due to n = 1,2, …, N chemical reactions. The equation which governs the 
transport of a contaminant in groundwater due to advection, dispersion and chemical 
reaction is: 
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The chemical sink source term for equilibrium-controlled sorption and first-order 
irreversible rate reactions can be written as: 
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where: 
ρb = bulk density of the porous medium, gm
-1, 
C’ = sorbed concentration, a function of the dissolved concentration C as defined by 
the sorption isotherm (an isotherm is a plot of the dissolved concentration C versus the 
sorbed concentration C’), gg-1, 
λ1 = reaction rate constant for the dissolved phase, s
-1, and 
λ2 = reaction rate constant for the sorbed (solid) phase, s
-1. 
By substituting ∑nRn in the advective, dispersive and reactive transport equation 2.14 
we get: 
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Assuming porosity θ does not change over time, equation 2.17 can be rearranged as: 
'
)()()(
)(
21 CCCq
z
Cy
y
Cq
x
Cq
z
C
D
y
C
D
x
C
D
z
z
C
D
y
C
D
x
C
D
yz
C
D
y
C
D
x
C
D
xt
C
R
bss s
zyx
zzzyzx
yzyyyxxzxyxx

































































 (2.17) 
where 








C
C
R b
'
1


known as the Retardation Factor, is dimensionless. 
Equation 2.17 is the mass balance equation which states that the change in mass 
storage (both dissolved and sorbed phases) at any given time is equal to the difference 
in mass inflow and outflow due to advection, dispersion, equilibrium-controlled 
sorption, first-order irreversible rate reactions and sink/source.  
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Appendix B 
HYPOTHETICAL RIVER CATCHMENT MODEL 
This appendix provides the details of the hypothetical river catchment model used to 
demonstrate the physical characteristics of the problem addressed in this thesis, the 
way nonpoint source nitrate pollution spreads over time and space.  
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Figure B.1: Hypothetical river catchment.  
This catchment, which drains towards a stream, has a maximum length of is 6 km 
from north to south and a maximum width of 6 km from east to west. The lower half 
(southern part) of the catchment is bounded by impermeable rocks (no-flow 
boundaries) on the east and west sides. The upper (northern) boundary is considered 
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as a fixed head boundary with a hydraulic head of 19.5 m. The aquifer thickness is 20 
m. A plan view of the study site is shown in Figure B.1. Rectangles indicate nonpoint 
sources (farms) and the circles indicate point sources. The two crossed circles indicate 
groundwater monitoring wells. We assume nitrate losses from farms occur due to 
leaching, and runoff losses are negligible. To understand the fate of leached nitrates, 
we model advective, dispersive, and reactive nitrate transport in groundwater with 
standard computer codes MODFLOW and MT3D, using Visual MODFLOW and a 
GUI to interface with the codes. The hydro-geological parameters used in the 
simulations are given in Table B.1. 
Parameter Value 
Horizontal hydraulic conductivity 0.0006 m/s 
Vertical hydraulic conductivity 0.0001 m/s 
Storage coefficient 0.0001 1/m 
Recharge 100 mm/year 
Effective porosity 0.2 
Specific yield 0.2 
Total porosity 0.3 
Longitudinal dispersivity 5 m 
Ratio: H/L dispersivity 0.1 
Ratio: V/L dispersivity 0.01 
First order decay coefficient 0.00002 1/day 
Molecular diffusion coefficient 0.00005 
Model Grid  
Cell length 200 m 
Cell width 200 m 
Cell thickness 20 m 
Number of layers 1 
Simulation period 10,978 days (30 years) 
 
Table B.1: Properties of the aquifer underlying the hypothetical catchment.   
Using the model, we simulated 1 kg nitrate loading from each farm during one year 
(2010). The whole simulation period was set to 30 years (from 2010 to 2039) to 
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observe the effects of one year‘s loading over the next 30 years. From each farm 
simulation, we observed (1) how much nitrate is discharged into the stream in each 
year and (2) by how much the concentration in each well increases in each year, due 
to 1 kg nitrate loading from the farm in the first year (2010). The results are given in 
Table B.2.    
Year 
Farm  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.038 
2011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.101 0.113 
2012 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.019 0.103 0.130 0.129 
2013 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.024 0.114 0.124 0.121 
2014 0.000 0.066 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.027 0.110 0.107 0.106 
2015 0.000 0.075 0.026 0.000 0.024 0.084 0.030 0.099 0.090 0.090 
2016 0.000 0.078 0.032 0.000 0.033 0.089 0.031 0.086 0.074 0.075 
2017 0.000 0.077 0.038 0.019 0.041 0.088 0.032 0.072 0.060 0.061 
2018 0.024 0.073 0.041 0.025 0.047 0.083 0.032 0.060 0.048 0.049 
2019 0.032 0.068 0.043 0.030 0.053 0.075 0.033 0.049 0.039 0.039 
2020 0.039 0.061 0.044 0.034 0.056 0.066 0.033 0.039 0.031 0.031 
2021 0.045 0.054 0.044 0.038 0.059 0.057 0.033 0.031 0.024 0.024 
2022 0.050 0.048 0.043 0.040 0.059 0.047 0.033 0.025 0.000 0.000 
2023 0.053 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.058 0.039 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2024 0.055 0.035 0.038 0.043 0.056 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2025 0.055 0.030 0.036 0.043 0.052 0.026 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2026 0.054 0.025 0.033 0.042 0.048 0.020 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2027 0.052 0.020 0.030 0.041 0.044 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2028 0.049 0.000 0.028 0.039 0.040 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2029 0.045 0.000 0.026 0.037 0.035 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2030 0.041 0.000 0.023 0.034 0.031 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2031 0.037 0.000 0.022 0.032 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2032 0.033 0.000 0.020 0.030 0.023 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2033 0.029 0.000 0.018 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2034 0.026 0.000 0.017 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2035 0.022 0.000 0.016 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2036 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year 
Farm 
11 12 13 14 15 
2010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2011 0.016 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2012 0.025 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2013 0.033 0.039 0.016 0.000 0.020 
2014 0.039 0.042 0.021 0.000 0.027 
2015 0.044 0.043 0.026 0.000 0.033 
2016 0.046 0.043 0.029 0.020 0.038 
2017 0.048 0.041 0.032 0.024 0.042 
2018 0.047 0.039 0.033 0.027 0.044 
2019 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.029 0.046 
2020 0.045 0.034 0.035 0.031 0.046 
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2021 0.043 0.032 0.035 0.033 0.046 
2022 0.041 0.029 0.034 0.034 0.044 
2023 0.038 0.027 0.034 0.035 0.043 
2024 0.036 0.025 0.032 0.035 0.041 
2025 0.033 0.024 0.031 0.035 0.038 
2026 0.031 0.022 0.030 0.035 0.036 
2027 0.029 0.021 0.028 0.034 0.033 
2028 0.026 0.020 0.027 0.034 0.031 
2029 0.024 0.019 0.025 0.032 0.028 
2030 0.022 0.018 0.024 0.031 0.025 
2031 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.023 
2032 0.000 0.016 0.021 0.028 0.021 
2033 0.000 0.016 0.019 0.027 0.019 
2034 0.000 0.015 0.018 0.025 0.000 
2035 0.000 0.014 0.017 0.023 0.000 
2036 0.000 0.014 0.015 0.022 0.000 
2037 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.020 0.000 
2038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 
2039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 
Table B.2: Amount of nitrate (kg) delivered to the stream from 1 kg nitrate loading in 
2010 from each farm. 
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Appendix C 
BID FUNCTIONS 
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate how to use available information to 
estimate the farm profit functions and to calculate the bids. We show how to calculate 
the bids for a dairy farm using the ―gross $:N relationships‖, presented by Woods et 
al. (2004) (Table 9.2). Those relationships have been estimated considering the farms 
in the Waikato region of New Zealand, and therefore the estimated marginal profit 
function are not generally applicable. 
Woods et al. (2004) expressed nitrate leaching (N-loading) and operating profit 
(profit) from dairy as a function of stocking rate (cows). These relationships are given 
by equations C1 and C2 below.  
N-loading (kg/ha/year) = 7.6×cows1.785      (C1) 
profit ($/ha) = 729×cows – 235       (C2) 
By re-arranging C1, cows (cows/ha) = (N-loading/7.6)1/1.785   (C3) 
Applicable range: 1 ≤ cows ≤ 4 
In Table C.1, we calculate the incremental profit from each 1 kg of nitrate loading 
based on the above relationships. To calculate the marginal profit, we first selected the 
range of the variable N-loading so that the range of the variable cows is from 1 to 4, 
because the relationships are valid for this range only (first column). Then we 
calculated the relevant values for the variable cows based on equation C3 (second 
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column). Then the profit corresponding to each N-loading was calculated from 
equation C2 (third column). The incremental profit from each kg of N-loading was 
calculated from the differences in profit.  
From the incremental profit generated from each incremental unit of nitrate loading, a 
marginal profit curve for a dairy farm can be drawn as in Figure C.1.  
The marginal profit function can be approximated to a piece-wise linear function as 
shown in Figure C.2. Based on the piece-wise linearization, a risk-averse farm would 
bid $41 for the first 13 kg, $33 for the next 8 kg, and so on, as given in Table 9.1.      
N-loading cows Profit 
Incremental 
profit  
8 1.03 $515.25 - 
9 1.10 $566.43 $51.18 
10 1.17 $615.16 $48.73 
11 1.23 $661.78 $46.63 
12 1.29 $706.58 $44.80 
13 1.35 $749.76 $43.18 
14 1.41 $791.51 $41.75 
15 1.46 $831.96 $40.45 
16 1.52 $871.25 $39.28 
17 1.57 $909.46 $38.22 
18 1.62 $946.70 $37.24 
19 1.67 $983.04 $36.34 
20 1.72 $1,018.55 $35.51 
21 1.77 $1,053.29 $34.74 
22 1.81 $1,087.31 $34.02 
23 1.86 $1,120.65 $33.34 
24 1.90 $1,153.36 $32.71 
25 1.95 $1,185.48 $32.12 
26 1.99 $1,217.03 $31.56 
27 2.03 $1,248.06 $31.03 
28 2.08 $1,278.59 $30.53 
29 2.12 $1,308.64 $30.05 
30 2.16 $1,338.23 $29.60 
31 2.20 $1,367.40 $29.17 
32 2.24 $1,396.16 $28.76 
33 2.28 $1,424.52 $28.36 
34 2.31 $1,452.51 $27.99 
35 2.35 $1,480.14 $27.63 
36 2.39 $1,507.42 $27.28 
37 2.43 $1,534.37 $26.95 
38 2.46 $1,561.00 $26.63 
39 2.50 $1,587.33 $26.33 
40 2.54 $1,613.36 $26.03 
41 2.57 $1,639.11 $25.75 
42 2.61 $1,664.58 $25.47 
43 2.64 $1,689.79 $25.21 
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44 2.67 $1,714.74 $24.95 
45 2.71 $1,739.44 $24.70 
46 2.74 $1,763.90 $24.46 
47 2.78 $1,788.13 $24.23 
48 2.81 $1,812.13 $24.00 
49 2.84 $1,835.92 $23.78 
50 2.87 $1,859.49 $23.57 
51 2.91 $1,882.86 $23.37 
52 2.94 $1,906.02 $23.16 
53 2.97 $1,928.99 $22.97 
54 3.00 $1,951.77 $22.78 
55 3.03 $1,974.37 $22.60 
56 3.06 $1,996.78 $22.42 
57 3.09 $2,019.02 $22.24 
58 3.12 $2,041.09 $22.07 
59 3.15 $2,062.99 $21.90 
60 3.18 $2,084.73 $21.74 
61 3.21 $2,106.31 $21.58 
62 3.24 $2,127.74 $21.43 
63 3.27 $2,149.01 $21.27 
64 3.30 $2,170.14 $21.13 
65 3.33 $2,191.12 $20.98 
66 3.36 $2,211.96 $20.84 
67 3.38 $2,232.66 $20.70 
68 3.41 $2,253.23 $20.57 
69 3.44 $2,273.66 $20.43 
70 3.47 $2,293.97 $20.30 
71 3.50 $2,314.14 $20.18 
72 3.52 $2,334.19 $20.05 
73 3.55 $2,354.12 $19.93 
74 3.58 $2,373.93 $19.81 
75 3.61 $2,393.63 $19.69 
76 3.63 $2,413.21 $19.58 
77 3.66 $2,432.67 $19.46 
78 3.69 $2,452.02 $19.35 
79 3.71 $2,471.27 $19.25 
80 3.74 $2,490.41 $19.14 
81 3.76 $2,509.44 $19.03 
82 3.79 $2,528.37 $18.93 
83 3.82 $2,547.20 $18.83 
84 3.84 $2,565.93 $18.73 
85 3.87 $2,584.56 $18.63 
86 3.89 $2,603.10 $18.54 
87 3.92 $2,621.54 $18.44 
88 3.94 $2,639.89 $18.35 
89 3.97 $2,658.14 $18.26 
90 3.99 $2,676.31 $18.17 
Table C.1: Incremental profit from kg nitrate loading.  
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Figure C.1: Marginal profit function. 
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Figure C.2: Piece-wise linearization of the marginal profit function. 
242 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
EDENDALE AQUIFER MODEL 
This discussion is based on a report and an accompanied nitrate-N (nitrogen in the 
form of nitrate) transport simulation model produced by AquaFirma Ltd for the 
Southland Regional Council (Rekker 1998), as part of a multi-disciplinary project on 
the nonpoint source effects on groundwater and surface water quality in the Southland 
Region of New Zealand. The main purpose of the report and the model was to study 
the effects of possible land use intensification in Southland on the quality of 
groundwater and groundwater-fed surface water bodies in the region.  
The Edendale aquifer which underlies the catchment area drains from north-west to 
south-east, towards the Mataura River which flows from north to south along the 
eastern margin of the aquifer (Figure D.1). Hence, the model domain includes only a 
part of the Mataura River Catchment. The western margin of the aquifer is covered by 
the Edendale Hills. The river receives groundwater flux directly and also indirectly via 
springs as shown in the cross-sectional view of the aquifer in Figure D.2. 
The purpose of the nitrate-N transport model developed using MODFLOW and 
MT3D was to study the effects of agricultural intensification on the groundwater 
nitrate-N levels and the nitrate-N levels in the springs and the Mataura River. The 
model was used to predict the effects of different land use intensification scenarios 
(for example, converting all pasture land to high intensity dairy) relative to the current 
(as at 1998) situation.    
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Figure D.1: Edendale aquifer setting. Source: Rekker (1998). 
 
Figure D.2: Edendale aquifer cross-sectional view. Source: Rekker (1998).  
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The pre-1998 land use distribution in the region, as given in the report and the model, 
is shown in Figure D.3. Areal nitrate-N loading for the base case (pre-1998) scenario 
has been assigned based on twelve recognized land use classes as shown in the figure 
(for example, 56 kg/ha/year from high intensity dairy and 1.7 kg/ha/year for low 
intensity sheep).  
 
Figure D.3: Land use distribution for the base case (pre-1998) scenario. Source: 
Rekker (1998).  
We used this nitrate-N transport model to demonstrate a tradable permit program to 
allocate nitrate loading permits among the farms in the region. Even though we used 
the original MODFLOW and MT3D simulation models without making any changes 
to the hydro-geological data, since we use it for a different purpose, we had to make a 
few assumptions.     
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Receptors: First, we assume that the Mataura River is the only receptor concerned 
(R=1). Since groundwater discharges through the springs eventually flow down to the 
river (the time delay is ignored), the total mass nitrate-N discharge into the river, 
directly or indirectly via springs, is a good indicator of nitrate pollution in the region.  
Receptor capacity: Assuming that the nitrate-N discharge into the river was in 
equilibrium with the land use nitrate loading as at 1998, annual mass nitrate-N 
discharge into the stream from pre-1998 land use is considered as the maximum 
acceptable nitrate discharge into the river (nitrate intake capacity of the river). The 
receptor capacity was calculated by simulating the pre-1998 nitrate loading over a 
period of 50 years (until equilibrium is achieved approximately) as 120,647 kg/year54 
(CSD1=120,647 kg/year). 
Farms: We assumed 62 farms so that they collectively cover the whole pre-1998 land 
use area. However, the farm boundaries do not correspond to either the actual 
(present) property boundaries or the property boundaries given in the original model. 
We defined the farms mainly based on the land use type. The hypothetical property 
boundary map is given in Figure D.4. To demonstrate the results of a trading program, 
we categorized the 62 farms into three groups (dairy, sheep, and crop) based on their 
pre-1998 land use type, and assigned a single marginal profit function of nitrate 
loading (kg/ha/year) and thus a single set of bids for each group. For example, all 
dairy farms (the properties in which most of the area was originally recognized as 
dairy land) submit the same set of bids.  The assigned groups and other information 
assumed for the farm are given in Tables D.1 and D.2. The bid function assigned for 
each group is given in Table 9.2 of Chapter 9.    
                                               
54
 The value is below the annual mass load 152,942 kg/year estimated in the report, for three reasons. First 
about 4-5% of the load is removed from the groundwater abstraction well. Second, we reduced the areal 
mass nitrate-N load from the effluent irrigation area and residential area to 80 and 1.7 kg/ha/year 
respectively, as recommended in the report (the original values were 178 and 16.3 kg/ha/year). Third, it 
would take a few more years to reach equilibrium because the nitrate load from upstream farms 1 and 2 
takes more than 50 years to be delivered to the river completely (as shown in the response matrix in Table 
D.3).       
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Response Matrix: Using the original nitrate-N transport model, we obtained response 
coefficients for each farm assuming each farm location as a node. Since the river is 
the only receptor concerned, we simulated 1 kg nitrate-N loading from each farm 
during one year, and obtained the mass nitrate discharge into the river (and springs 
modelled as drains in MT3D) in each of the next 50 years (including the loading 
year). We used some VB.NET codes to read the output files produced by MT3D, to 
convert the units and calculate the response coefficients, and to write the response 
matrix into MS Excel. The response matrix is given in Table D.3. 
Available Capacity: Currently available capacity is the difference between the nitrate 
intake capacity of the river (120,647 kg/year) and the mass nitrate load expected to 
reach the river from groundwater nitrate storage, assuming no other unmanageable 
sources. Available capacity depends on all previous land uses. For the demonstration 
of a tradable permit program to be started from 2011, we considered two sets of 
available capacities calculated based on two prior land use scenarios, sustainable land 
use and intensive land use.  
The sustainable land use scenario assumes that the pre-1998 land use has been 
continued until 2010. To estimate the available capacities for this scenario, we 
simulated the pre-1998 nitrate loading over a period of 50 years to obtain the current 
(as at 2010) concentration distribution in groundwater. Then we simulated the current 
concentration distribution (as initial concentration) over a period of another 50 years 
to obtain the mass nitrate-N load expected to be delivered to the river from current 
nitrate-N storage in groundwater. The results and the calculated tradable capacities are 
given in Table D.4. Since the nitrate intake capacity of the river was estimated based 
on pre-1998 nitrate loading, the available capacity is always positive. 
The intensive land use scenario assumes that all dairy and sheep land were converted 
to high intensity farming after 1998. To estimate the available capacities for this 
scenario, we ran the simulation for a 50 year period with pre-1998 nitrate loading over 
the first 48 years, and intensive loading over the next 12 years. We obtained the output 
concentration distribution file, and again simulated it as the initial concentration for a 
period of 50 years. The results and the calculated tradable capacities are given in 
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Table D.4. Since the nitrate intake capacity of the river was estimated based on pre-
1998 nitrate loading, and the nitrate loading has been significantly increased over the 
last 12 years, the available capacity is zero in the early years.  
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Figure D.4: Hypothetical farm boundary map. 
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Pre-1998 Land use type Group Colour Code Nitrate Loading 
(kg/ha/year) 
Dairy-High Dairy  DH 53.3 
Dairy-Medium Dairy  DM 22.6 
Dairy-Low Dairy  DL 11.9 
Sheep-High Sheep  SH 10.8 
Sheep-Medium Sheep  SM 3.6 
Sheep-Low Sheep  SL 1.7 
Forage Crop  F 79.9 
Horticulture Crop  H 1.6 
Tree Nursery Crop  T 15.7 
Residential/Urban Crop  R 1.7 
Effluent Irrigation Dairy  E 80.0 
Sheep & Cattle Sheep  SC 10.5 
Table D.1: Pre-1998 land use types, nitrate loading, and the groups assigned. 
Farm Pre-1998 land 
use type 
Area (ha) Farm Pre-1998 land 
use type  
Area (ha) 
1 DL 50 36 SH 43.75 
2 SM 25 37 F 37.5 
3 DH 62.5 38 SM 37.5 
4 SM 106.25 39 DM 118.75 
5 DM 150 40 DH 68.75 
6 DM 118.75 41 SH 137.5 
7 T 112.5 42 SC 62.5 
8 SH 37.5 43 F 12.5 
9 SM 37.5 44 DH 106.25 
10 E 168.75 45 SL 37.5 
11 SL 56.25 46 F 37.5 
12 DL 87.5 47 DM 50 
13 SM 168.75 48 SM 87.5 
14 DM 56.25 49 DM 225 
15 SH 331.25 50 SM 25 
16 DM 656.25 51 H 37.5 
17 DH 62.5 52 DH 112.5 
18 SL 43.75 53 F 68.75 
19 SM 62.5 54 SL 56.25 
20 SC 62.5 55 SC 50 
21 DL 62.5 56 SH 87.5 
22 SC 112.5 57 DM 168.75 
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23 SM 325 58 F 56.25 
24 SH 56.25 59 DL 150 
25 DM 100 60 SM 193.75 
26 F 37.5 61 F 6.25 
27 SM 237.5 62 SH 131.25 
28 DM 56.25    
29 SL 106.25    
30 DH 43.75    
31 F 56.25    
32 DH 81.25    
33 SH 68.75    
34 DL 150    
35 SC 50    
Table D.2: Hypothetical farms, areas, and land use types. 
 Delay Node n (Farm f) 
d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0.056 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0.107 0 0 0.009 0 0.001 0 
5 0 0 0 0.001 0.139 0 0.004 0.03 0 0.004 0 
6 0 0 0 0.005 0.144 0.001 0.015 0.063 0 0.009 0 
7 0 0 0 0.013 0.13 0.003 0.039 0.098 0 0.017 0 
8 0 0 0 0.026 0.107 0.007 0.073 0.121 0 0.028 0 
9 0 0 0 0.043 0.082 0.012 0.107 0.127 0 0.039 0.001 
10 0 0 0 0.06 0.061 0.018 0.13 0.116 0.002 0.049 0.002 
11 0 0 0.001 0.073 0.044 0.023 0.133 0.096 0.005 0.054 0.005 
12 0 0 0.002 0.082 0.032 0.027 0.121 0.075 0.012 0.057 0.011 
13 0.001 0 0.004 0.085 0.023 0.03 0.1 0.056 0.023 0.057 0.02 
14 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.084 0.017 0.033 0.077 0.041 0.037 0.054 0.031 
15 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.078 0.012 0.037 0.056 0.031 0.052 0.051 0.044 
16 0.003 0.003 0.017 0.071 0.009 0.041 0.039 0.024 0.066 0.046 0.057 
17 0.005 0.005 0.024 0.062 0.006 0.046 0.028 0.019 0.076 0.041 0.07 
18 0.007 0.008 0.032 0.054 0.005 0.051 0.02 0.015 0.082 0.036 0.079 
19 0.009 0.013 0.04 0.045 0.003 0.055 0.015 0.012 0.083 0.03 0.085 
20 0.012 0.018 0.048 0.038 0.002 0.058 0.011 0.01 0.081 0.025 0.086 
21 0.016 0.024 0.056 0.031 0.002 0.059 0.008 0.008 0.076 0.021 0.084 
22 0.019 0.031 0.061 0.026 0.001 0.058 0.006 0.006 0.068 0.017 0.077 
23 0.023 0.037 0.065 0.021 0.001 0.056 0.005 0.004 0.06 0.013 0.069 
24 0.027 0.044 0.066 0.017 0.001 0.052 0.003 0.003 0.051 0.01 0.06 
25 0.031 0.049 0.066 0.014 0 0.047 0.002 0.002 0.042 0.008 0.05 
26 0.034 0.054 0.064 0.011 0 0.042 0.002 0.002 0.034 0.006 0.041 
27 0.038 0.057 0.061 0.009 0 0.037 0.001 0.001 0.026 0.005 0.033 
28 0.039 0.058 0.055 0.007 0 0.031 0.001 0.001 0.02 0.003 0.025 
29 0.042 0.06 0.051 0.006 0 0.026 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.019 
30 0.042 0.057 0.044 0.005 0 0.021 0 0 0.011 0.002 0.014 
251 
 
 
 
31 0.044 0.057 0.04 0.004 0 0.017 0 0 0.008 0.001 0.011 
32 0.042 0.052 0.034 0.003 0 0.013 0 0 0.006 0.001 0.007 
33 0.042 0.05 0.029 0.002 0 0.01 0 0 0.004 0.001 0.005 
34 0.04 0.044 0.024 0.002 0 0.008 0 0 0.003 0 0.004 
35 0.039 0.041 0.021 0.001 0 0.006 0 0 0.002 0 0.003 
36 0.036 0.035 0.017 0.001 0 0.004 0 0 0.001 0 0.002 
37 0.034 0.031 0.014 0.001 0 0.003 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 
38 0.031 0.026 0.011 0.001 0 0.002 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 
39 0.029 0.023 0.009 0 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0.001 
40 0.027 0.019 0.007 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0.024 0.016 0.006 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
42 0.022 0.013 0.005 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
43 0.019 0.011 0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
44 0.018 0.009 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0.016 0.007 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
46 0.014 0.006 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 0.012 0.005 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48 0.011 0.004 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 0.01 0.003 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Delay 
d 
Node n (Farm f) 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
0 0 0 0 0.005 0.131 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0.068 0.229 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0.148 0.142 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0.003 0.173 0.09 0 0.013 0 0 0 0.003 
4 0 0 0.012 0.16 0.076 0 0.031 0 0 0.001 0.023 
5 0 0 0.028 0.129 0.071 0 0.046 0 0.001 0.009 0.068 
6 0 0.002 0.046 0.094 0.066 0 0.055 0 0.003 0.033 0.121 
7 0 0.009 0.06 0.064 0.057 0.002 0.062 0.003 0.012 0.07 0.15 
8 0.001 0.023 0.064 0.042 0.046 0.006 0.068 0.009 0.028 0.106 0.146 
9 0.004 0.043 0.061 0.028 0.033 0.015 0.07 0.021 0.05 0.125 0.125 
10 0.01 0.065 0.055 0.02 0.023 0.029 0.069 0.042 0.073 0.126 0.101 
11 0.022 0.083 0.049 0.015 0.014 0.047 0.064 0.066 0.092 0.116 0.078 
12 0.038 0.093 0.044 0.013 0.009 0.066 0.057 0.088 0.106 0.102 0.059 
13 0.056 0.095 0.04 0.011 0.005 0.082 0.049 0.105 0.112 0.086 0.043 
14 0.071 0.091 0.037 0.008 0.003 0.093 0.04 0.112 0.11 0.07 0.029 
15 0.082 0.084 0.033 0.006 0.002 0.1 0.031 0.109 0.101 0.053 0.019 
16 0.087 0.074 0.028 0.005 0.001 0.1 0.023 0.1 0.086 0.038 0.012 
17 0.088 0.063 0.023 0.003 0.001 0.095 0.016 0.085 0.07 0.025 0.007 
18 0.084 0.052 0.019 0.002 0 0.085 0.011 0.07 0.053 0.016 0.004 
19 0.077 0.042 0.014 0.001 0 0.072 0.007 0.054 0.038 0.01 0.002 
20 0.068 0.032 0.01 0.001 0 0.058 0.004 0.041 0.026 0.005 0.001 
21 0.059 0.024 0.007 0.001 0 0.044 0.003 0.03 0.017 0.003 0.001 
22 0.048 0.017 0.005 0 0 0.032 0.002 0.021 0.01 0.002  
23 0.039 0.012 0.003 0 0 0.023 0.001 0.015 0.006 0.001  
24 0.03 0.008 0.002 0 0 0.016 0.001 0.01 0.004 0  
25 0.023 0.005 0.001 0 0 0.01 0 0.007 0.002 0  
26 0.016 0.003 0.001 0 0 0.007 0 0.005 0.001 0  
27 0.012 0.002 0 0 0 0.004 0 0.003 0.001 0  
28 0.008 0.001 0 0 0 0.003 0 0.002 0 0  
29 0.005 0.001 0 0 0 0.002 0 0.001 0 0  
30 0.003 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 0  
31 0.002 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 0  
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32 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
33 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
34 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 Delay 
d 
Node n (Farm f) 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
0 0.003 0 0 0 0.078 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.048 0 0 0 0.098 0 0 0 0 0.003 0.024 
2 0.118 0 0 0.003 0.07 0 0 0.001 0.003 0.045 0.177 
3 0.12 0 0 0.028 0.106 0 0.002 0.008 0.029 0.142 0.294 
4 0.093 0 0.001 0.099 0.144 0.001 0.014 0.037 0.087 0.182 0.213 
5 0.076 0.001 0.008 0.171 0.148 0.007 0.05 0.08 0.137 0.153 0.116 
6 0.07 0.006 0.023 0.179 0.121 0.026 0.103 0.107 0.145 0.122 0.069 
7 0.07 0.021 0.049 0.141 0.087 0.061 0.145 0.114 0.132 0.105 0.046 
8 0.071 0.046 0.079 0.104 0.057 0.101 0.159 0.114 0.116 0.087 0.028 
9 0.068 0.076 0.106 0.079 0.036 0.13 0.147 0.113 0.1 0.065 0.016 
10 0.061 0.102 0.124 0.063 0.022 0.139 0.12 0.108 0.083 0.043 0.008 
11 0.05 0.116 0.129 0.047 0.014 0.13 0.09 0.096 0.063 0.026 0.004 
12 0.039 0.118 0.121 0.033 0.008 0.11 0.063 0.077 0.044 0.014 0.002 
13 0.029 0.109 0.104 0.021 0.005 0.087 0.042 0.057 0.028 0.007 0.001 
14 0.021 0.094 0.082 0.013 0.003 0.065 0.027 0.038 0.016 0.004 0.001 
15 0.014 0.078 0.061 0.008 0.002 0.047 0.017 0.023 0.009 0.002  
16 0.009 0.062 0.042 0.005 0.001 0.033 0.01 0.013 0.004 0.001  
17 0.006 0.048 0.028 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.006 0.007 0.002 0  
18 0.004 0.036 0.017 0.002 0 0.015 0.003 0.004 0.001 0  
19 0.002 0.026 0.011 0.001 0 0.01 0.002 0.002 0 0  
20 0.001 0.019 0.006 0.001 0 0.006 0.001 0.001 0 0  
21 0.001 0.014 0.004 0 0 0.004 0 0 0 0  
22 0.001 0.009 0.002 0 0 0.002 0 0 0 0  
23 0 0.006 0.001 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0  
24 0 0.004 0.001 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0  
25 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0  
26 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
27 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
28 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 Delay 
d 
Node n (Farm f) 
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 
0 0 0 0 0.002 0 0 0.022 0.182 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0.115 0 0.008 0.294 0.448 0 0 0.003 
2 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.372 0 0.045 0.379 0.161 0 0.005 0.046 
3 0.038 0.044 0.005 0.288 0.005 0.091 0.17 0.07 0.002 0.06 0.164 
4 0.101 0.132 0.019 0.115 0.027 0.136 0.071 0.057 0.014 0.19 0.247 
5 0.151 0.193 0.043 0.048 0.076 0.172 0.036 0.04 0.042 0.271 0.231 
6 0.166 0.189 0.076 0.027 0.136 0.177 0.017 0.022 0.08 0.229 0.158 
7 0.152 0.15 0.115 0.015 0.176 0.148 0.007 0.01 0.114 0.138 0.087 
8 0.122 0.108 0.145 0.008 0.178 0.103 0.002 0.005 0.13 0.066 0.04 
9 0.09 0.072 0.154 0.004 0.148 0.062 0.001 0.002 0.129 0.027 0.016 
10 0.063 0.046 0.141 0.002 0.107 0.033 0 0.001 0.115 0.01 0.006 
11 0.041 0.028 0.111 0.001 0.068 0.016 0 0.001 0.095 0.004 0.002 
12 0.027 0.016 0.079 0.001 0.039 0.007 0 0.001 0.075 0.001 0.001 
13 0.017 0.009 0.051 0 0.021 0.003 0 0 0.057 0 0 
14 0.01 0.005 0.03 0 0.01 0.001 0 0 0.041 0 0 
15 0.006 0.002 0.016 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 
16 0.004 0.001 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.021 0 0 
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17 0.002 0 0.004 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 
18 0.001 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0.011 0 0 
19 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0.008 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.006 0 0 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.004 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.003 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 0 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 
 Delay 
d 
Node n (Farm f) 
45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 
0 0.044 0 0 0 0.143 0 0 0.065 0 0 0.002 
1 0.328 0 0.005 0.048 0.2 0 0 0.183 0 0.009 0.122 
2 0.279 0.001 0.095 0.297 0.208 0.001 0.016 0.277 0.009 0.118 0.409 
3 0.151 0.019 0.29 0.365 0.199 0.019 0.108 0.25 0.061 0.299 0.308 
4 0.099 0.077 0.313 0.191 0.133 0.08 0.238 0.141 0.148 0.288 0.113 
5 0.058 0.154 0.183 0.069 0.071 0.159 0.263 0.059 0.197 0.164 0.032 
6 0.027 0.195 0.075 0.021 0.031 0.196 0.187 0.019 0.187 0.073 0.009 
7 0.01 0.183 0.026 0.006 0.011 0.179 0.103 0.005 0.148 0.03 0.003 
8 0.003 0.142 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.137 0.049 0.001 0.103 0.012 0.001 
9 0.001 0.097 0.003 0 0.001 0.093 0.021 0 0.065 0.005 0 
10 0 0.06 0.001 0 0 0.059 0.009 0 0.039 0.002 0 
11 0 0.034 0 0 0 0.035 0.004 0 0.021 0.001 0 
12 0 0.019 0 0 0 0.02 0.001 0 0.011 0 0 
13 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.011 0.001 0 0.006 0 0 
14 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.006 0 0 0.003 0 0 
15 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.003 0 0 0.001 0 0 
16 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0.001 0 0 
17 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
 Delay 
d 
Node n (Farm f) 
56 57 58 59 60 61 62     
0 0.065 0 0 0.012 0.1 0.404 0.236     
1 0.427 0.035 0.045 0.206 0.525 0.573 0.502     
2 0.35 0.183 0.272 0.368 0.296 0.023 0.163     
3 0.122 0.271 0.342 0.23 0.062 0 0.06     
4 0.03 0.225 0.194 0.106 0.012 0 0.025     
5 0.006 0.143 0.085 0.047 0.003 0 0.01     
6 0.001 0.077 0.037 0.02 0.001 0 0.004     
7 0 0.038 0.015 0.008 0 0 0.001     
8 0 0.017 0.006 0.003 0 0 0     
9 0 0.007 0.002 0.001 0 0 0     
10 0 0.003 0.001 0 0 0 0     
11 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0     
Table D.3: Response matrix for the river (r=1). All the coefficients not listed in the 
table are equal to zero.  
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Year (t) Committed capacity 
C
GW
1t (kg) 
Available capacity C
0
1t = 
Tradable capacity C1t (kg) * 
 Sustainable Intensive Sustainable Intensive 
2011 114,267 194,491 6,380 -73,844 (0) 
2012 105,310 178,875 15,337 -58,228 (0) 
2013 93,119 158,112 27,528 -37,465 (0) 
2014 80,440 137,642 40,207 -16,995 (0) 
2015 68,897 119,439 51,750 1,208 
2016 58,817 103,351 61,830 17,297 
2017 49,968 88,689 70,679 31,958 
2018 42,835 76,197 77,812 44,450 
2019 36,986 65,586 83,662 55,061 
2020 32,113 56,633 88,534 64,014 
2021 28,055 49,140 92,592 71,507 
2022 24,437 42,562 96,210 78,085 
2023 21,391 37,037 99,256 83,610 
2024 18,801 32,347 101,846 88,300 
2025 16,447 28,143 104,200 92,504 
2026 14,425 24,562 106,222 96,085 
2027 12,637 21,382 108,010 99,265 
2028 11,049 18,688 109,598 101,960 
2029 9,661 16,273 110,986 104,374 
2030 8,377 14,145 112,270 106,502 
2031 7,262 12,250 113,385 108,397 
2032 6,290 10,657 114,357 109,990 
2033 5,399 9,166 115,248 111,481 
2034 4,629 7,920 116,018 112,727 
2035 3,952 6,804 116,695 113,843 
2036 3,361 5,859 117,286 114,788 
2037 2,853 5,033 117,794 115,614 
2038 2,417 4,345 118,230 116,303 
2039 1,988 3,651 118,659 116,996 
2040 1,712 3,209 118,935 117,438 
2041 1,391 2,688 119,256 117,959 
2042 1,193 2,366 119,454 118,281 
2043 967 1,985 119,680 118,662 
2044 827 1,750 119,820 118,897 
2045 669 1,472 119,978 119,175 
2046 572 1,302 120,075 119,345 
2047 464 1,097 120,184 119,550 
2048 397 972 120,250 119,675 
2049 323 776 120,324 119,872 
2050 277 691 120,370 119,956 
2051 232 598 120,415 120,049 
2052 189 505 120,458 120,142 
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2053 164 451 120,483 120,196 
2054 134 382 120,513 120,266 
2055 117 342 120,530 120,305 
2056 96 289 120,551 120,358 
2057 84 259 120,563 120,388 
2058 70 220 120,577 120,427 
2059 61 198 120,586 120,449 
T ≥ 2060 0 0 120,647 120,647 
Table D.4: Tradable capacities for the two available capacity scenarios based on 
sustainable and intensive land uses. 
*C1t = C
0
1t = (C
SD
1 − C
N
1) − C
GW
1t =120,647 – C
GW
1t. 
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Appendix E 
AMPL MODELS, RESULTS AND CALCULATIONS 
The appendix presents the AMPL formulations and the results based on the physical 
simulation model and information discussed in Appendix D. We used AMPL to model 
the LPs and MS Excel to analyse the results. 
E.1 Optimal Loading Model (OLM) 
This section is based on the generalized Optimal Loading Model (OLM) discussed in 
Chapter 7. Receptor capacities are based on sustainable prior land use (4th column in 
Table D.4).  
E.1.1 OLM AMPL Formulation 
param numFarms=62; 
param numNodes=62; 
param numReceptors=1; 
param maxDelay=49; 
param permitLimit=5; 
param maxBids=5; 
set F=1..numFarms by 1; 
set N=1..numNodes by 1; 
set R=1..numReceptors by 1; 
set D=0..maxDelay by 1; 
set S=1..permitLimit by 1; 
set T=1..maxDelay+permitLimit by 1; 
set K=1..maxBids by 1; 
 
#~ Setting the bids 
257 
 
 
 
param bidType {f in F}; 
param farmArea {f in F}; 
param dairyBidQ {k in K}; 
param dairyBidP {k in K}; 
param sheepBidQ {k in K}; 
param sheepBidP {k in K}; 
param U {f in F,S,k in K} = farmArea[f]*(if bidType[f]=1 then dairyBidQ[k] else (if 
bidType[f]=2 then sheepBidQ[k] else 22)); #~Bid quantity 
param P {f in F,S,k in K}= if bidType[f]=1 then dairyBidP[k] else (if bidType[f]=2 
then sheepBidP[k] else 28.45);   #~Bid Price 
 
param H {N,R,D};  #~Response coefficient 
param C {R,T};  #~Receptor capacity 
 
#~ Decision variables 
var x {F,S,K}>=0; #~Quantity accepted from each bid  
var q {F,S};  #~Final quantity 
var nodalQ {N,S}; #~Nodal loading  
 
#~ Model:OLM 
maximize benefit: sum {f in F} (sum {s in S}(sum {k in K}( x[f,s,k] * P[f,s,k]))); 
subject to uBound {f in F, s in S, k in K}: x[f,s,k] <= U[f,s,k]; 
subject to lBound {f in F, s in S, k in K}: x[f,s,k] >=0;  
subject to farmPermit {f in F, s in S}: q[f,s] - sum{k in K} x[f,s,k] = 0; 
subject to nodalLoad {n in N, s in S}: nodalQ[n,s] - q[n,s] = 0;  #~Assuming a 
distinct node for each 
farm 
subject to CapCons{r in R, t in T}: sum {n in N} (sum {s in max(1,t-
maxDelay)..min(t,permitLimit)}(H[n,r,t-s] * nodalQ[n,s])) <= C[r,t]; 
data OLM.dat; 
 
solve; 
option display_round 3; 
display {f in F, s in S} q[f,s]/farmArea[f]; 
option display_round 2; 
display nodalLoad.dual; 
display CapCons.dual; 
  
OLM Data File: OLM.dat 
param: bidType farmArea:= 
1 1 50 
2 2 25 
3 1 62.5 
.... 
… 
62 2 131.25; 
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param:  dairyBidQ dairyBidP sheepBidQ sheepBidP := 
1 13 41 9 70 
2 8 33 3 48 
3 20 25 3 30 
4 19 21 8 18 
5 30 18 19 6; 
 
param: C:= 
1,1 6380 
1,2 15337 
1,3 27528 
… 
… 
1,54 120647; 
 
param: H:= 
1,1,0 0 
1,1,1 0 
1,1,2 0 
… 
… 
41,1,0 0.182 
41,1,1 0.448 
41,1,2 0.161 
… 
… 
62,1,49 0; 
 
E.1.2 OLM Results 
This section includes the results produced by the OLM.  
Final Permit Positions qfs (kg/ha/year) 
Farm f Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 90 90 90 90 90 
2 42 42 42 42 42 
3 90 90 90 90 90 
4 42 42 42 42 42 
5 41 60 90 90 90 
6 90 90 90 90 90 
7 110 110 110 110 110 
8 23 42 42 42 42 
9 42 42 42 42 42 
10 90 90 90 90 90 
11 90 90 90 90 90 
12 90 90 90 90 90 
13 42 42 42 42 42 
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14 90 90 90 90 90 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
16 21 21 39.022 39.355 41 
17 90 90 90 90 90 
18 23 23 42 42 42 
19 42 42 42 42 42 
20 42 42 42 42 42 
21 90 90 90 90 90 
22 23 23 37.222 42 42 
23 15 15 23 23 23 
24 42 42 42 42 42 
25 90 90 90 90 90 
26 110 110 110 110 110 
27 15 15 15 15 23 
28 90 90 90 90 90 
29 23 23 42 42 42 
30 90 90 90 90 90 
31 110 110 110 110 110 
32 21 21 41 90 90 
33 12 12 12 15 15 
34 21 60 90 90 90 
35 15 15 15 23 42 
36 23 23 42 42 42 
37 0 0 0 0 0 
38 15 23 23 42 42 
39 21 21 43.365 90 90 
40 21 21 13 13 21 
41 15 12 15 12 12 
42 23 23 42 42 42 
43 0 0 110 110 110 
44 13 21 21 41 90 
45 12 12 12 12 12 
46 110 110 110 110 110 
47 21 13 13 21 41 
48 15 12 12 12 12 
49 21 21 21 21 21 
50 15 15 23 23 42 
51 0 0 110 110 110 
52 21 21 13 13 21 
53 0 110 110 110 110 
54 12 12 12 12 15 
55 15 12 12 12 12 
56 12 15 12 12 12 
57 21 21 13.446 21 41 
58 0 0 0 0 0 
59 21 21 13 13 21 
60 14.47 15 14.93 12 12 
61 110 0 110 0 0 
62 15 12 15 12 12 
Table E.1: OLM results for trading scenario 1, final permit allocations to the farms. 
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Nodal loading prices βns 
Node n Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
2 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
3 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
4 $1.17 $0.43 $0.09 $0.00 $0.00 
5 $23.65 $19.99 $15.20 $9.94 $4.88 
6 $0.26 $0.09 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
7 $3.56 $1.30 $0.35 $0.00 $0.00 
8 $10.22 $5.89 $2.64 $0.79 $0.09 
9 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
10 $1.70 $0.83 $0.35 $0.09 $0.00 
11 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
12 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
13 $0.78 $0.18 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
14 $7.02 $4.64 $2.55 $1.04 $0.26 
15 $28.55 $27.91 $26.70 $23.52 $18.30 
16 $25.88 $27.40 $25.00 $25.00 $23.71 
17 $0.17 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
18 $9.07 $6.75 $4.65 $2.76 $1.13 
19 $0.26 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
20 $1.09 $0.26 $0.09 $0.00 $0.00 
21 $6.49 $2.90 $0.79 $0.09 $0.00 
22 $17.06 $11.60 $6.00 $2.01 $0.28 
23 $21.15 $19.29 $17.94 $15.57 $12.70 
24 $1.87 $0.53 $0.09 $0.00 $0.00 
25 $4.64 $2.04 $0.70 $0.09 $0.00 
26 $24.81 $21.22 $16.09 $8.66 $2.46 
27 $28.17 $28.61 $24.99 $21.23 $16.72 
28 $5.62 $2.30 $0.62 $0.09 $0.00 
29 $15.41 $9.59 $4.42 $1.23 $0.18 
30 $15.25 $11.28 $7.28 $3.25 $0.71 
31 $21.97 $17.79 $13.24 $7.62 $2.53 
32 $27.97 $25.71 $21.76 $17.83 $12.29 
33 $30.48 $32.06 $31.37 $27.74 $26.17 
34 $25.14 $20.64 $14.96 $8.91 $3.30 
35 $28.30 $24.34 $18.82 $11.56 $3.84 
36 $12.80 $7.67 $3.98 $1.69 $0.44 
37 $29.59 $30.95 $34.57 $32.41 $30.18 
38 $19.88 $13.16 $6.79 $2.35 $0.45 
39 $29.82 $26.43 $21.00 $14.16 $8.20 
40 $30.66 $29.56 $33.05 $35.87 $29.84 
41 $27.91 $30.37 $29.03 $33.35 $34.74 
42 $12.37 $7.62 $3.72 $1.22 $0.18 
43 $33.59 $31.15 $26.23 $16.53 $5.25 
44 $33.19 $32.77 $29.50 $23.44 $14.21 
45 $31.06 $30.31 $31.91 $35.02 $30.74 
46 $26.47 $21.15 $14.15 $6.69 $1.68 
47 $32.60 $34.77 $33.44 $31.46 $24.99 
48 $29.97 $33.12 $35.76 $32.67 $33.33 
49 $27.48 $32.46 $32.31 $32.38 $31.92 
50 $26.49 $21.38 $14.57 $6.95 $1.68 
51 $33.45 $31.95 $28.29 $21.11 $9.34 
52 $29.20 $32.01 $33.71 $33.88 $32.62 
53 $29.43 $25.67 $20.14 $13.11 $5.29 
54 $32.12 $34.37 $33.20 $30.63 $25.92 
55 $29.49 $31.17 $35.69 $34.32 $32.21 
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56 $30.11 $28.96 $31.68 $36.73 $33.91 
57 $31.56 $32.96 $33.00 $29.46 $24.80 
58 $30.25 $33.09 $35.01 $31.59 $31.24 
59 $30.46 $30.61 $34.05 $34.92 $30.18 
60 $30.00 $28.55 $30.00 $36.87 $34.97 
61 $22.20 $31.42 $26.55 $31.73 $42.85 
62 $26.35 $30.46 $28.92 $34.01 $38.46 
Table E.2: OLM results for trading scenario 1, nodal prices.  
Receptor capacity prices λ1t  
Year t Price λ1t 
2011 $0.00 
2012 $37.65 
2013 $27.25 
2014 $25.70 
2015 $35.24 
2016 $49.93 
2017 $0.00 
2018 $84.20 
2019 $1.03 
2020-2064 $0.00 
Table E.3: OLM results for trading scenario 1, receptor capacity prices.  
E.2 Optimal Resource Allocation Model (ORAM) 
This section is based on the Optimal Resource Allocation Model (ORAM) discussed 
in Chapter 8, and the set of available receptor capacities calculated based on 
sustainable land use until 2010 (4th column of Table D.4). We assume that the 
regulator participates in the market as a bank, and the available receptor capacities are 
currently owned by the regulator.    
E.2.1 ORAM AMPL Formulation  
param numFarms=62; 
param numNodes=62; 
param numReceptors=1; 
param maxDelay=49; 
param permitLimit=5; 
param maxBids=5; 
param maxBbids=1; 
set F=1..numFarms by 1; 
set N=1..numNodes by 1; 
set R=1..numReceptors by 1; 
set D=0..maxDelay by 1; 
set S=1..permitLimit by 1; 
set T=1..maxDelay+permitLimit by 1; 
set K=1..maxBids by 1; 
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set L=1..maxBbids by 1; 
 
#~ Setting farm bids 
param bidType {f in F}; 
param farmArea {f in F}; 
param dairyBidQ {k in K}; 
param dairyBidP {k in K}; 
param sheepBidQ {k in K}; 
param sheepBidP {k in K}; 
param U {f in F,S,k in K} = farmArea[f]*(if bidType[f]=1 then dairyBidQ[k] else (if 
bidType[f]=2 then sheepBidQ[k] else 22)); #~Bid quantity 
param P {f in F,S,k in K}= if bidType[f]=1 then dairyBidP[k] else (if bidType[f]=2 
then sheepBidP[k] else 28.45);   #~Bid Price 
 
param H {N,R,D};  #~Response coefficient 
param C {R,T};  #~Receptor capacity 
 
#~ Setting regulator bids 
param U_Regulator {r in R, t in T, l in L} = if l=1 then C[r,t] else 0; 
param P_Regulator {r in R, t in T, l in L}= if t<=permitLimit then 1 else 25; 
 
var x {F,S,K}>=0;   #~Quantity accepted from each farm bid 
var x_Regulator {R,T,L}>=0; #~Quantity accepted from each regulator bid 
var q {F,S};    #~final quantity for the farms 
var q_Regulator {R,T};  #~final quantity for the regulator 
var nodalQ {N,S};   #~nodal loading  
 
maximize benefit: sum {f in F} (sum {s in S}(sum {k in K}( x[f,s,k] * P[f,s,k]))) + 
sum{l in L}(sum {r in R} (sum {t in T} (x_Regulator[r,t,l]*P_Regulator[r,t,l]))); 
 
subject to uBound {f in F, s in S, k in K}: x[f,s,k] <= U[f,s,k]; 
subject to lBound {f in F, s in S, k in K}: x[f,s,k] >=0; 
subject to uBound_Reg {r in R, t in T, l in L}: x_Regulator[r,t,l] <= 
U_Regulator[r,t,l]; 
subject to lBound_Reg {r in R, t in T, l in L}: x_Regulator[r,t,l] >=0; 
 
subject to farmPermit {f in F, s in S}: q[f,s] - sum{k in K} x[f,s,k] = 0; 
subject to regulatorHeld {r in R, t in T}: q_Regulator[r,t] - sum{l in L} 
x_Regulator[r,t,l] = 0; 
subject to nodalLoad {n in N, s in S}: nodalQ[n,s] - q[n,s] = 0;  #~Assuming a 
discrete node for 
each farm 
subject to CapCons{r in R, t in T}: sum {n in N} (sum {s in max(1,t-
maxDelay)..min(t,permitLimit)}(H[n,r,t-s] * nodalQ[n,s])) + q_Regulator [r,t] 
= C[r,t]; 
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data Str_ORAM1.dat; 
solve; 
option display_round 3; 
display {f in F, s in S} q[f,s]/farmArea[f]; 
display {r in R, t in T} q_Regulator [r,t];   #~Regulator‘s ex-post capacity position 
display {r in R, t in T} C[r,t]-q_Regulator [r,t];  #~Total capacity allocation 
option display_round 2; 
display nodalLoad.dual; 
display CapCons.dual; 
display benefit; 
 
E.2.2 ORAM Results 
Final Permit Positions qfs (kg/ha/year) 
Farm f Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 41 41 41 41 41 
2 15 15 15 15 15 
3 21 21 21 21 21 
4 15 15 15 15 15 
5 21 21 21 21 21 
6 41 41 41 41 41 
7 110 110 110 110 110 
8 15 15 15 15 15 
9 15 15 15 15 15 
10 90 90 90 90 90 
11 41 41 41 41 41 
12 41 41 41 41 41 
13 15 15 15 15 15 
14 90 90 90 90 90 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
16 21 21 21 21 21 
17 41 41 41 41 41 
18 15 15 15 15 15 
19 15 15 15 15 15 
20 15 15 15 15 15 
21 21 41 41 41 41 
22 15 15 15 15 15 
23 15 15 15 15 15 
24 15 15 15 15 15 
25 21 41 41 41 41 
26 110 110 110 110 110 
27 15 15 15 15 15 
28 21 41 41 41 41 
29 15 15 15 15 15 
30 21 21 21 21 41 
31 110 110 110 110 110 
32 21 21 21 21 21 
33 15 15 15 15 15 
34 21 21 21 41 41 
35 15 15 15 15 15 
36 15 15 15 15 15 
37 0 98.09 0 64.819 110 
38 15 15 15 15 15 
39 21 21 21 21 21 
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40 21 21 21 21 21 
41 15 15 15 15 15 
42 15 15 15 15 15 
43 110 110 110 110 110 
44 21 21 21 21 21 
45 12 15 15 15 15 
46 110 110 110 110 110 
47 21 21 21 21 21 
48 15 15 15 15 15 
49 21 21 21 21 21 
50 15 15 15 15 15 
51 59.834 110 110 110 110 
52 21 21 21 21 21 
53 110 110 110 110 110 
54 15 15 15 15 15 
55 15 15 15 15 15 
56 12 15 15 15 15 
57 21 21 21 21 21 
58 42.323 0 0 110 110 
59 21 21 21 21 21 
60 12 15 15 15 15 
61 110 0 110 0 0 
62 15 13.624 15 15 12 
Table E.4: ORAM results for trading scenario 2, final permit allocations to the farms. 
Nodal loading prices βns 
Node n Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 $21.53 $21.53 $21.53 $21.53 $21.53 
2 $24.30 $24.30 $24.30 $24.30 $24.30 
3 $25.15 $25.15 $25.15 $25.15 $25.15 
4 $24.56 $24.55 $24.55 $24.55 $24.55 
5 $26.77 $26.15 $25.52 $25.13 $25.01 
6 $23.47 $23.47 $23.47 $23.47 $23.47 
7 $24.96 $24.92 $24.92 $24.92 $24.92 
8 $24.58 $24.38 $24.31 $24.30 $24.30 
9 $23.70 $23.70 $23.70 $23.70 $23.70 
10 $17.24 $17.21 $17.20 $17.20 $17.20 
11 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 
12 $23.40 $23.40 $23.40 $23.40 $23.40 
13 $23.10 $23.10 $23.10 $23.10 $23.10 
14 $16.41 $16.24 $16.15 $16.12 $16.12 
15 $28.27 $27.53 $27.16 $26.41 $25.51 
16 $27.00 $28.69 $27.12 $27.49 $27.33 
17 $24.82 $24.82 $24.82 $24.82 $24.82 
18 $18.67 $18.44 $18.24 $18.14 $18.12 
19 $25.02 $25.02 $25.02 $25.02 $25.02 
20 $25.06 $25.05 $25.05 $25.05 $25.05 
21 $25.00 $24.93 $24.92 $24.92 $24.92 
22 $25.46 $25.00 $24.83 $24.80 $24.80 
23 $26.54 $26.09 $25.98 $25.53 $24.79 
24 $24.96 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 
25 $25.05 $24.98 $24.97 $24.97 $24.97 
26 $26.90 $25.96 $25.27 $25.05 $25.02 
27 $27.00 $28.20 $26.53 $26.27 $26.10 
28 $25.04 $24.98 $24.97 $24.97 $24.97 
29 $25.50 $25.15 $25.04 $25.02 $25.02 
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30 $25.83 $25.34 $25.07 $25.01 $25.00 
31 $26.53 $25.81 $25.23 $25.00 $24.98 
32 $27.55 $27.21 $26.37 $25.41 $25.05 
33 $28.25 $28.49 $28.13 $26.53 $25.18 
34 $26.69 $25.92 $25.26 $24.97 $24.92 
35 $27.24 $26.27 $25.38 $25.04 $25.00 
36 $25.47 $25.20 $25.07 $25.03 $25.02 
37 $28.74 $28.45 $29.10 $28.45 $25.92 
38 $25.72 $25.22 $25.02 $24.97 $24.97 
39 $27.45 $26.68 $26.00 $25.45 $25.12 
40 $30.66 $28.00 $28.92 $29.22 $27.50 
41 $29.21 $29.35 $27.95 $28.63 $29.35 
42 $25.41 $25.12 $25.02 $25.00 $25.00 
43 $28.18 $26.83 $25.54 $25.07 $25.02 
44 $28.52 $27.83 $26.56 $25.42 $25.05 
45 $31.00 $28.13 $28.58 $28.62 $27.89 
46 $26.65 $25.74 $25.19 $25.03 $25.03 
47 $28.86 $28.99 $27.76 $25.81 $25.04 
48 $28.44 $29.05 $29.23 $27.62 $25.38 
49 $26.88 $30.09 $28.17 $28.05 $27.17 
50 $26.68 $25.74 $25.16 $25.01 $25.00 
51 $28.45 $27.42 $25.96 $25.13 $25.00 
52 $28.54 $29.25 $28.77 $28.21 $26.75 
53 $27.40 $26.48 $25.54 $25.08 $25.00 
54 $28.74 $28.94 $27.96 $26.04 $25.10 
55 $28.82 $28.68 $29.44 $28.81 $26.00 
56 $31.42 $28.10 $29.02 $29.66 $28.81 
57 $28.63 $28.56 $28.03 $26.65 $25.29 
58 $28.45 $28.89 $28.94 $27.40 $25.35 
59 $29.88 $28.37 $29.06 $28.84 $26.78 
60 $31.93 $28.03 $28.69 $29.64 $29.69 
61 $25.31 $31.86 $27.33 $28.85 $31.14 
62 $28.48 $30.00 $28.11 $29.08 $30.01 
Table E.5: ORAM results for trading scenario 2, nodal prices. 
Receptor capacity prices λ1t  
Year t Price λ1t 
2011 $1.00 
2012 $42.49 
2013 $24.48 
2014 $29.30 
2015 $28.36 
2016 $33.35 
2017-64 $25.00 
Table E.6: ORAM results for trading scenario 2, receptor capacity prices. 
Farm f Nitrate loading  
until 2010 
(kg/ka/year)  
 
Final permit allocations via trading 
From 2011 to 2015, qfs (kg/ha/year) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 11.9 41 41 41 41 41 
2 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
3 53.3 21 21 21 21 21 
4 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
5 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
6 22.6 41 41 41 41 41 
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7 15.7 110 110 110 110 110 
8 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
9 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
10 80 90 90 90 90 90 
11 1.7 41 41 41 41 41 
12 11.9 41 41 41 41 41 
13 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
14 22.6 90 90 90 90 90 
15 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
16 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
17 53.3 41 41 41 41 41 
18 1.7 15 15 15 15 15 
19 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
20 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
21 11.9 21 41 41 41 41 
22 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
23 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
24 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
25 22.6 21 41 41 41 41 
26 79.9 110 110 110 110 110 
27 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
28 22.6 21 41 41 41 41 
29 1.7 15 15 15 15 15 
30 53.3 21 21 21 21 41 
31 79.9 110 110 110 110 110 
32 53.3 21 21 21 21 21 
33 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
34 11.9 21 21 21 41 41 
35 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
36 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
37 79.9 0 66.792 86.136 0 110 
38 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
39 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
40 53.3 21 21 21 21 21 
41 10.8 13.281 15 15 15 12 
42 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
43 79.9 0 110 110 110 110 
44 53.3 21 21 21 21 21 
45 1.7 12 15 15 15 15 
46 79.9 110 110 110 110 110 
47 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
48 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
49 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
50 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
51 1.6 0 110 110 110 110 
52 53.3 21 21 21 21 21 
53 79.9 110 110 110 110 110 
54 1.7 15 15 15 15 15 
55 10.5 15 15 15 12 15 
56 10.8 12 15 15 15 12 
57 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
58 79.9 68.232 0 0 0 110 
59 11.9 21 21 21 21 21 
60 3.6 12 15 15 15 12 
61 79.9 110 0 0 110 0 
62 10.8 15 15 15 15 12 
Table E.7: ORAM results for trading scenario 3, final allocations to the farms. 
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Nodal loading prices βns 
Node n Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 $21.53 $21.53 $21.53 $21.53 $21.53 
2 $24.30 $24.30 $24.30 $24.30 $24.30 
3 $25.15 $25.15 $25.15 $25.15 $25.15 
4 $24.56 $24.55 $24.55 $24.55 $24.55 
5 $27.04 $26.46 $25.77 $25.22 $25.02 
6 $23.47 $23.47 $23.47 $23.47 $23.47 
7 $24.98 $24.92 $24.92 $24.92 $24.92 
8 $24.71 $24.43 $24.31 $24.30 $24.30 
9 $23.70 $23.70 $23.70 $23.70 $23.70 
10 $17.25 $17.21 $17.20 $17.20 $17.20 
11 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 
12 $23.40 $23.40 $23.40 $23.40 $23.40 
13 $23.10 $23.10 $23.10 $23.10 $23.10 
14 $16.51 $16.29 $16.17 $16.12 $16.12 
15 $28.40 $27.72 $27.40 $26.84 $25.92 
16 $27.43 $28.77 $27.33 $27.21 $27.72 
17 $24.82 $24.82 $24.82 $24.82 $24.82 
18 $18.77 $18.54 $18.31 $18.15 $18.12 
19 $25.02 $25.02 $25.02 $25.02 $25.02 
20 $25.06 $25.05 $25.05 $25.05 $25.05 
21 $25.05 $24.94 $24.92 $24.92 $24.92 
22 $25.73 $25.13 $24.85 $24.80 $24.80 
23 $26.64 $26.18 $26.02 $25.92 $25.08 
24 $24.96 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 $24.95 
25 $25.09 $24.99 $24.97 $24.97 $24.97 
26 $27.34 $26.39 $25.43 $25.07 $25.02 
27 $27.36 $28.50 $26.91 $26.34 $26.08 
28 $25.07 $24.99 $24.97 $24.97 $24.97 
29 $25.72 $25.22 $25.05 $25.02 $25.02 
30 $26.08 $25.52 $25.11 $25.01 $25.00 
31 $26.85 $26.16 $25.39 $25.02 $24.98 
32 $27.66 $27.44 $26.95 $25.68 $25.07 
33 $28.30 $28.29 $28.69 $27.50 $25.33 
34 $27.02 $26.29 $25.47 $25.00 $24.92 
35 $27.62 $26.80 $25.63 $25.07 $25.00 
36 $25.62 $25.29 $25.09 $25.04 $25.02 
37 $28.70 $28.45 $28.45 $29.94 $26.66 
38 $26.02 $25.35 $25.05 $24.97 $24.97 
39 $27.80 $27.03 $26.26 $25.68 $25.17 
40 $30.70 $28.18 $28.38 $29.33 $29.27 
41 $30.00 $28.94 $28.94 $26.87 $30.76 
42 $25.58 $25.20 $25.03 $25.00 $25.00 
43 $28.67 $27.61 $25.90 $25.10 $25.02 
44 $28.70 $28.31 $27.27 $25.70 $25.07 
45 $31.28 $28.03 $28.90 $27.90 $29.69 
46 $27.11 $26.09 $25.30 $25.04 $25.03 
47 $28.71 $29.10 $28.90 $26.40 $25.07 
48 $28.41 $28.69 $29.36 $29.18 $25.69 
49 $27.13 $30.12 $28.33 $28.52 $27.27 
50 $27.15 $26.11 $25.28 $25.01 $25.00 
51 $28.70 $28.16 $26.54 $25.24 $25.00 
52 $28.64 $29.13 $28.86 $28.84 $27.40 
53 $27.75 $26.99 $25.87 $25.13 $25.00 
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54 $28.66 $28.91 $28.98 $26.75 $25.16 
55 $28.69 $28.68 $28.65 $30.49 $26.79 
56 $31.80 $27.91 $29.02 $28.67 $31.09 
57 $28.63 $28.63 $28.45 $27.56 $25.52 
58 $28.45 $28.62 $29.12 $28.82 $25.65 
59 $29.84 $28.49 $28.55 $29.58 $28.05 
60 $32.55 $27.67 $29.19 $27.65 $32.32 
61 $26.75 $31.04 $28.97 $26.36 $31.46 
62 $29.43 $29.43 $29.13 $27.18 $31.31 
Table E.8: ORAM results for trading scenario 3, nodal prices. 
Payments due from farms Receptor capacity prices and 
allocations  
Payments due to the 
regulator λ1t×(C1t − q
bank
1t) 
 Farm 
f 
Total payment      
∑sβns×qfs  
Year 
t 
Price  
λ1t 
Total allocation  
C1t − q
bank
1t 
1 $220,682.50 2011 $1.00 4418 $4,418.28 
2 $45,562.50 2012 $45.14 15337 $692,312.18 
3 $165,046.88 2013 $20.94 27528 $576,436.32 
4 $195,648.75 2014 $35.00 40207 $1,407,245.00 
5 $407,956.50 2015 $19.73 51750 $1,021,027.50 
6 $571,347.81 2016 $40.00 58547 $2,341,867.72 
7 $1,542,667.50 2017 $25.00 61571 $1,539,277.35 
8 $68,653.13 2018 $25.00 61437 $1,535,936.98 
9 $66,656.25 2019 $25.00 58379 $1,459,465.90 
10 $1,307,036.25 2020 $25.00 54073 $1,351,815.43 
11 $287,704.69 2021 $25.00 49163 $1,229,079.35 
12 $419,737.50 2022 $25.00 44432 $1,110,795.93 
13 $292,359.38 2023 $25.00 40223 $1,005,569.93 
14 $411,125.63 2024 $25.00 36232 $905,807.60 
15 $677,141.25 2025 $25.00 32242 $806,056.53 
16 $1,908,151.88 2026 $25.00 28195 $704,862.80 
17 $318,006.25 2027 $25.00 24364 $609,104.23 
18 $60,302.81 2028 $25.00 20875 $521,867.83 
19 $117,281.25 2029 $25.00 17833 $445,821.73 
20 $117,431.25 2030 $25.00 15259 $381,472.65 
21 $288,359.38 2031 $25.00 13076 $326,904.38 
22 $211,460.63 2032 $25.00 11263 $281,580.15 
23 $632,970.00 2033 $25.00 9688 $242,201.25 
24 $105,266.25 2034 $25.00 8319 $207,972.03 
25 $462,279.00 2035 $25.00 7122 $178,045.00 
26 $533,156.25 2036 $25.00 6079 $151,983.75 
27 $481,614.38 2037 $25.00 5159 $128,978.90 
28 $260,008.31 2038 $25.00 4381 $109,527.18 
29 $200,860.31 2039 $25.00 3696 $92,408.28 
30 $138,299.00 2040 $25.00 3126 $78,150.93 
31 $794,475.00 2041 $25.00 2639 $65,962.80 
32 $226,590.00 2042 $25.00 2225 $55,614.23 
33 $142,425.94 2043 $25.00 1864 $46,595.93 
34 $555,165.00 2044 $25.00 1585 $39,630.63 
35 $97,590.00 2045 $25.00 1338 $33,451.88 
36 $82,726.88 2046 $25.00 1141 $28,531.55 
37 $273,127.56 2047 $25.00 968 $24,194.85 
38 $71,077.50 2048 $25.00 830 $20,749.23 
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39 $329,025.38 2049 $25.00 705 $17,614.05 
40 $210,585.38 2050 $25.00 610 $15,246.40 
41 $280,335.00 2051 $25.00 525 $13,116.25 
42 $117,946.88 2052 $25.00 457 $11,427.80 
43 $142,491.25 2053 $25.00 400 $9,993.75 
44 $301,330.31 2054 $25.00 346 $8,653.43 
45 $78,493.50 2055 $25.00 298 $7,460.48 
46 $530,351.25 2056 $25.00 260 $6,498.43 
47 $145,089.00 2057 $25.00 226 $5,639.23 
48 $185,495.63 2058 $25.00 192 $4,798.75 
49 $667,973.25 2059 $25.00 169 $4,224.70 
50 $48,206.25 2060 $25.00 148 $3,692.83 
51 $432,877.50 2061 $25.00 110 $2,741.58 
52 $337,530.38 2062 $25.00 76 $1,902.20 
53 $988,721.25 2063 $25.00 48 $1,207.50 
54 $116,825.63 2064 $25.00 23 $573.45 
55 $102,901.50 Total $21,877,514.90 
56 $178,384.50  
57 $491,837.06 
 
58 $267,901.90 
59 $455,206.50 
60 $396,429.94 
61 $36,513.13 
62 $276,054.19 
Total $21,876,457.83 
Table E.9: ORAM results for trading scenario 3, receptor capacity prices and 
allocations, and financial flows.  
Farm f Nitrate loading  
until 2010 
(kg/ka/year)  
 
Final permit allocations via trading 
From 2011 to 2015, qfs (kg/ha/year) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 11.9 41 41 41 41 41 
2 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
3 53.3 42.64 31.98 21.32 21 21 
4 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
5 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
6 22.6 41 41 41 41 41 
7 15.7 110 110 110 110 110 
8 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
9 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
10 80 90 90 90 90 90 
11 1.7 41 41 41 41 41 
12 11.9 41 41 41 41 41 
13 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
14 22.6 90 90 90 90 90 
15 10.8 12 15 15 15 15 
16 22.6 21 17.567 21 21 21 
17 53.3 42.64 41 41 41 41 
18 1.7 15 15 15 15 15 
19 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
20 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
21 11.9 21 41 41 41 41 
22 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
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23 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
24 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
25 22.6 21 41 41 41 41 
26 79.9 110 110 110 110 110 
27 3.6 15 12 15 15 15 
28 22.6 21 41 41 41 41 
29 1.7 15 15 15 15 15 
30 53.3 42.64 31.98 21.32 21 41 
31 79.9 110 110 110 110 110 
32 53.3 42.64 31.98 21.32 21 21 
33 10.8 12 15 15 15 15 
34 11.9 21 21 21 41 41 
35 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
36 10.8 15 15 15 15 15 
37 79.9 63.92 47.94 31.96 15.98 110 
38 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
39 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
40 53.3 42.64 31.98 21.32 21 21 
41 10.8 12 12 12 15 12 
42 10.5 15 15 15 15 15 
43 79.9 63.92 110 110 110 110 
44 53.3 42.64 31.98 21.32 21 21 
45 1.7 12 12 12 15 15 
46 79.9 110 110 110 110 110 
47 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
48 3.6 12 12 12 15 15 
49 22.6 21 13.56 21 21 21 
50 3.6 15 15 15 15 15 
51 1.6 1.28 0.96 110 110 110 
52 53.3 42.64 31.98 21.32 21 21 
53 79.9 63.92 110 110 110 110 
54 1.7 12 12 15 15 15 
55 10.5 12 12 12 12 15 
56 10.8 12 12 12 12 12 
57 22.6 21 21 21 21 21 
58 79.9 63.92 47.94 31.96 15.98 110 
59 11.9 13 18.164 21 21 21 
60 3.6 12 12 12 14.787 12 
61 79.9 110 47.94 31.96 110 0 
62 10.8 13.457 12 12 15 12 
Table E.10: ORAM results for trading scenario 4, final permit allocations to the farms. 
Final Permit Positions qfs (kg/ha/year) 
Farm f Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 90 90 90 90 90 
2 42 42 42 42 42 
3 90 90 90 90 90 
4 42 42 42 42 42 
5 90 90 90 90 90 
6 90 90 90 90 90 
7 110 110 110 110 110 
8 42 42 42 42 42 
9 42 42 42 42 42 
10 90 90 90 90 90 
11 90 90 90 90 90 
12 90 90 90 90 90 
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13 42 42 42 42 42 
14 90 90 90 90 90 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
16 21 21 21 21 21 
17 90 90 90 90 90 
18 42 42 42 42 42 
19 42 42 42 42 42 
20 42 42 42 42 42 
21 90 90 90 90 90 
22 15 15 15 15 15 
23 42 42 42 42 42 
24 42 42 42 42 42 
25 90 90 90 90 90 
26 110 110 110 110 110 
27 15 15 15 15 15 
28 90 90 90 90 90 
29 15 15 15 15 15 
30 21 21 21 21 41 
31 110 110 110 110 110 
32 21 21 21 21 21 
33 15 15 12 15 15 
34 21 21 21 21 41 
35 15 15 15 15 15 
36 15 15 15 15 15 
37 0 0 0 0 110 
38 15 15 15 15 15 
39 21 21 21 21 21 
40 21 21 21 21 21 
41 12 12 15 15 12 
42 42 42 42 42 42 
43 0 110 110 110 110 
44 21 21 21 21 21 
45 12 15 15 12 12 
46 110 110 110 110 110 
47 21 21 21 21 21 
48 15 12 12 15 15 
49 21 21 21 21 21 
50 15 15 15 15 15 
51 0 0 110 110 110 
52 21 21 21 21 21 
53 0 110 110 110 110 
54 15 12 12 15 15 
55 12 15 12 12 15 
56 12 15 15 12 12 
57 21 21 21 21 21 
58 0 0 0 0 110 
59 21 21 21 21 21 
60 12 14.678 15 12 12 
61 110 0 110 72.69 0 
62 14.868 12 15 13.842 12 
Table E.11: ORAM results for trading scenario 5, final permit allocation to the farms.  
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Receptor capacity prices and allocations  
Year t Price λ1t Total allocation, C1t−q
bank
1t (kg) 
2011 $1.00   4,408 
2012 $44.13 15,337 
2013 $29.17 27,528 
2014 $26.61 40,207 
2015 $29.28 51,750 
2016 $40.00 61,424 
2017-64 $25.00  
Table E.12: ORAM results for trading scenario 5, receptor capacity prices. 
E.3 ORAM with Multiple Banks 
This section is based on the Optimal Resource allocation Model (ORAM) discussed in 
Chapter 8, and available capacities calculated based on intensive land use prior to 
2010 (5th column of Table D.4). The regulator who possesses the currently available 
capacities, and a third party who has the ability to remove nitrates from the receptor, 
participate in the market as resource banks to sell receptor capacities.      
E.3.1 ORAM AMPL Formulation for Multiple Banks 
The following AMPL model is formulated assuming that the resource banks submit a 
single bid (offer) with a single (reservation) price, for each receptor capacity 
constraint.  
param numFarms=62; 
param numNodes=62; 
param numReceptors=1; 
param maxDelay=49; 
param permitLimit=5; 
param maxBids=5; 
param numBanks=2; 
 
set F=1..numFarms by 1; 
set N=1..numNodes by 1; 
set R=1..numReceptors by 1; 
set D=0..maxDelay by 1; 
set S=1..permitLimit by 1; 
set T=1..maxDelay+permitLimit by 1; 
set K=1..maxBids by 1; 
set B=1..numBanks by 1; 
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#~ Setting farm bids 
param bidType {f in F}; 
param farmArea {f in F}; 
param dairyBidQ {k in K}; 
param dairyBidP {k in K}; 
param sheepBidQ {k in K}; 
param sheepBidP {k in K}; 
param U {f in F,S,k in K} = farmArea[f]*(if bidType[f]=1 then dairyBidQ[k] else (if 
bidType[f]=2 then sheepBidQ[k] else 22)); #~Bid quantity 
param P {f in F,S,k in K}= if bidType[f]=1 then dairyBidP[k] else (if bidType[f]=2 
then sheepBidP[k] else 28.45);   #~Bid Price 
 
param H {N,R,D};  #~Response coefficient 
param C {R,T};  #~Receptor capacity 
 
#~ Setting bank bids 
param U_Bank {b in B, r in R, t in T} = if b=1 then C[r,t] else (if t<=5 then 75000 
else 0); 
param P_Bank {b in B, r in R, t in T}= if b=1 then (if t<=permitLimit then 1 else 25) 
else 30; 
 
var x {F,S,K}>=0;   #~Quantity accepted from each farm bid 
var x_Bank {B,R,T}>=0;  #~Quantity accepted from each bank bid 
var q {F,S};    #~final quantity for the farms 
var nodalQ {N,S};   #~nodal loading  
 
maximize benefit: sum {f in F} (sum {s in S}(sum {k in K}( x[f,s,k] * P[f,s,k]))) + 
sum {b in B} (sum {r in R} (sum {t in T} (x_Bank[b,r,t]*P_Bank[b,r,t]))); 
 
subject to uBound {f in F, s in S, k in K}: x[f,s,k] <= U[f,s,k]; 
subject to lBound {f in F, s in S, k in K}: x[f,s,k] >=0; 
subject to uBound_Reg {b in B, r in R, t in T}: x_Bank[b,r,t] <= U_Bank[b,r,t]; 
subject to lBound_Reg {b in B, r in R, t in T}: x_Bank[b,r,t] >=0; 
 
subject to farmPermit {f in F, s in S}: q[f,s] - sum{k in K} x[f,s,k] = 0; 
subject to nodalLoad {n in N, s in S}: nodalQ[n,s] - q[n,s] = 0;  #~Assuming one 
node for each farm 
subject to CapCons{r in R, t in T}: sum {n in N} (sum {s in max(1,t-
maxDelay)..min(t,permitLimit)}(H[n,r,t-s] * nodalQ[n,s])) + sum {b in B} 
(x_Bank [b,r,t]) = C[r,t] + if t<=5 then 75000 else 0; 
 
data Str_ORAM4.dat; 
solve; 
option display_round 3; 
display {f in F, s in S} q[f,s]/farmArea[f]; 
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display {b in B, r in R, t in T} x_Bank [b,r,t]; 
option display_round 2; 
display nodalLoad.dual; 
display CapCons.dual; 
E.3.2 ORAM with Multiple Banks Results 
Final Permit Positions qfs (kg/ha/year) 
Farm f Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 41 41 41 41 41 
2 15 15 15 15 15 
3 21 21 21 21 21 
4 15 15 15 15 15 
5 13 13 21 21 21 
6 41 41 41 41 41 
7 110 110 110 110 110 
8 15 15 15 15 15 
9 15 15 15 15 15 
10 90 90 90 90 90 
11 41 41 41 41 41 
12 41 41 41 41 41 
13 15 15 15 15 15 
14 60 90 90 90 90 
15 12 12 12 12 12 
16 13 13 13 0 0 
17 41 41 41 41 41 
18 15 15 15 15 15 
19 15 15 15 15 15 
20 15 15 15 15 15 
21 21 21 41 41 41 
22 12 15 15 15 15 
23 12 12 12 12 15 
24 15 15 15 15 15 
25 21 21 41 41 41 
26 0 0 110 110 110 
27 12 12 12 12 12 
28 21 21 41 41 41 
29 12 15 15 15 15 
30 13 21 21 21 21 
31 0 0 110 110 110 
32 0 0 13 21 21 
33 12 9 9 12 15 
34 0 13 21 21 41 
35 12 12 15 15 15 
36 15 15 15 15 15 
37 0 0 0 0 0 
38 12 15 15 15 15 
39 0 13 13 21 21 
40 13 13 0 0 0 
41 12 12 12 12 0 
42 15 15 15 15 15 
43 0 0 0 110 110 
44 0 0 0 21 21 
45 12 12 12 9 9 
46 0 0 110 110 110 
47 0 0 0 13 21 
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48 12 9 9 9 12 
49 13 0 0 0 0 
50 12 12 15 15 15 
51 0 0 0 110 110 
52 13 0 0 0 0 
53 0 0 0 110 110 
54 12 9 9 12 15 
55 12 12 9 2.925 12 
56 12 12 12 9 0 
57 0 0 0 0 21 
58 0 0 0 0 0 
59 13 13 0 0 0 
60 12 12 12 9 0 
61 0 0 0 0 0 
62 12 12 12 12 0 
Table E.13: ORAM results for trading scenario 6, final allocations to the farms.  
Receptor capacity prices Receptor capacity sales (kg)  
Year t Price λ1t Regulator 
Crt−q
bank
11t 
Supplier  
75000-q
bank
21t 
Total 
allocation 
2011 $30.00 0 2922 2922 
2012 $30.00 0 10114 10114 
2013 $30.00 0 16262 16262 
2014 $30.00 0 18832 18832 
2015 $30.00 1208 16675 17883 
2016 $133.57 17297 0 17297 
2017-64 $25.00    
Table E.14: ORAM results for trading scenario 6, capacity prices and allocations. 
Farm 
f 
Final permit 
position for 2011 
qfs (kg/ha/year) 
Farm 
f 
Final permit position 
for 2011 qfs 
(kg/ha/year) 
1 41 32 21 
2 15 33 15 
3 21 34 21 
4 15 35 15 
5 21 36 15 
6 41 37 0 
7 110 38 15 
8 15 39 21 
9 15 40 21 
10 90 41 15 
11 41 42 15 
12 41 43 110 
13 15 44 21 
14 90 45 15 
15 15 46 110 
16 21 47 21 
17 41 48 15 
18 15 49 21 
19 15 50 15 
20 15 51 110 
21 41 52 21 
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22 15 53 110 
23 15 54 15 
24 15 55 15 
25 41 56 15 
26 110 57 21 
27 15 58 0 
28 41 59 21 
29 15 60 15 
30 21 61 0 
31 110 62 15 
Table E.15: ORAM results for trading scenario 7, final permit positions for the farms. 
Receptor capacity prices Ex-post (unsold) capacity 
positions (kg) 
Total allocation 
to the farms 
(kg) Year t Price λ1t Regulator 
q
bank
11t 
Supplier 
q
bank
21t 
2011 $30.00 0 70736 4264 
2012 $30.00 0 63938 11062 
2013 $30.00 0 63745 11255 
2014 $30.00 0 63637 11363 
2015 $30.00 0 63923 12285 
2016-64 $25.00    
Table E.16: ORAM results for trading scenario 7, capacity prices and allocations. 
E.4 Initial Distribution of Permits 
The results presented in this section were also produced from the ORAM, but in 
calculating the financial flows, we assume that the farms possess initial permit 
holdings, based on their prior land uses. The available capacities are based on 
sustainable prior land use (4th column of Table D.4).   
Farm 
f 
Total payment 
∑sβns×(qfs−Q*fs) 
Year 
t 
Capacity 
price λrt 
Regulator‘s 
final 
position 
q
bank
1t 
Regulator‘s 
initial position 
Q
Bank*
1t (kg) 
Regulator‘s revenue 
λrt×(Q
Bank*
1t− q
bank
1t) 
1 $158,552.30 2011 $1.00 1962 2308 $346.71 
2 $34,955.55 2012 $45.14 0 953 $43,026.55 
3 -$241,290.67 2013 $20.94 0 583 $12,198.39 
4 $150,101.72 2014 $35.00 0 510 $17,836.70 
5 -$17,911.23 2015 $19.73 0 332 $6,555.69 
6 $265,857.89 2016 $40.00 3283 3918 $25,395.32 
7 $1,329,092.20 2017 $25.00 9108 14038 $123,261.10 
8 $20,705.78 2018 $25.00 16375 26263 $247,213.98 
9 $51,138.68 2019 $25.00 25283 38689 $335,132.15 
10 $180,080.55 2020 $25.00 34461 50104 $391,054.43 
11 $276,133.35 2021 $25.00 43429 60257 $420,715.10 
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12 $301,566.04 2022 $25.00 51778 69100 $433,047.43 
13 $224,298.11 2023 $25.00 59033 76307 $431,854.43 
14 $310,984.56 2024 $25.00 65614 82232 $415,457.35 
15 $204,225.80 2025 $25.00 71958 87329 $384,276.28 
16 -$83,776.95 2026 $25.00 78027 91702 $341,869.55 
17 -$82,999.63 2027 $25.00 83646 95474 $295,693.98 
18 $53,673.52 2028 $25.00 88723 98765 $251,039.58 
19 $89,978.18 2029 $25.00 93153 101590 $210,926.98 
20 $37,695.43 2030 $25.00 97011 104091 $176,985.65 
21 $198,360.05 2031 $25.00 100309 106256 $148,691.63 
22 $67,878.86 2032 $25.00 103094 108114 $125,493.65 
23 $485,614.58 2033 $25.00 105560 109788 $105,702.75 
24 $31,748.30 2034 $25.00 107699 111244 $88,617.27 
25 $188,275.92 2035 $25.00 109573 112511 $73,443.50 
26 $157,508.90 2036 $25.00 111207 113621 $60,359.25 
27 $369,494.55 2037 $25.00 112635 114596 $49,033.40 
28 $105,906.24 2038 $25.00 113849 115428 $39,465.18 
29 $178,779.07 2039 $25.00 114963 116220 $31,438.53 
30 -$148,331.34 2040 $25.00 115809 116816 $25,173.17 
31 $234,709.58 2041 $25.00 116617 117422 $20,108.05 
32 -$331,263.79 2042 $25.00 117229 117875 $16,132.73 
33 $42,955.66 2043 $25.00 117816 118338 $13,047.42 
34 $332,327.39 2044 $25.00 118235 118669 $10,851.38 
35 $31,326.39 2045 $25.00 118640 119008 $9,190.37 
36 $24,950.43 2046 $25.00 118934 119257 $8,091.30 
37 -$140,157.19 2047 $25.00 119216 119503 $7,157.85 
38 $54,530.66 2048 $25.00 119420 119682 $6,541.22 
39 -$14,445.78 2049 $25.00 119619 119858 $5,973.05 
40 -$307,865.79 2050 $25.00 119760 119979 $5,472.65 
41 $70,735.12 2051 $25.00 119890 120092 $5,042.75 
42 $37,860.95 2052 $25.00 120001 120188 $4,670.05 
43 $14,320.66 2053 $25.00 120083 120256 $4,320.50 
44 -$440,530.57 2054 $25.00 120167 120323 $3,896.67 
45 $69,477.59 2055 $25.00 120232 120372 $3,509.97 
46 $156,680.22 2056 $25.00 120291 120419 $3,201.93 
47 -$6,370.10 2057 $25.00 120337 120453 $2,896.98 
48 $142,312.24 2058 $25.00 120385 120489 $2,606.50 
49 -$29,327.21 2059 $25.00 120417 120513 $2,405.45 
50 $36,983.84 2060 $25.00 120448 120535 $2,163.83 
51 $425,099.65 2061 $25.00 120537 120602 $1,620.32 
52 -$493,453.34 2062 $25.00 120571 120617 $1,157.45 
53 $292,095.22 2063 $25.00 120599 120628 $727.75 
54 $103,982.59 2064 $25.00 120624 120638 $341.95 
55 $29,925.98  Total    $5,452,434 
56 $42,271.14  
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57 -$21,593.99 
58 -$345,311.53 
59 $204,994.66 
60 $295,363.16 
61 -$33,520.52 
62 $74,647.85 
Total $5,452,007 
Table E.17: ORAM results for scenario 8, receptor capacity prices and calculated 
fanatical flows. QBank*1t  = fsf
St
Dts frtt
QHC *
),min(
),1max(1    . 
E.5 Point and Nonpoint Source Trading 
This section presents the results for point and nonpoint source trading, based on the 
ORAM. The available capacities are based on sustainable prior land use (4th column 
of Table D.4).  To compare the allocations between point and nonpoint sources, the 
farm allocations are given in total kg/year rather than in kg/ha/year.  
Final Permit Positions qfs (kg/year) 
Farm f Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
2 375 375 375 375 375 
3 1312 1312 1312 1312 1312 
4 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 
5 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 
6 4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 
7 12375 12375 12375 12375 12375 
8 562 562 562 562 562 
9 562 562 562 562 562 
10 15188 15188 15188 15188 15188 
11 2306 2306 2306 2306 2306 
12 3588 3588 3588 3588 3588 
13 2531 2531 2531 2531 2531 
14 5062 5062 5062 5062 5062 
15 4969 4969 4969 4969 4969 
16 13781 13781 13781 13781 13781 
17 2562 2562 2562 2562 2562 
18 656 656 656 656 656 
19 938 938 938 938 938 
20 938 938 938 938 938 
21 1312 2562 2562 2562 2562 
22 1688 1688 1688 1688 1688 
23 4875 4875 4875 4875 4875 
24 844 844 844 844 844 
25 2100 4100 4100 4100 4100 
26 4125 4125 4125 4125 4125 
27 3562 3562 3562 3562 3562 
28 1181 2306 2306 2306 2306 
29 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 
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30 919 919 919 919 919 
31 6188 6188 6188 6188 6188 
32 1706 1706 1706 1706 1706 
33 1031 1031 1031 1031 1031 
34 3150 3150 3150 3150 6150 
35 750 750 750 750 750 
36 656 656 656 656 656 
37 0 2505 3230 0 4125 
38 562 562 562 562 562 
39 2494 2494 2494 2494 2494 
40 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 
41 1826 2062 2062 2062 1650 
42 938 938 938 938 938 
43 0 1375 1375 1375 1375 
44 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 
45 450 562 562 562 562 
46 4125 4125 4125 4125 4125 
47 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 
48 1312 1312 1312 1312 1312 
49 4725 4725 4725 4725 4725 
50 375 375 375 375 375 
51 0 4125 4125 4125 4125 
52 2362 2362 2362 2362 2362 
53 7562 7562 7562 7562 7562 
54 844 844 844 844 844 
55 750 750 750 600 750 
56 1050 1312 1312 1312 1050 
57 3544 3544 3544 3544 3544 
58 3838 0 0 0 6188 
59 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 
60 2325 2906 2906 2906 2325 
61 688 0 0 688 0 
62 1969 1969 1969 1969 1575 
PS 1962 0 0 0 0 
Table E.18: ORAM results for point and nonpoint source trading (scenario 9), final 
allocations. 
Receptor capacity prices and allocations  
Year t Price λ1t 
2011 $5.00 
2012 $43.36 
2013 $21.43 
2014 $34.82 
2015 $19.78 
2016 $40.00 
2017-64 $25.00 
Table E.19: ORAM results for point and nonpoint source trading (scenario 9), 
receptor capacity prices. 
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Final Permit Positions qfs (kg/year) 
Farm f Permit year s 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
2 375 375 375 375 375 
3 1312 1312 1312 1312 1312 
4 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 
5 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 
6 4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 
7 12375 12375 12375 12375 12375 
8 562 562 562 562 562 
9 562 562 562 562 562 
10 15188 15188 15188 15188 15188 
11 2306 2306 2306 2306 2306 
12 3588 3588 3588 3588 3588 
13 2531 2531 2531 2531 2531 
14 5062 5062 5062 5062 5062 
15 3975 3975 4969 4969 4969 
16 8531 8531 13781 13781 13781 
17 2562 2562 2562 2562 2562 
18 656 656 656 656 656 
19 938 938 938 938 938 
20 938 938 938 938 938 
21 1312 2562 2562 2562 2562 
22 1688 1688 1688 1688 1688 
23 3900 4875 4875 4875 4875 
24 844 844 844 844 844 
25 2100 4100 4100 4100 4100 
26 4125 4125 4125 4125 4125 
27 2850 2850 3562 3562 3562 
28 1181 2306 2306 2306 2306 
29 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 
30 919 919 919 919 919 
31 6188 6188 6188 6188 6188 
32 1706 1706 1706 1706 1706 
33 825 825 825 1031 1031 
34 3150 3150 3150 3150 6150 
35 750 750 750 750 750 
36 656 656 656 656 656 
37 0 0 0 0 4125 
38 562 562 562 562 562 
39 2494 2494 2494 2494 2494 
40 894 894 1444 1444 1444 
41 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
42 938 938 938 938 938 
43 0 1375 1375 1375 1375 
44 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 
45 450 450 450 450 450 
46 4125 4125 4125 4125 4125 
47 650 1050 1050 1050 1050 
48 1050 1050 1050 1312 1312 
49 2925 2925 4432 4725 4725 
50 375 375 375 375 375 
51 0 0 4125 4125 4125 
52 1462 1462 2362 2362 2362 
53 0 7562 7562 7562 7562 
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54 675 675 675 844 844 
55 600 600 600 600 750 
56 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 
57 2194 3544 3544 3544 3544 
58 0 0 0 0 6188 
59 1950 1950 3150 3150 3150 
60 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325 
61 0 0 0 0 0 
62 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 
PS 3458 4594 7764 10000 10106 
Table E.20: ORAM results for point and nonpoint source trading (scenario 10), final 
allocations. 
Receptor capacity prices and allocations  
Year t Price λ1t 
2011 $50.00 
2012 $50.00 
2013 $40.00 
2014 $34.03 
2015 $30.00 
2016 $40.00 
2017-64 $25.00 
Table E.21: ORAM results for point and nonpoint source trading (scenario 10), 
receptor capacity prices. 
Final Permit Positions for 2011 qfs (kg/year) 
Farm f PS and NPS trading NPS trading 
1 2050 2050 
2 375 375 
3 1312 1312 
4 1594 1594 
5 3150 3150 
6 4869 4869 
7 12375 12375 
8 562 562 
9 562 562 
10 15188 15188 
11 2306 2306 
12 3588 3588 
13 2531 2531 
14 5062 5062 
15 4969 4969 
16 13781 22841 
17 2562 2562 
18 656 656 
19 938 938 
20 938 938 
21 1312 1312 
22 1688 1688 
23 4875 4875 
24 844 844 
25 2100 2100 
26 4125 4125 
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27 3562 3562 
28 1181 1181 
29 1594 1594 
30 919 919 
31 6188 6188 
32 1706 1706 
33 1031 1031 
34 3150 3150 
35 750 750 
36 656 656 
37 4125 4125 
38 562 562 
39 2494 2494 
40 1444 1444 
41 1650 2062 
42 938 938 
43 0 0 
44 2231 2231 
45 562 562 
46 4125 4125 
47 1050 1050 
48 1312 1312 
49 4725 9225 
50 375 375 
51 0 0 
52 2362 2362 
53 7562 7562 
54 844 844 
55 750 750 
56 1312 1312 
57 3544 3544 
58 6188 6188 
59 3150 3150 
60 2906 2906 
61 0 688 
62 1575 1969 
PS 2276 - 
Table E.22: ORAM results for point and nonpoint source trading (scenario 11), final 
allocations. 
E.6 Market Competitiveness 
This section demonstrates the measures of market competitiveness discussed in 
Chapter 11 of the main thesis. We present the calculated values of the proposed 
measures based on the catchment example discussed in Appendix D. 
Year HHI
M
Rt Year HHI
M
Rt 
2011 0.14 2036 0.11 
2012 0.08 2037 0.12 
2013 0.05 2038 0.14 
2014 0.04 2039 0.15 
2015 0.03 2040 0.17 
283 
 
 
 
2016 0.03 2041 0.19 
2017 0.03 2042 0.21 
2018 0.03 2043 0.23 
2019 0.03 2044 0.25 
2020 0.03 2045 0.26 
2021 0.03 2046 0.29 
2022 0.04 2047 0.31 
2023 0.04 2048 0.32 
2024 0.04 2049 0.33 
2025 0.04 2050 0.36 
2026 0.05 2051 0.39 
2027 0.05 2052 0.39 
2028 0.06 2053 0.40 
2029 0.06 2054 0.43 
2030 0.07 2055 0.46 
2031 0.08 2056 0.49 
2032 0.08 2057 0.49 
2033 0.09 2058 0.52 
2034 0.10 2059 0.54 
2035 0.10 2060 0.56 
Table E.23: Calculated values of HHIMRt.  
Contiguity index  
 S=1 S=5 
Pair-wise CI 
1,2 0.92 0.92 
17,19 0.95 0.96 
8,42 0.94 0.95 
46,50 0.99 1.00 
35,53 0.97 0.98 
CI for all 62 farms 0.33 0.39 
CI for sets of farms 
1-10 0.49 0.52 
1-20 0.48 0.51 
21-30 0.64 0.67 
31-40 0.53 0.60 
41-50 0.41 0.50 
46-55 0.44 0.55 
50-62 0.37 0.49 
Table E.24: Calculated values of the Contiguity Index (CI).  
 
 
 
 
 
